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Chapter 1
Introduction
The study of oligopoly has a long tradition in economic thought and has stayed up
to now a major field which is relevant for both theoretical and practical issues. Many
theories of oligopoly developed in the last century have become a framework for the
analysis of models in different fields of economics and are used in antitrust and regu-
latory issues. In this preface I want to give short treatise of the history of oligopoly
theory and after that present a summary of the three chapters of the thesis and how
they relate to and differ from the existing literature.1
The term oligopoly goes back to the year 1516 where the British humanist and
political scientist Sir Thomas More coined the term in his Utopia. He noted that
prices need not fall only because there is more than one supplier.2 But after More’s
work it took more than 300 years before Cournot (1838) provided a first formal theory
of oligopoly. Probably the reason why no progress could be made in the mean time
was, as Schumpeter (1954) noted, that, ”as we leave the case of pure monopoly, fac-
tors assert themselves that are absent in this case and vanish again as we approach
pure competition,” thus ”the unbroken line from monopoly to competition is a treach-
erous guide.”3 In a modern terminology this is the problem of strategic interaction.
1Nevertheless all chapters can be read independently because a motivation and summary is given
in the introduction to each chapter as well.
2A reference on More can be found in Schumpeter (1954), p. 305.
3See Schumpeter (1954), p.981.
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Cournot (1838) presented a model where firms compete in quantities and prices are
determined by the interplay of supply and demand. He presents a solution concept
which is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium (Nash (1950)). The results of his analysis
are that prices are above marginal costs and firms earn positive profits but this profits
fall as the number of firms in the market increase. This results are quite intuitive and
realistic. But one natural objection against Cournot’s model (1838) is that in practice
businesses choose prices rather than quantities. But it took 50 years before economists
get aware of Cournot’s work and Bertrand (1883) brought forward the above criticism.
He proposed a model with two similar firms competing in prices where both firms
have constant marginal costs. Bertrand (1883) pointed out that each firm has a strong
incentive to undercut the other’s price to capture the whole demand. In equilibrium
prices equal marginal costs and firms earn zero profits. This result became famous as
the ”Bertrand-Paradoxon” because two firms are enough to get the same outcome as
under perfect competition. So economists faced the dilemma that with the strange
assumption of quantities as strategic variables we get a realistic result but with the
reasonable assumption of prices as strategic variables the result is utterly unrealistic.
But for the Bertrand result to hold many crucial assumptions have to be satisfied,
among others, that marginal costs are constant, that firms compete only in a one-
shot game, and perhaps the most unnatural one that products are homogeneous and
therefore perfect substitutes. Addressing the first point, Edgeworth (1925) presented
an analysis where firms face capacity constraints, i.e. an extreme form of decreasing
returns to scale, and proved the non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.4
Later Levitan & Shubik (1972) showed that an equilibrium in mixed strategies exists
but pointed out that it is very hard to interpret a mixed strategy equilibrim in prices.5
For the second critique to the Bertrand model, namely that the result only holds in
a one-shot game, it took almost one hundred years until the first formal models of
dynamic price competition were provided. The reason is that non-cooperative game
theory made rapid progress only in the 1970’s and 1980’s. This holds especially in the
4This result became known in oligopoly theory as Edgeworth cycle.
5See also Dasgupta & Maskin (1986).
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area of repeated games under asymmetric information which is the appropriate tool to
study dynamic price competition.6 The general result of this literature is that prices
above marginal costs can be sustained if firms’ discount factors are high enough.7 The
underlying idea is that it does not pay for a firm to undercut its competitor’s price
today because this triggers a punishment in the following periods. This behaviour
is called tacit collusion.8 Empirical studies, e.g. Porter (1983) or Rees (1993), also
seem to confirm the intuition that firms in real world markets engage heavily in tacit
collusion.
Let us now turn to the third and perhaps most serious critique on Bertrand’s
model, namely that products are assumed to be perfect substitutes. In this case a
firm can capture the entire market by slightly undercutting the other’s price. This is
obviously an unrealistic assumption because there is basically always some degree of
heterogeneity between goods. The literature on heterogeneity of goods is subsumed
under the generic term ”product differentiation” and has two branches, the ”non-
address” branch and the ”address” branch,9 where the latter was the more successful
one.10 The non-address approach started with Chamberlin’s book (1933), ”the theory
of monopolistic competition”, in which he tried to explain unexploited scale economies.
He analyses a model where firms produce differentiated products and where the degree
of competition between each firm is the same. This gave rise to the critique of Kaldor
(1935) who argues that each firm has competitors producing similar products and
others producing distinct products and that competition between similar products
6For the theoretical foundations of the analysis of repeated games used in Industrial Organisation
see Abreu (1988), Farrell & Maskin (1986), Fudenberg & Maskin (1986), and the references in Shapiro
(1989).
7The most influential papers in dynamic price competition are Green & Porter (1984), Rotemberg
& Saloner (1986) and the three papers by Maskin & Tirole (1987,1988,1988).
8The idea that it is the obvious choice for oligopolists to collude was already emphasized by
Bertrand (1883).
9For a longer discussion on this classification see Eaton & Lipsey (1989).
10The name ”address approach” stems from Hotelling’s (1929) idea that consumers are located on
a position on the main street of a linear city. In the non-address approach consumers are described
by some characteristics but not by a location.
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should bear the main effect of change in a firm’s behaviour. So Kaldor (1935) in some
sense proposed the address approach as the more realistic one and his argumentation
was widely accepted.11
The address approach started with the famous seminal paper of Hotelling (1929).
He assumes that each consumer is described by her preference which is expressed
through her location on a line. Two competing firms are located on the line as well
and if a consumer’s distance to firm 1 is shorter than her distance to firm 2 she prefers
firm 1’s product. Hotelling shows that the higher consumers’ ”transportation costs”,
i.e. consumers’ disutility from not consuming her ideal product, the higher profits of
both firms. So by relaxing the assumption of homogeneous goods one gets a model with
prices as strategic variables and firms earning positive profits. Hotelling’s model was
developed further in many respects.12 Since the new developments in non-cooperative
game theory the model came under scrutiny of many economists. Hotelling assumed
that the transportation cost function is linear in the distance between the location of
a consumer and a firm. But d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, & Thisse (1979) showed that if
firms’ locations are endogenous with such a formulation an equilibrium might not exist
because profit functions are discontinuous and non concave. Instead they came up with
a quadratic transportation cost function which is now common. They also show that
firms position themselves at the opposite ends of the line to minimize price competition.
Salop (1979) considers a model where consumers are distributed on a circle instead of
a line. With this formulation he allows entry of more than two firms. Irmen & Thisse
(1998) consider competition in not only one but in many characteristics and show that
firms choose maximal differentiation in the most important characteristic and minimal
differentiation in all others.
The model also serves as a building block in many papers which analyse different
aspects of competition. Examples are Judd (1985) who used the model to look at the
case of product proliferation to deter entry and Keller & Rady (2003) who analyse a
11For an extensive discussion of the non-address approach see Anderson, de Palma, & Thisse (1992).
12For examle a famous new development was made by Lancaster (1966) who builds a model in
which consumers’ preferences are defined over characteristics which are embodied in the goods.
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dynamic game with firms learning about the degree of product differentiation.
Chapters two, three, and four of this thesis all relate in one or the other way to
this model of product differentiation. Each of the three chapters analyses a different
problem of pricing behaviour in oligopoly. The second analyses commodity bundling,
the third two-sided markets with negative externalities and the fourth quality differ-
entiation and market entry. In what follows I summarise each chapter and point out
the important results and the differences to the existing literature.
In the second chapter, ”The Effects of Product Bundling in Duopoly”, a
duopoly model is analysed where both firms sell two goods. These goods can be sold
either only independently (independent pricing) or independently and in a package
consisting of both goods at some discount (mixed bundling).13 In the economics liter-
ature starting with the seminal paper by Adams & Yellen (1976) bundling for a long
time has been seen as a price discrimination device for monopolists. Whether mixed
bundling raises a monopolist’s profit depends on the correlation of consumers’ reser-
vation values for the two goods. If this correlation is negative, i.e. there exists many
consumers with high valuation for good A but low valuation for good B and vice versa
(extreme preferences), mixed bundling is more profitable than independent pricing.
This result was shown by Adams & Yellen (1976) in some examples and was gener-
alised by Schmalensee (1984) to a joint normal distribution and by McAfee, McMillan,
& Whinston (1989) to general distribution functions. The intuition behind this result
is the following. If correlation is negative there are many consumers with extreme
preferences. The monopolist charges high independent prices and these consumers buy
only the good for which they have a high valuation. Yet, there are some consumers
with middle range valuations for both goods and they buy the bundle. Thus with the
instrument of the bundle the monopolist can sort its consumers into three categories
instead of only two and can extract more consumer rent. This is especially profitable
13There are many examples of this practice. Electronic companies sell stereo systems consisting of
CD-player and receiver at a low price. In the USA long distance telephone companies sell internet
access together with long distance service. This package is cheaper than if both services are bought
independently.
6
with negative correlation because of the consumers with different valuations for both
goods. Those do not exist under positive correlation.
Now let us look at the duopoly situation. Firms compete for consumers with the
help of the bundle. So in addition to the sorting effect there is a business-stealing effect
which lowers profits. Whether mixed bundling is profitable depends on which effect is
dominant.
In my model both firms’ products are maximally differentiated on two circles a la
Salop (1979). The correlation of consumers’ valuations can be expressed through their
location on both circles. If many consumers are located near the same firm on both
circles they have higher valuations for both goods of that firm than for the goods of the
other firm and correlation is positive. If there are many consumers who are located on
circle A near firm 1 but on circle B near firm 2 and vice versa, correlation is negative.
First let us look at the case of positive correlation. In this case firms can act in
some sense as local monopolists because only few consumers are undecided between
both firms. So it does not pay to lower prices much in order to get these consumers
at the margin. The sorting effect of bundling dominates the business stealing effect
and profits are higher than without the ability to bundle. Thus the consequences are
similar to the ones in the monopoly case.
If correlation is negative the situation is completely different and bundling lowers
profits. The intuition is the following. If we look only at the bundle many consumers
are indifferent between the bundle of firm 1 and firm 2. Thus by undercutting the
competitor’s bundle price a firm can capture many new consumers. This results in
harsh competition and low bundle prices. But this affects the independent prices as
well and profits are lower than without the ability to bundle. Firms are in a prisoner’s
dilemma. The business-stealing effect dominates the sorting effect. The results are ex-
actly opposite to the monopoly case where negative correlation renders mixed bundling
profitable.
Concerning welfare I can show that bundling reduces welfare. The reason is that the
bundle price is cheaper than the sum of the independent prices. This induces consumers
to buy the bundle although they may prefer the goods of different firms. I also analyse
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the consequences of endogenous firm location. In choosing their locations on the circles
firms influence consumers’ reservation price correlation. Thus firms try to avoid strong
negative correlation. They achieve this by choosing maximal differentiation in the good
with the higher transportation costs and minimal differentiation in the good with the
lower transportation costs. Thus they forego profits with the second product to avoid
the negative consequences arising from additional competition in the bundle.14
The literature on commodity bundling in a duopolistic framework is up to now
mainly concerned with bundling as strategic foreclosure and entry deterrence. The
main question is if a monopolist in one market can monopolise a second market with
the help of bundling. This is modelled in different ways by Choi (1996), Nalebuff (2004),
and Whinston (1990). Exceptions are the papers by Anderson & Leruth (1992) and
Matutes & Regibeau (1993) who analyse duopolistic competition in both goods as in
my model. They get the result that a prisoners’ dilemma will always arise. But they
are not concerned with the consequences of different correlations of reservation prices.
I show that this correlation is the driving force for the results in duopoly as well as in
monopoly but has completely different effects in duopoly as compared to monopoly.
The third chapter analyses ”Two-Sided Markets with Negative Externali-
ties”. The term ”two-sided market” is a relatively new one in economics and is, to my
best knowledge, coined by Rochet & Tirole in an early draft of their 2003 paper ”Plat-
form Competition in Two-Sided Markets”. It refers to a market where two distinct
sides are present interacting with each other on a common platform. The platform’s
problem now is to ”get both sides on board”. The real world examples inspiring these
literature usually are markets where both sides exert positive externalities on each
other.15 These markets have been studied extensively by Rochet & Tirole (2003) and
Wright (2003,2004).
14Such firm behaviour can be observed by US telephone companies where the long distance offer
in each package is very similar while firms try to differentiate themselves a lot in the offer of internet
access.
15An example is the market for credit cards. Card holders value their cards only to the extent that
the cards are accepted by merchants and merchants benefit from widespread diffusion of cards they
accept.
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In chapter three I analyse a model where one side causes a negative externality on
the other. A prominent example for such an industry are the media. Platforms are
e.g. radio stations or internet portals, one side are listeners or users and the other side
are advertisers. Users dislike advertising and spend less time to consume platform’s
services if there are many commercials.16 By contrast, advertisers wish to gain users’
attention to tempt them to buy their products. So users exert a positive externality on
advertisers while advertisers cause a negative externality on users. I study a model in
which two platforms compete for advertisers and users. In the basic model platforms
can only charge advertisers because it is either impossible to set a user fee (like in
case of radio stations) or it is not customary to do so (like in the case of internet
portals). From the users’ point of view platforms are differentiated a la Hotelling while
advertisers have no special preference for one of the platforms. Both sides decide for
only one platform.17
First take a look at the efficient outcome. If the gains from trading advertisers’
goods are high compared to users’ utility loss from advertising all advertisers should
advertise while some should be excluded if users’ utility loss is comparatively high.
The optimal allocation of advertisers among platforms is even. The reason is that if
one platform has more advertisers the externality on its users is high and the overall
externality can be reduced if some advertisers switch to the other platform.
Comparing the efficient outcome with the Nash equilibrium of the game I find that
there can be too much or too little advertising. The intuition behind this is the follow-
ing. An additional commercial on a platform causes a negative externality directly on
16The assumption that users are disturbed by advertising is strongly confirmed in the literature.
See Bagwell (2003) for an overview.
17This is a realistic assumption with regard to users who usually use only one platform to do
e-mailing or listen to only one radio station at a time. Advertisers instead can advertise on both
platforms which is not possible in my model. But this is not crucial to the results because the only
thing which matters is that a change in the price of platform 1 changes the number of advertisers on
platform 2. So one gets the same result with the assumption that advertisers are ”multi-homing”(can
advertise on both platforms) but have only a certain budget for advertising expenditures where the
last unit can either be spend on one or the other platform.
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the users but indirectly on all other advertisers as well because users spend less time
on a platform and some switch to the other platform. In their pricing behaviour plat-
forms consider only the indirect externality on advertisers because they cannot charge
users. If differentiation between platforms is small many users switch to platform 1 if
platform 2 broadcasts many advertisements. This results in high prices for advertising
and too little advertising. If differentiation is high advertising prices are low and there
is too much advertising.
Platforms’ profits depend on the level of differentiation as well. But contrary to
standard results in my model a higher level of differentiation can lead to lower profits.
This is the case if differentiation is relatively high. The reason is that in this case
platforms want to attract many advertisers and set low prices. But since both platforms
do so advertising levels stay the same and profits fall. This shows that in a two-
sided market a lower level of competition on one side can increase competition on the
other side and lead to lower profits. If differentiation is relatively small an increase in
differentiation raises profits because more firms advertise.18
I also analyse the case if platforms can set a user charge. I show that if this user
charge is positive in equilibrium profits always increase. But dependent on parameters
it is well possible that the user charge is negative in equilibrium. Platforms subsidise
users to make higher profits on advertisers. If this is the case profits are lower and the
additional instrument of a user charge hurts platforms.
Nevertheless the equilibrium with two instruments is efficient. The intuition is that
platforms have two instruments for two groups and competition induces them to use
the instruments efficiently.
Recently several papers dealt with media competition and advertising.19 The ones
closest to my model are Anderson & Coate (2003) and Kind, Nilssen & Sorgard (2003).
I replicate the result of their papers that there can be too much or too little advertising.
The big difference to my model is that they only consider competition for users but not
18In Section 3.5 I present an example of a such pricing behaviour by the internet portals AOL and
GMX.
19See Section 3.1 for an overview of this papers.
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for advertisers while in my model platforms compete for both sides of the market. Thus
the result that profits can fall with an increase in differentiation cannot be generated
in their model. Kind, Nilssen & Sorgard (2003) do also not analyse the case where a
platform can set a user charge. Anderson & Coate (2003) briefly analyse this possibility
but obtain different results to my model because in their model platforms decide in
addition whether they want to provide the same or different contents.
In contrast to the first two chapters which analyse models of horizontal product
differentiation the fourth chapter deals with ”Vertical Product Differentiation,
Market Entry, and Welfare”. In models of horizontal product differentiation con-
sumers have different preferences for the goods. By contrast, in a model of vertical
product differentiation everyone agrees on the most preferred good, e.g. because it is
of superior quality. The pioneering papers in this field are Gabszewicz & Thisse (1979)
and Shaked & Sutton (1982). In both models consumers differ in their income levels
and in equilibrium consumers with higher income buy the high quality good at a high
price while consumers with a lower income buy the low quality good at a lower price.
Shaked & Sutton (1982) show that ex-ante similar firms choose different qualities to
relax price competition.
In chapter four I compare two duopoly models with respect to welfare. In one model
firms can produce only one quality level while in the other model they can produce
a whole quality range and engage in second-degree price discrimination. Both models
have a leader-follower game structure. The leading firm (incumbent) chooses a quality
or a quality range in the first stage to which it is committed for the rest of the game.
After observing this choice the follower (entrant) decides whether it wants to enter the
market at some fixed entry costs. If it enters it chooses its quality or quality range.20
In the third stage firms set their prices depending on the chosen quality levels.
First consider the case where each firm produces only one quality. The incumbent
has an incentive to deter entry if its monopoly profit (given entry deterring quality)
is higher than the duopoly profit. The way entry can be deterred depends on the
20It is assumed that it is profitable for the leader to be the high quality firm. So in equilibrium the
entrant always produces a lower quality or quality range than the incumbent.
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strategic relation between the two qualities, e.g. if they are strategic complements
or strategic substitutes. If qualities are strategic complements welfare in the case of
entry deterrence is lower than in the case of pure monopoly. The intuition is that
the incumbent produces a lower quality than in monopoly to induce the entrant to
produce a lower quality as well which reduces the entrant’s profit. If fixed costs are
high the entrant stays out of the market. But since quality is lower welfare is reduced.
If qualities are strategic substitutes the reverse is true.
Even in the case where entry is accommodated the incumbent might lower its quality
as compared to monopoly. This is the case if production costs of quality are high. The
reason is that due to competition it is harder for the incumbent to extract consumer
rent, inducing it to produce lower quality. If costs are low it produces higher quality
to reach a higher level of differentiation in order to reduce price competition. In this
case welfare increases.21
If firms can produce a quality range and engage in second-degree price discrimi-
nation results are different. I show that the lowest quality of the incumbent and the
highest quality of the entrant are strategic complements. Thus if the incumbent wants
to deter entry he has to expand its quality range which leads to an increase in wel-
fare. So the result is quite different to the one-quality model where welfare in case of
entry deterrence can be lower than in monopoly. If entry is accommodated I find that
consumer rent unambiguously increases. The reason is that competition leads to lower
prices. By contrast, the consequences for welfare are not clear. The intuition is that
the incumbent might contract its quality range to avoid fierce price competition. There
is a gap between the two quality ranges of the firms. More consumers are served but
some consumers buy lower quality than in monopoly. The welfare effects are therefore
ambiguous.22
Concerning the related literature on product differentiation and entry Donnenfeld
21I provide two examples of such firm behaviour from different industries, namely the pharmaceutical
industry and the cosmetic industry.
22Again, I give two examples for such firm behaviour, one from the airline industry and the other,
again, from the pharmaceutical industry.
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& Weber (1992,1995) in two papers analyse a situation with two incumbents and one
potential entrant, but neither do they provide a welfare analysis nor are they interested
in price discrimination. A paper which is very close to my quality range model is the one
by Champsaur & Rochet (1989). They analyse a model of simultaneous quality choice.
My analysis in some respects draws heavily on theirs. The difference is that in my
model firms choose their quality ranges sequentially which gives rise to the question
of entry deterrence and that I am mainly interested in the welfare consequences of
potential competition while they only look at a pure duopoly situation and do not give
a welfare analysis.
I conclude the work with some remarks on the limitations of the models and give
an outlook on how they can be interrelated.
Chapter 2
The Effects of Product Bundling in
Duopoly
2.1 Introduction
Product bundling refers to the practice of selling two or more goods together in a
package at a price which is below the sum of the independent prices. This practice can
be observed very often in the real world. For example in the USA internet access is
sold by long distance telephone companies. If a consumer buys internet access and long
distance service together from the same company this is cheaper than if he buys both
services independently. Another well known example is the selling of stereo systems.
Big electronic companies always supply a package consisting of CD-player, stereo deck
and receiver which is sold at a low price. There are many other examples of bundling in
big department stores or cultural organisations, e.g. theaters and concert halls always
offer season tickets.
In the industrial organisation literature bundling has been extensively studied for
monopolists and it is shown that mixed bundling, that is selling the goods individually
and bundled together in a package, will in general increase the monopolist’s profit.23
However, the industry structure in the examples above is clearly not monopolistic.
23See Varian (1989) for an overview.
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This shows that there is a need to examine bundling in oligopolistic or competitive
markets. The objective of this paper is to analyse, how the ability to bundle affects
profits and consumer rents in a duopolistic market structure.
It is shown that duopolists generically have an incentive to use mixed bundling,
but the consequences on profits are ambiguous. If consumers are homogeneous, i.e.
correlation of their reservation prices is positive, firms are better off with bundling.
If instead consumers are heterogeneous, i.e. their reservation values are negatively
correlated, profits are lower than without bundling. This is in sharp contrast to the
monopoly case, where bundling raises the monopolist’s profit, especially if consumers
are heterogeneous.
The intuition behind this result is the following. First look at the monopoly case. If
correlation of reservation values is negative there exist many consumers with extreme
preferences, that means with a high valuation for good A but a low valuation for good
B and vice versa. The optimal pricing strategy for a monopolist is to charge a high
individual price for each good and the consumers with these extreme preferences buy
only the good for which they have a high valuation. But still there are some consumers
with middle range valuations for both goods and they buy the bundle at some discount.
Thus bundling has a sorting effect. It allows the monopolist to sort its consumers into
three categories instead of two and it can therefore extract more consumer rent.
Now let us look at a situation with two firms. Each firm must compete for demand
and will do this with the help of the bundle. So beside the sorting effect, bundling
now causes a second effect, which is called ’business-stealing’ effect. This effect goes
in the opposite direction than the sorting effect, because it results in a higher degree
of competition and thus in lower profits. Whether bundling is profitable for the firms
depends on which effect is dominating the other one.
The first result is that there is always an incentive for the duopolists to engage in
mixed bundling as long as the correlation of valuations is not perfectly positive. This
result is in line with the monopoly case. Since the firms have an additional instrument
to sort their consumers they will use it.
Now assume consumers are homogeneous. This means that many of them have a
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strong preference for both goods of one firm. Therefore firms can act in some sense
as local monopolists and can extract more consumer rent with bundling. There are
only few consumers who are undecided between both firms. So it does not pay for a
firm to undercut its competitor’s prices to get these consumers at the margin. Thus
prices and profits are relatively high. The sorting effect dominates the business-stealing
effect. The consequences of bundling are very similar to the monopoly case.
If instead consumer preferences are heterogeneous the situation is completely dif-
ferent. In this case many consumers prefer good A from firm 1 and good B from firm
2 and vice versa. For simplicity assume first that both firms can sell their goods only
in a bundle. These bundles are now almost perfect substitutes to each other. Each
firm can gain many new customers by lowering the price of its own bundle. Thus
harsh price competition arises. If the firms can sell their products independently as
well, this business-stealing effect endures. The price of the bundle is driven down to
nearly marginal costs and this influences the unbundled prices which are now very low.
Thus profits are low and consumer rent is high. The initial idea of the bundle, namely
to price discriminate in a more skilful manner, is dominated by the business-stealing
effect. So the result is completely opposite to the monopoly case. In this second case
firms are in a prisoner’s dilemma situation. It would be better for both of them not to
bundle.
There is also an interesting welfare effect. Since the bundle is cheaper than the
sum of the two independent prices, consumers are encouraged to buy the bundle. If
heterogeneity increases firms react in equilibrium with an increase of their independent
prices. Thus more consumers buy the bundle. This results in distributive inefficiency
because some consumers prefer the products from different firms. So if markets are
covered bundling reduces social welfare as it can only cause consumers to purchase the
wrong good.
It is also analysed what will happen if firms can influence the correlation of valu-
ations. This can be done with the introduction of an additional stage in which firms
choose their location in the product range. It is shown that firms may choose minimal
differentiation in one product and thus forego profits with that product. They do this
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to avoid competition on the bundle which is very fierce if correlation is negative. Such
firm behavior can be observed in the US by telephone companies which sell long dis-
tance service and internet access in one package. The long distance service offer is very
similar in each package while firms try to differentiate themselves a lot in the offer of
internet access with each firm offering different rates and amounts of installation gifts.
In the literature economists’ attention on bundling was first drawn by the seminal
paper of Adams and Yellen (1976). They show in a series of examples with an atomistic
distribution of consumers that selling goods through bundling will raise the profit of
a monopolist. This result was generalized by Schmalensee (1984) to a joint normal
distribution and by McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989) to general distribution
functions. They all show that bundling will raise the monopolist’s profit, because it is
an additional instrument to sort its customers. This is especially the case if reservation
values for different goods are negatively correlated.
There are some papers which study bundling in a more competitive environment.
The focus of these papers is if and how a multiproduct firm, which has monopoly
power in one market, can increase its profit through bundling. Such a strategy is
called tying. Whinston (1990) analyses whether a firm which has monopoly power in
the first market can monopolize a second market with duopolistic market structure by
committing to engage in pure bundling. He shows that this is possible. The reason
is that the monopolist prices the bundle aggressively with the consequence that many
consumers will now buy the bundle and therefore the profit of the rival is very low,
which induces him to exit. Carbajo, deMeza and Seidmann (1990) study a model with
the same market structure as in Whinston (1990). They present another idea why a
tying commitment can be profitable for a monopolist. This is that with pure bundling
products in the second market are differentiated and thus prices are higher. Profits of
both firms are increased.24 Nalebuff (2004) shows that pure bundling is more profitable
for an incumbent even if commitment is not possible. This is the case if the entrant
24Chen (1997) presents a model with the same intuition only the market structure is different. He
assumes duopoly in one market and perfect competition in the second. The duopolists can differentiate
themselves by one firm selling the bundle and the other firm selling the goods only independently.
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can enter only in one market. The intuition is that the entrant must compete for
consumers in the first market as well since the incumbent only offers the bundle. This
greatly reduces the profit of the entrant. Choi (1996) analyses the effects of bundling
on research & development. In his model there is originally duopoly in both markets
but both firms can invest in R&D to lower their production costs before reaching the
price competition stage. If the difference in production costs for one good is large after
the R&D game the market for this good is monopolised by the low cost firm. Choi
(1996) shows that in this case bundling serves as a channel to monopolise the second
market. Finally, Mathewson and Winter (1997) study a model with monopoly in one
market and perfect competition in the other. They show that requirements tying is
profitable for the monopolist provided that demands are stochastically dependent. For
a great parameter range the optimal prices are Ramsey prices.25
There are two papers which have the same market structure as in my model
(duopoly in both markets), namely Matutes and Regibeau (1992) and Anderson and
Leruth (1993). The result in both papers is that if firms cannot commit not to bundle
in equilibrium they choose mixed bundling. But this results in increased competition
and lowers profits. A prisoner’s dilemma dilemma arises because profits would be
higher without bundling. However, in these papers the driving force of the monopoly
case, the correlation of consumers’ reservation values, is not modelled. In my model
it is shown that this is also the crucial variable for the oligopoly case, but can create
opposite effects. Also these papers are not concerned with welfare and location choice.
This chapter is also in the spirit of a relatively new literature which studies the
effects of price discriminating methods in a competitive environment. An extensive
overview of the different branches of these literature is given in a paper by Stole (2003)
which is prepared for the forthcoming volume of the Handbook of Industrial Orga-
nization. In the section about bundling Stole (2003) summarizes many of the recent
papers which are concerned with the question how bundling affects profits and market
structure when commitment is possible or not.
25Seidmann (1991) and Denicolo (2000) analyse the consequences of bundling in other market
structures.
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The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the model. The par-
ticular structure of consumer heterogeneity and the correlation of reservation values is
presented in Section 2.3. Equilibrium selling and price policy is determined in Section
2.4. Section 2.5 studies the welfare consequences of bundling. Section 2.6 analyses the
effects if firms have the possibility to choose their location and influence the reserva-
tion price correlation. An application of the model to the US telephone industry is
considered in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 concludes the chapter. The proofs of all results
are given in the Appendix of this chapter.
2.2 The Model
The model is a variant of Salop’s (1979) model of spatial competition on the circle but
with two goods.
There are two firms i = 1, 2. Both firms produce two differentiated goods j = A, B
at the same constant marginal costs cA and cB.
26 The product space for each good
is taken to be the unit-circumference of a circle. The product variants are then the
locations of the firms on each circle. It is assumed that firm 1 is located at point 0
on both circles and firm 2 is located at point 1
2
on both circles. So there is maximum
product differentiation in both goods. The firms have the choice to sell their products
not only independently but also together as a bundle. So each firm i can choose
between two possible selling strategies. It can sell its goods separately at prices piA
and piB (independent pricing) or it can sell the goods independently and as a bundle at
prices piA, p
i
B and p
i
AB (mixed bundling).
27 Firms have to decide simultaneously about
their selling and price strategies. It is assumed that they cannot monitor the purchases
of consumers. So the strategy space for each firm i is to quote three prices piA, p
i
B and
26The assumption of the same cost function for both firms is made for simplicity and is not crucial
to the results.
27There can also be a third strategy, namely to sell the goods only as a bundle at price piAB . Adams
& Yellen (p. 483) and McAfee, McMillan & Whinston (p. 334) have shown that this cannot be the
unique optimal strategy because mixed bundling with prices piA = p
i
AB − cB and piB = piAB − cA
always does weakly better. This also holds in my model.
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piAB. If p
i
AB < p
i
A + p
i
B firm i engages in mixed bundling while if p
i
AB ≥ piA + piB firm i
practice independent pricing as no consumer would buy the bundle from firm i. Last,
resale by consumers is impossible.
There is a continuum of consumers and without loss of generality we normalize
its total mass to 1. Each consumer is described by her location on both circles, x =
(xA, xB)
T . Every consumer has a unit demand for both goods and purchases each good
independently of the other. So there is no complementarity between the products. This
allows me to focus on the pure strategic effect of bundling. The consumers are uniformly
distributed on each circle j. This is mainly for tractability reasons and to compare the
results with previous papers.28 In the next section we give some structure to the joint
distribution and present the modelling of the correlation of reservation values.
A consumer who is located at 0 ≤ xA, xB ≤ 12 and buys good A from firm 1 and
good B from firm 2 enjoys an indirect utility of
V (xA, xB) = KA − p1A − tA(xA)2 + KB − p2B − tB
(
1
2
− xB
)2
. (2.1)
A similar expression holds for consumers who are located somewhere else or buy dif-
ferent products. KA and KB are the surpluses from consumption (gross of price and
transportation cost) of good A and B. pij is the price of variant i of product j. The
transportation cost function is the weighted squared distance between the location of
the consumer and the variant produced by the firm where she buys. The weight is the
salience coefficient for each product, tj, and without loss of generality we assume that
tA > tB > 0.
29 The reservation price of a consumer for variant i of good j, Rij, is thus
Kj − tj(di)2, where di is the shortest arc length between the consumer’s location and
firm i on circle j. It is also assumed that Kj is sufficiently large such that both markets
are covered. This means that the reservation values are high enough such that in each
price equilibrium all consumers buy both goods. When dealing with welfare considera-
tions this means that there is no welfare loss due to exclusion of consumers who should
28For analyses without uniform distributions see Neven (1986), Tabuchi & Thisse (1995) and An-
derson, Goeree & Ramer (1997).
29The cases tB → tA and tB → 0 are analysed in Section 2.4.
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buy the product from a social point of view. The form of utility in (2.1) looks special
but it is the standard form in models with spatial competition if consumers can buy
many products.30
The consumers thus have the choice between four alternative consumption combi-
nations. They can buy the bundle from firm 1 (AB1), the bundle from firm 2 (AB2),
good A from firm 1, good B from firm 2 (A1B2), and good B from firm 1, good A
from firm 2 (B1A2).
2.3 Dependence between Location and Correlation
In the monopoly case the correlation of reservation values is crucial for the incentive
to bundle. It is a known result that especially in case of independence or negative
correlation bundling dominates unbundled sales.
In our case it is possible to infer the joint distribution function of reservation values
G(RiA, R
i
B) for firm i and therefore the correlation between the reservation values from
the joint distribution function of consumer location F (xA, xB). If for example every
consumer has the same location on both circles then the conditional density function
of xA given xB is
f(xA | xB) =
 0 if xA 6= xB1 if xA = xB.
The conditional density function g(RiA | RiB) of reservation values for firm i is then
g(RiA | RiB) =
 0 if R
i
A −RiB 6= KA −KB − (tA − tB)(di)2
1 if RiA −RiB = KA −KB − (tA − tB)(di)2.
This would imply a reservation price correlation of ρ[RiA, R
i
B] = 1. This is a sim-
ple example and there are possibly infinitely many ways how the consumers can be
30In the literature the assumption of a quadratic transportation cost function is usually made to
guarantee existence of an equilibrium if firms can choose their locations before setting prices (see e.g.
D’Aspremont et al (1979) and Irmen & Thisse (1998)). In my basic model this assumption is not
necessary since firms are maximally differentiated and one could also work with a linear transportation
cost function. However, in Section 2.6 the model is extended to allow for location choice of firms. To
keep the analysis consistent quadratic transportation costs are assumed right from the beginning.
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distributed on one circle given the location on the other circle. To keep the model
tractable, we have to give some structure to this conditional distribution, which still
captures the main point of expressing different correlations. This is done in a very
simple way. It is assumed that if a consumer is located at xA on circle A then she is
located at
xB =
 xA + δ if xA + δ ≤ 1xA + δ − 1 if xA + δ > 1
on circle B, where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
2
.31 This means a δ-shift of all consumers on circle B. So
a δ of 0 corresponds to the former example. The advantage of doing this is that with
this simple structure correlations of values can be obtained easily by altering δ.
Remark 2.1
The function ρ[RA, RB](δ) =
Cov[RA,RB ](δ)
σ(RA)σ(RB)
is given by 1 − 30δ2 + 60δ3 −
30δ4.32
Thus correlation is strictly decreasing in δ.33 If δ = 0, ρ(δ) = 1, i.e. perfect positive
correlation while if δ = 0.5, ρ(δ) = −0.875.34 Correlation here relates to the products
of one firm. So negative correlation means that a consumer who values product A from
firm i highly has a low valuation for product B of firm i.
Obviously this simple structure has important characteristics. First, there is a one-
to-one mapping between positions on circles. This implies that there is no stochastic
in the model.
Second given the location on circle A the location on circle B is exactly ordered by
δ and can not be crisscross.
31It suffices to consider δ between 0 and 12 . A δ greater than
1
2 expresses the same correlation as
one between 0 and 12 . For example a δ of 0.8 expresses the same correlation as a δ of 0.2.
32The proof of this and all other results can be found in the appendix of this chapter.
33The term correlation does not mean a stochastical correlation in this model, because there is no
stochastic element. It describes the relation between known reservation values. So it is a term from
descriptive statistics.
34We do not get the whole range of correlation coefficients because distance enters quadratically in
the utility function. With a linear transportation cost function the whole range of coefficients could
be reached but the results of the analysis would stay the same.
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However, this structure captures the main point of correlation. With a low δ, there
are many consumers having high reservation values for both goods of firm i. For a high
δ, many people have extremely different reservation values for both goods of firm i. So
this structure represents exactly what is meant with correlation. Its main advantage
is that it keeps the model tractable and gives clear cut results.
2.4 Equilibrium Price and Selling Strategies
In this section the equilibrium price and selling strategies of a firm conditional on the
correlation of values is analysed.
Before doing this the equilibrium of the game without the bundling option is de-
termined. The result will later be used as a benchmark.
If bundling is not possible there is no connection between the two products. Each
market is independent and we are in a standard situation of product differentiation
on the circle. The Nash equilibrium can be determined in the usual way. In this
equilibrium firms set prices
p1A = p
2
A = p
?
A = cA +
1
4
tA,
p1B = p
2
B = p
?
B = cB +
1
4
tB
and earn profits
Π?1 = Π
?
2 =
1
8
(tA + tB).
Now assume that bundling is possible. In the following the profit functions of the
firms for different correlations are determined. First, the question arises if firms have
an incentive to bundle.
Proposition 2.1
If δ > 0, i.e. ρ < 1, then in equilibrium both firms choose mixed bundling.
This is in line with the monopoly case. The firms have an additional instrument
to sort their customers and so they will use it. The exception is, if δ = 0, i.e perfect
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positive correlation. In this case all consumers have the same position on each circle.
Thus firms do not need a third instrument because consumers cannot be sorted better
than with independent prices.
Now the demand structure on the circles in dependence of δ can be derived. The
special form of locations allows us to work only with one circle because the location on
the other circle is then uniquely determined.
First, assume δ is small and start at a consumer with location xA = 0. She has a
high reservation value for both variants 1 and will therefore buy bundle (AB1).35 If we
move clockwise on circle A then the consumer who is indifferent between (AB1) and
(A1B2) is defined by
xA =
1
4
+
p1A + p
2
B − p1AB
tB
− δ.
The product combination which is bought to the right of (AB1) is (A1B2). It is not
bundle 2, because then no one would buy the independent products, which cannot be
the case in equilibrium.36 Moving further to the right the next combination which is
bought is (AB2) and the marginal consumer is located at
xA =
1
4
+
p2AB − p1A − p2B
tA
.
If we pass the point 1
2
and move upward on the left side of the circle, we get the same
product structure as on the right side, because of symmetry, only with firm 1 and 2
reversed. Consumers next to 1
2
buy (AB2), consumers in the middle buy (A2B1) and
consumers next to 1 buy (AB1). Figure 2.1 illustrates the product combinations on
circle A.
The profit function of firm 1 is therefore
Π1 = (p
1
AB − cA − cB)(14 +
p1A+p
2
B−p
1
AB
tB
− δ + 1− 3
4
− p
1
AB−p
1
B−p
2
A
tA
)
+(p1A − cA)(
p2AB+p
1
A−p
2
B
tA
+
p1A+p
2
B−p
1
AB
tB
+ δ)
+(p1B − cB)(
p1AB+p
2
A−p
1
B
tA
+
p2AB−p
2
A−p
1
B
tB
+ δ).
(2.2)
35Product combination (AB1) is only bought if p1AB is not too high compared with other prices. In
the proof of Proposition 2.2 in the appendix it is shown that this is the case in equilibrium .
36Remember that firms always engage in mixed bundling.
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Figure 2.1: Demand structure if δ ≤ 1
3
+ tB
6tA
Because of symmetry we get a similar function for firm 2. Calculating prices and
profits we get
p?A = cA +
1
4
tA +
1
3
δ tAtB
tA+tB
,
p?B = cB +
1
4
tB +
1
3
δ tAtB
tA+tB
,
p?AB = cA + cB +
1
4
(tA + tB),
Π? = 1
8
(tA + tB) +
4
9
δ2 tAtB
tA+tB
.
(2.3)
for both firms.
Next assume that δ is large and start again at xA = 0. The consumer located
there has the highest reservation value for variant 1 of good A and a high reservation
value for variant 2 of good B. If p1A and p
2
B are not much higher than other prices
she will buy (A1B2). Moving clockwise the next combination can only be bundle 1 or
bundle 2, because it is shown in Claim 2.1 in the appendix, that (A2B1) can never be
in direct rivalry to (A1B2). In equilibrium it will be bundle 1 because the position of
the consumer on circle A is nearer to firm 1. Since tA > tB, the distance on circle A is
more important than the one on circle B. The marginal consumer is given by
xA =
3
4
+
p1AB − p1A − p2B
tB
− δ.
If we move further clockwise the distance to firm 2 becomes shorter than that to firm
1 and so consumers buy bundle 2. The marginal consumer between (AB1) and (AB2)
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Figure 2.2: Demand structure if δ > 1
3
+ tB
6tA
is defined by
xA =
1
(tA − tB)
(
p2AB − p1AB +
1
4
tA −
3
4
tB + tBδ
)
.
Next, consumers located near 1
2
buy (A2B1). The structure on the left side is the same
only with firms reversed. The whole demand structure is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
The profit function of firm 1 is thus
Π1 = (p
1
A − cA)(34 +
p1AB−p
1
A−p
2
B
tB
− δ − 1
4
+ δ − p
1
A+p
2
B−p
1
AB
tB
)
+(p1AB − cA − cB)
(
p2AB−p
1
AB+
1
4
tA− 34 tB+tBδ
(tA−tB)
− 3
4
− p
1
AB−p
1
A−p
2
B
tB
+ δ
+5
4
+
p1A+p
2
B−p
1
AB
tB
− δ − p
1
AB−p
2
AB+
3
4
tA− 54 tB+tBδ
(tA−tB)
)
+(p1B − cB)(54 +
p2AB−p
1
B−p
2
A
tB
− δ − 3
4
− p
2
A+p
1
B−p
2
AB
tB
+ δ).
(2.4)
and equilibrium prices and profits are
p?A = cA +
1
6
tA − 16tB,
p?B = cB +
1
12
tB,
p?AB = cA + cB +
1
4
(tA − tB),
Π? = 1
8
tA − 772tB.
(2.5)
for both firms. It remains to calculate at which value of δ the profit function is changing.
The difference between the two profit functions is that on the right side of the circle the
region (A1B2) is followed by (AB2) in profit function (2.2) while in profit function (2.4)
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(A1B2) is followed by (AB1). Likewise on the left side (A2B1) is followed by (AB1)
in profit function (2.2) but by (AB2) in profit function (2.4). If profit function (2.2)
is relevant there is some value of δ at which (A1B2) would no longer be followed by
(AB2) but by (AB1) if firms charge equilibrium prices. Calculating this threshold yields
δ = 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
). At this value both firms begin to lower its prices in such a way that
demand structure of Figure 2.1 is still valid. The prices and profits for δ > 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
)
are given by
p?A = cA +
1
4
tA +
tAtB
2(tA−tB)2
((5tA + 4tB)− 2δ(8tA + tB)),
p?B = cB +
1
4
tB +
tAtB
2(tA−tB)2
((5tA + 4tB)− 2δ(8tA + tB)),
p?AB = cA + cB +
1
4
(tA + tB) +
tAtB
2(tA−tB)2
(9(tA + tB)− 6δ(5tA + tB)),
Π? = 1
8
tA +
1
8
tB +
tAtB
2(tA−tB)2
(4(tA + tB)− 2δ(6tA + tB)− 4δ2tA) .
(2.6)
But if δ increases further at some point it is profitable for both firms to deviate from
the above strategy and keep their prices constant. At this value the demand structure
changes and for all δ above this value profit function (2.4) is valid. Calculating this
threshold yields δ = 1
3
+ tB
6tA
.
The analysis above is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2
If δ ≤ 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) then in the unique Nash equilibrium firms set prices and
earn profits according to (2.3).
If δ > 1
3
+ tB
6tA
, then in the unique Nash equilibrium firm set prices and earn
profits according to (2.5).
If 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) < δ ≤ 1
3
+ tB
6tA
then in the unique Nash equilibrium firm set
prices and earn profits according to (2.6).
So the profit function is continuous but non-monotonic in δ. It is first increasing
in δ then decreasing and for high values of δ it is constant. The profit function in
dependence of δ is illustrated graphically in Figure 2.3.
What is the intuition behind this result? First look at the case where δ ≤ 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
).
Because δ is small, the locations of consumers on both circles are similar. This means
27
-
6
δ
Π?i
1
8
(tA + tB) +
(tA+tB)tAtB
(5tA+tB)2
1
8
(tA + tB)
1
8
tA − 772tB
1
2
3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) 1
3
− tB
6tA
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium profits
that there are a lot of consumers with high reservation values for both goods of one
firm. From the perspective of these consumers, firms are very distinct. Thus firms
have high market power and price competition is low. One can see this also in Figure
2.1. There are four product combination regions. But there are no bundle regions side
by side. This means that if one firm lowers its bundle price, it will get more bundle
consumers but also lose demand on its own independent sales. So lowering a price has
also a negative effect on a firm’s own demand and thus there is only little incentive to
lower prices. Note that for δ → 0 equation (2.3) implies that prices and profits are the
same as without bundling. This is in line with Proposition 2.1 where it is shown that
if δ = 0, there is no incentive to bundle.
From (2.3), p?AB is independent of δ. p
?
AB is the sum of the two prices that arise
if bundling is not possible. So consumers buying the bundle have to pay the same
amount of money if bundling is possible or not. Consumers located further away from
the variants of the firms, thus buying (A1B2) or (A2B1), lose through bundling because
p?A and p
?
B are increasing in δ. Calculating the breadth of the product combination
ranges we get that demand for each bundle is DAB1 = DAB2 =
1
2
− 1
3
δ and demand
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for each two-variant-combination is DA1B2 = DA2B1 =
1
3
δ. Despite the fact that p?A
and p?B increase with δ, DA1B2 = DA2B1 increase with δ as well. The reason is that
preferences get more heterogeneous with higher δ and this effect is stronger than the
price increase. Because of this increasing heterogeneity firms gain through product
bundling. They charge higher independent prices and can better sort their consumers.
Profits rise with δ and consumer rent decreases.
If on the opposite δ > 1
3
+ tB
6tA
, then profits are low. It is apparent from (2.3) that
profits are lower than without bundling. This can be explained in the following way.
Assume that firms can only offer the bundle. In this case the reservation value of a
consumer for both bundles is nearly the same. An extreme case would be δ = 1
2
and
tA = tB. Then each consumer has the same valuation for both bundles. Firms can
gain many new consumers by lowering the bundle price. So competition in the bundle
is very harsh and this affects also the unbundled prices. This business-stealing effect
of bundling drives profits down. In terms of strategic substitutes and complements
defined by Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), the two bundles are direct
strategic complements, ∂
2Πi
∂p1AB∂p
2
AB
> 0. So if one firm lowers its bundle price, the other
will do the same. This can also be seen in Figure 2.2. On the right as well as on the
left side of the circle there is a region, where bundle 1 is side by side with bundle 2. If
a firm lowers its bundle price then it gets new consumers, who formerly did not buy
either good of that firm. Such a region does not exist in Figure 2.1. In case of profit
function (2.2) there is no direct strategic complementarity.
This result is in sharp contrast to the monopoly case. In monopoly the bundle helps
the firm to reduce the dispersion of reservation values to get more consumer rent. This
is especially profitable if correlation is negative. In duopoly there is the same effect,
but with completely different consequences. The bundle also reduces dispersion, but
competition gets harsher and profits lower.
In this region prices and profits are low and do not change with δ. The reason is that
there is no incentive to decrease prices because they are already low and thus the gains
from decreasing prices are low compared with the losses. There is also no incentive to
increase prices because a firm would lose some consumers who have formerly bought
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the bundle and would buy both goods from the rival after the price increase.
In the remaining region 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) < δ ≤ 1
3
+ tB
6tA
prices are decreasing with δ. As
δ is already high consumers are more homogeneous. Each firm has an incentive to
exploit this and reduce its price to induce more consumers to buy the bundle. So both
firms lower their prices. But since δ is not very high and consumers’ bundle valuations
are still heterogeneous the demand structure does not change. This effect of lowering
prices becomes stronger the higher δ is. Thus prices and profits decrease with δ.
It is interesting to compare profits in case of bundling with profits if bundling is not
possible. If bundling is not possible profits are Π? = 1
8
tA +
1
8
tB. Thus if δ ≤ 32(
tA+tB
5tA+tB
)
bundling raises profits while if δ > 1
3
+ tB
6tA
profits are lower with bundling. Since the
profit function is strictly and continuously decreasing in δ in the region 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) <
δ ≤ 1
3
+ tB
6tA
there is one value of δ for which profits are the same. Calculating this
value by comparing profits yields the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1
If δ >
√
52t2A+28tAtB+t
2
B
4tA
− 3
2
− tB
4tA
profits are lower than without bundling
and firms are in a prisoner’s dilemma.
Firms are in a prisoner’s dilemma situation because as is shown in Proposition 2.1
they both choose to bundle. But this results in lower profits than if they did not
bundle. Thus firms would be better off without the possibility to bundle.
It is also possible to analyse the thresholds where the profit function has kinks. The
first threshold is given by δTS1 =
3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
). Since tA > tB > 0 the threshold lies in the
range δTS1 ∈] 310 ,
1
2
[. The maximal profit of the firms is reached at this threshold and is
given by Π? = 1
8
tA +
1
8
tB +
(tAtB)(tA+tB)
(5tA+tB)2
. The second threshold is given by δTS2 =
1
3
+ tB
6tA
.
At this threshold the demand structure changes. Since tA > tB > 0 this threshold lies
in the range δTS2 ∈]13 ,
1
2
[. Thus the intermediate region where the profit decreases is
very small. Its maximal breadth is approximately 0.03. This is the case when tB → 0
which implies δTS1 =
3
10
and δTS2 =
1
3
. Thus the profit decreases sharply from a high
level to a level that is even lower than without bundling.
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It is also interesting to look at two extreme cases of the transportation costs. First
let us see what will happen if tB → 0. In this case limtB→0 δTS2 = 13 . In this case no
consumer has a special preference for product B of one firm. The standard Bertrand
argument leads to p∗B = cB. But also if firms bundle they can only make profits on
good A. A look at the profit functions shows that Π∗i =
1
8
tA independent of which profit
function arises. The bundle has neither a sorting nor an additional competition effect
since good B is offered in perfect competition. Another extreme is if tB → tA which
results in limtB→tA δ
TS
2 =
1
2
. This shows that in this case only profit function (2.2) is
relevant. Thus only the price discrimination effect of bundling is valid and profits are
always increasing the more negative the correlation is. But for all values of tB between
0 and tA whenever δ >
√
52t2A+28tAtB+t
2
B
4tA
− 3
2
− tB
4tA
the ability to bundle reduces profits.
2.5 Welfare Consequences
The model has also interesting welfare implications. It is assumed that the reservation
price of every consumer is high enough, so that in each price equilibrium all consumers
are served. Thus there is no inefficiency that results from consumers whose valuations
are higher than marginal costs and who do not buy the goods. But there is a distributive
inefficiency. It arises because some consumers do not buy their preferred product.37
As a benchmark we can first calculate maximal welfare. Welfare is maximized if
transportation costs are minimized. This is the case if on both circles consumers at
0 ≤ xj ≤ 14 and
3
4
≤ xj ≤ 1 buy from firm 1 and consumers at 14 ≤ xj ≤
3
4
buy from
firm 2. The resulting welfare is
WFmax = KA + KB − cA − cB −
1
48
[tA + tB].
Maximal welfare is reached if the firms do not bundle.
If bundling is possible welfare depends on δ.
37Distributive inefficiency is also present in the monopoly case. Here some consumers who value a
good higher than others do not buy it while the latter individuals do. See Adams & Yellen (1976).
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Proposition 2.3
If δ ≤ 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) then
WF = KA + KB − cA − cB −
1
48
(tA + tB)−
4
9
δ2
tAtB
tA + tB
. (2.7)
If 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) < δ ≤ 1
3
+ tB
6tA
then
WF = KA +KB−cA−cB−
1
48
(tA + tB)−(
1
4
−δ2 +δ)(tA + tB)tAtB
(tA − tB)2
. (2.8)
If δ > 1
3
+ tB
6tA
then
WF = KA + KB − cA − cB −
1
48
(tA + tB)−
1
36
(tA + tB)
tB
tA
. (2.9)
Thus welfare in case of bundling is always lower than without bundling. The reason
is that the price of the bundle is lower than the sum of the independent prices. This
induces some consumers to buy the bundle and therefore both goods from one firm
although they prefer the goods from different firms. Bundling always causes a welfare
loss if markets are covered.
In case of δ ≤ 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) welfare decreases with δ. With an increase in δ consumers
get more heterogeneous. This means that they wish to buy the goods from different
firms. But in equilibrium independent prices are increasing in δ while the bundle price
is constant. The difference between the independent prices and the bundle price is
therefore increasing in δ. This tempts consumers to buy the bundle. Thus distributive
inefficiency increases with δ.
In the region 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) < δ ≤ 1
3
+ tB
6tA
welfare slightly increases with δ because
δ < 1
2
. All three prices are decreasing in δ because competition rises. This reduces the
distributive inefficiency slightly.
If δ > 1
3
+ tB
6tA
welfare is independent of δ because all prices are independent of δ as
well.
As the profit functions the welfare function is also continuous but non-monotonic
in δ. Figure 2.4 illustrates the shape of the welfare function, where WFgr = KA +
KB − cA − cB.
32
-
6
δ
Welfare
WFgr − 148(tA + tB)
WFgr − (tA+tB)48 −
(tA+tB)tB
36tA
WFgr − (tA+tB)48 −
tAtB
tA+tB
1
2
3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) 1
3
− tB
6tA
Figure 2.4: Welfare function
This shows that the shape of the welfare function in the first two regions is exactly
opposite to the shape of the profit function. The intuition is the following. If δ is
small an increase in consumer heterogeneity helps firms to extract more consumer
rent through bundling. But this is done by increasing the independent prices thereby
inducing consumers to buy the bundle which reduces welfare. If δ is high consumers
are heterogeneous and their valuation for both bundles is almost the same. Price
competition is fierce and profits are low. But the difference between the sum of the
independent prices and the bundle price is almost the same as with a δ in the middle
range. Thus welfare stays unchanged.
2.6 Location Choice
In this section the model is extended by endogenizing the extent of product differen-
tiation. In choosing the locations the firms not only change the differentiation and
with that the degree of competition but also the correlation of values. This effect of
correlation change has interesting implications on firms’ location choice.
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Before analysing this let us look at a generalisation of the basic model where prod-
ucts are no longer maximally differentiated. This is also a first step towards the later
analysis of location choice.
The location of firm 1 is point 0 on both circles as before. Firm 2 is now located
at α on both circles with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
2
.38 In calculating marginal consumers the same
analysis as in Section 2.4 can be conducted. This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4
If δ ≤ 3
2
( tA+tB
3tA−tB+4α(tA+tB)
) prices of the firms are
p?A = cA + α(1− α)
(
tA +
4
3
δ tAtB
tA+tB
)
,
p?B = cB + α(1− α)
(
tB +
4
3
δ tAtB
tA+tB
)
,
p?AB = cA + cB + α(1− α)(tA + tB),
and profits of the firms are given by
Π? =
1
2
α(1− α)((tA + tB) +
8
9
δ2
tAtB
tA + tB
).
If δ > 1
2
− α
3
+ tB(1−α)
3tA
prices of the firms are
p?A = cA + α(1− α)
(
tA − 23tB
)
,
p?B = cB + α(1− α)13tB,
p?AB = cA + cB + α(1− α)(tA − tB)
and profits of the firms are given by
Π? =
1
2
α(1− α)(tA −
7
9
tB).
If 3
2
( tA+tB
3tA−tB+4α(tA+tB)
) < δ ≤ 1
2
− α
3
+ tB(1−α)
3tA
prices of the firms are
p?A = cA + α(1− α)
(
tA +
tAtB
(tA−tB)2
(2(5tA + 4tB)− 4δ(8tA + tB)
)
,
p?B = cB + α(1− α)
(
tB +
tAtB
(tA−tB)2
(2(5tA + 4tB)− 4δ(8tA + tB)
)
,
p?AB = cA + cB + α(1− α)
(
(tA + tB) +
tAtB
(tA−tB)2
(18(tA + tB)− 12δ(5tA + tB))
)
38Assuming α between 12 and 1 would give the same results since e.g. α = 0.8 represents the same
game as α = 0.2.
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and profits of the firms are given by
Π? =
1
2
α(1−α)((tA+tB)+
tAtB
(tA − tB)2
(
16(tA + tB)− 8δ(6tA + tB)− 16δ2tA
)
).
The method of proof is the same as in Section 2.4 and the proof is therefore omitted.
This shows that the results are qualitatively similar to the results with maximal
product differentiation. The profit function is non-monotonic in δ and negative cor-
relation hurts firms. The only difference is that profits are lower if α < 1
2
. This is a
result one would expect. Since product differentiation is no longer maximal the degree
of competition is higher and thus prices are lower.
Now let us turn to the location choice of firms. As is standard in the literature this
is modelled in a two-stage-game. In the first stage location is chosen, in the second
stage firms set prices after observing the location choices. To keep the model tractable
we have to make two additional assumptions which are not very restrictive. The first is
that in the first stage only firm 2 chooses its location αA, αB on both circles while firm
1’s location is fixed. This assumption is not crucial although it sounds asymmetric.
The reason is that in a model on the circle there is no possibility for one firm to have
a better position than the other one.39 Even with the connection between the circles
through the bundle there is no advantage for firm 2 and in equilibrium both firms earn
the same profits. The second assumption is that firm 1 is still located at (0, 0)T . This
assumption is a bit more restrictive because the equilibrium values would be different if
the exogenous positions of firm 1 were different from each other.40 Yet, the qualitative
results would be the same; only the values of the equilibrium prices and profits would
be different but the location choice of firm 2 in the first stage would be the same. To
compare the results with the former analysis a location of firm 1 at (0, 0)T is assumed.
The game is solved by backward induction. In the second stage optimal prices can be
39This stands in contrast to competition on the line where such a modelling would give firm 2 a
huge advantage.
40The exception is if the distance is 12 . This would yield the same results as an equal location on
the circles.
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calculated given αA, αB and in the first stage firm 2 chooses αA and αB. This is done
in the appendix.
Proposition 2.5
If δ ≤
√
53t2A+26tAtB+2t
2
B
4tA
− 3
2
− tB
4tA
= δ′ firm 2 chooses maximal product
differentiation for both goods (αA = αB =
1
2
).
If δ >
√
53t2A+26tAtB+2t
2
B
4tA
− 3
2
− tB
4tA
= δ′ firm 2 chooses maximal product
differentiation on circle A (αA =
1
2
) and minimal product differentiation on
circle B (αB = 0).
Thus if δ ≤ δ′ there is maximal product differentiation on both circles. But if δ > δ′
we have a sudden shift to minimal differentiation on the circle with lower transportation
costs. What is the intuition behind this result?
If δ is small the result is not surprising. With maximal product differentiation firms
have high market power and competition is best reduced with a location which is most
distant. If δ is high we know from Proposition 2.2 that competition is fierce. This is the
case because from the point of view of the bundle consumers are nearly homogeneous if
firms are maximally differentiated. With the same location on circle B firms avoid the
additional competition resulting from this homogeneity. They make no longer profits
with good B because p∗B = cB. But consumer homogeneity is reduced because on circle
A each consumer has a strict preference for one firm. Thus the business stealing effect
of bundling is reduced and each firm earns profits of Π∗i =
1
8
tA.
The threshold value δ′ =
√
53t2A+26tAtB+2t
2
B
4tA
− 3
2
− tB
4tA
can be compared with the
value of δ at which the profit with mixed bundling is lower than the profit without
bundling. From Lemma 2.1 this value of δ is given by
√
52t2A+28tAtB+t
2
B
4tA
− 3
2
− tB
4tA
. Thus
δ′ is slightly above this value. The reason is that in choosing minimal differentiation
on circle B firms forego all profits with good B. Firm 2 therefore chooses αB = 0 only
when profits with maximal differentiation are lower than 1
8
tA. But the profits without
bundling are given by 1
8
tA +
1
8
tB. Thus δ
′ is higher.
With the location choice the firms change the correlation of values. They have to
balance the effect of increasing competition because of smaller differentiation with the
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effect of increasing competition because of homogeneity of the bundle. If the latter
effect is dominating firms choose minimal differentiation in one product.
The result can also compared with the result of Irmen & Thisse (1998). They
analyse a model with one product where firms have to compete in multidimensional
characteristics. Each characteristic is independent from each other. Irmen & Thisse
(1998) find that firms choose maximal differentiation in the characteristic with the
highest salience coefficient and minimal differentiation in all others. The intuition is
that price competition is relaxed with differentiation in one characteristic but firms
enjoy the advantage of a central location in all others. The argument for minimal
differentiation is quite different in my model where firms want to avoid additional
competition on the bundle that would arise with differentiation.
2.7 Application
In this section an application of the model to US telephone companies is presented. In
the US many of these companies sell internet access and long distance service together
in one package. The price of this package is by far lower than if both services are
bought independently.
Here I look at three companies, AT&T, birch telecom, and Verizon. Each of them
offers such a package. The long distant service in each package is almost the same,
so there are no essential differences in offers. But internet access is supplied quite
differently in each bundle. AT&T offers only 20 hours per month but gives a free
installation kit and free live support. By contrast, birch telecom offers unlimited access
but gives only standard support and no gifts. Verizon offers also unlimited access and
free live support but no installation kit. In addition, consumers can choose at Verizon
if they want to buy DSL or wireless where wireless is a bit more expensive.
This fits the results of the model in the last section, maximal differentiation in one
good and minimal in the other, quite well. It is empirically hard to estimate in which
good firms are more differentiated, which is represented by higher transportation costs,
but the example points to the fact that it is more important for consumers from which
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firm they get internet access than which one offers them long distance service.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper has shown that commodity bundling in duopoly has inherently different
consequences than in the monopoly case. In duopoly there is a high incentive to bun-
dle. But if the correlation of reservation values is negative, profits of the firms decrease
through bundling. This is contrary to the monopoly case where bundling is particularly
profitable if correlation is negative. The decrease in consumer heterogeneity which ren-
ders bundling profitable in monopoly creates a higher degree of competition in duopoly
and lowers profits. Thus firms are in a prisoner’s dilemma situation. It has also been
shown that welfare decreases with bundling because of distributive inefficiency. If firms
can choose their location and thus influence the correlation they want to avoid high
negative correlation of reservation values and choose minimal product differentiation
in one good.
An interesting way in which the model could be extended is to introduce uncertainty.
I assumed a one-to-one mapping of consumer locations on both circles to get clear cut
results. A possible way to introduce uncertainty might be to assume that a consumer’s
location on circle B conditional on her location on circle A is uniformly distributed
between xA + δ − ε and xA + δ + ε, with ε ∈ [0, 1/2]. So an ε of zero is the model
analysed in this paper while ε = 1/2 means that xB is independent of xA. My intuition
is that if ε is small the qualitative results would not change because uncertainty is
small. If instead ε is high one may get different results. So the model also offers a
framework to deal with questions of uncertainty.
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2.9 Appendix
Proof of Remark 2.1
The goal is to calculate the function ρ[RA, RB](δ) =
Cov[RA,RB ](δ)
σ(RA)σ(RB)
. The proof is
done from the perspective of firm 1 but we get the same result for firm 2 because of
symmetry.
The gross utility from buying the good, Kj, j = 1, 2, is constant and the same for all
consumers. It can thus be ignored in the calculation of σ(RA), σ(RB) and Cov(RA, RB).
First we calculate of σ(RA) =
∫ 1
0 t
2
A(d(xA))
2dxA − d̄
2
A, where d̄A is the expected
value of the transportation costs. We start with calculating d̄A,
d̄A = tA
∫ 1
2
0
(xA)
2dxA + tA
∫ 1
1
2
(1− xA)2dxA =
1
12
tA.
Next, calculating
∫ 1
0 t
2
A(d(xA))
2dxA yields∫ 1
0
t2A(d(xA))
2dxA = t
2
A
∫ 1
2
0
x4AdxA + t
2
A
∫ 1
1
2
(1− xA)4dxA =
1
80
t2A.
Thus
σ(RA) =
1
80
t2A −
1
144
t2A =
1
180
t2A.
Turning to circle B, d̄B is given by
d̄B = tB
∫ 1
2
−δ
0
(xA +δ)
2dxA +tB
∫ 1−δ
1
2
−δ
(1−xA−δ)2dxA +tB
∫ 1
1−δ
(xA +δ−1)2dxA =
1
12
tB.
Calculating σ(RB) gives
σ(RB) = t
2
B
∫ 1
2
−δ
0 (xA + δ)
4dxA + t
2
B
∫ 1−δ
1
2
−δ(1− xA − δ)
4dxA
+t2B
∫ 1
1−δ(xA + δ − 1)4dxA − ( 112)
2t2B =
1
180
t2B.
The covariance Cov(RA, RB) is thus given by
Cov(RA, RB)(δ) =
∫ 1
2
−δ
0 (tAx
2
A − 112tA)(tB(xA + δ)
2 − 1
12
tB)dxA
+
∫ 1
2
1
2
−δ(tAx
2
A − 112tA)(tB(1− xA − δ)
2 − 1
12
tB)dxA
+
∫ 1−δ
1
2
(tA(1− xA)2 − 112tA)(tB(1− xA − δ)
2 − 1
12
tB)dxA
+
∫ 1
1−δ(tA(1− xA)2 − 112tA)(tB(xA + δ − 1)
2 − 1
12
tB)dxA
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which after some manipulations yields
Cov(RA, RB)(δ) = tAtB[
1
180
− 1
6
δ2 +
1
3
δ3 − 1
6
δ4].
Thus
ρ(RA, RB)(δ) = 1− 30δ2 + 60δ3 − 30δ4.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Consider the case where both firms do not bundle. Since the equilibrium is sym-
metric both firms charge the same independent prices, pindA and p
ind
B , and earn profits
of Π∗i =
1
2
(pindA − cA + pindB − cB).
Now let us look if there is an incentive for firm 1 to introduce a bundle, that means
selling both goods together at a price p1AB < p
1
A + p
1
B. We analyse the case where
p1AB = p
ind
A + p
ind
B and p
1
j = p
ind
j + ε1, with ε1 > 0, but small. So firm 1 increases its
independent prices by ε1 and sets the bundle price equal to the sum of the prices if
firms do not bundle.
We have to distinguish between two cases, either if δ is ”near” 1
2
or not, because
this changes the demand structure on the circles. First look at the case where δ
is not near 1
2
. If firms do not bundle there are four demand regions on the circles,
namely (AB1), (A1B2), (AB2) and (A2B1). The frontiers between this regions (or the
marginal consumers) are the following,
1. frontier between (AB1) and (A1B2): 1
4
− δ,
2. frontier between (A1B2) and (AB2): 1
4
,
3. frontier between (AB2) and (A2B1): 3
4
− δ,
4. frontier between (A2B1) and (AB1): 3
4
.
If firm 1 introduces the bundle the frontiers are changed to
1. frontier between (AB1) and (A1B2): 1
4
− δ + ε1
tB
,
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2. frontier between (A1B2) and (AB2): 1
4
− ε1
tA
,
3. frontier between (AB2) and (A2B1): 3
4
− δ + ε1
tB
,
4. frontier between (A2B1) and (AB1): 3
4
− ε1
tA
.
The new profit function of firm 1 is
Π∗∗1 = (p
1
A + p
1
B − cA − cB)(12 − δ + ε1(
1
tA
+ 1
tB
))
+(p1A − cA + ε1)(δ − ε1( 1tA +
1
tB
)) + (p1B − cB + ε1)(δ − ε1( 1tA +
1
tB
))
or
Π∗∗1 = (p
1
A − cA + p1B − cB)12 + 2δε1 − 2(ε1)
2( 1
tA
+ 1
tB
)
= Π∗1 + 2δε1 − 2(ε1)2( 1tA +
1
tB
).
This is always higher than the old profit Π∗1 as long as δ > 0, because ε1 can made
arbitrary small and so (ε1)
2 tends faster to 0 then ε1.
Up to now we have shown that firm 1 has an incentive to introduce a bundle. The
question is now if firm 2 has an incentive to bundle if firm 1 is already bundling. The
profit of firm 2 if firm 1 bundles while firm 2 not is given by
Π∗2 = (p
2
A + p
2
B − cA − cB)(12 − δ + ε1(
1
tA
+ 1
tB
))
+(p2A − cA)(δ − ε1( 1tA +
1
tB
)) + (p2B − cB)(δ − ε1( 1tA +
1
tB
))
= (p2A + p
2
B − cA − cB)12 .
If firm 2 chooses to bundle and set p2AB = p
ind
A + p
ind
B and p
2
j = p
ind
j + ε2, with ε2 > 0,
but small, the frontiers are given by
1. frontier between (AB1) and (A1B2): 1
4
− δ + ε1+ε2
tB
,
2. frontier between (A1B2) and (AB2): 1
4
− ε1+ε2
tA
,
3. frontier between (AB2) and (A2B1): 3
4
− δ + ε1+ε2
tB
,
4. frontier between (A2B1) and (AB1): 3
4
− ε1+ε2
tA
.
The new profit of firm 2 is then
Π∗∗2 = (p
2
A + p
2
B − cA − cB)(12δ + (ε1 + ε2)(
1
tA
+ 1
tB
))
+(p1A − cA + ε2)(δ − (ε1 + ε2)( 1tA +
1
tB
)) + (p1B − cB + ε2)(δ − (ε1 + ε2)( 1tA +
1
tB
))
= Π∗2 + 2ε2δ − 2[(ε2)2 + ε1ε2]( 1tA +
1
tB
).
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Thus for ε1 and ε2 small, bundling is profitable if δ > 0 since (ε2)
2 and ε1ε2 tends faster
to 0 then ε2.
Now let us turn the case where δ is near 1
2
and look if firm 1 has an incentive to
introduce a bundle. The difference to the former analysis is that in the surrounding of
xA =
1
4
there are now some consumers who buy (AB1) because they have almost the
same preferences for all combinations but the bundle has a lower price than all other
combinations. Thus moving clockwise on circle A starting at point zero the product
combination (A1B2) is followed by (AB1) and no one buys (AB2). The frontiers are
given by
1. frontier between (A1B2) and (AB1): 3
4
− δ − ε1
tB
,
2. frontier between (AB1) and (A2B1): 1
4
+ ε1
tA
,
3. frontier between (A2B1) and (AB1): 3
4
− ε1
tA
,
4. frontier between (AB1) and (A1B2): 5
4
− δ + ε1
tB
.
The profit of firm 1 if it bundles is
Π∗∗1 = (p
1
A + p
1
B − cA − cB)(2ε1( 1tA +
1
tB
))
+(p1A − cA + ε1)(12 − 2ε1(
1
tB
) + (p1B − cB + ε1)(12 − 2ε1(
1
tA
)
or
Π∗∗1 = Π
∗
1 + 2(p
1
A − cA)
ε1
tA
+ 2(p1B − cB)
ε1
tB
+ ε1 − 2
(ε1)
2
tA
− 2(ε1)
2
tB
.
Thus Π∗∗1 is independent of δ and always greater than Π
∗
1 if ε1 is small.
Let us now look at firm 2 if firm 1 is already bundling. If firm 2 chooses not to
bundle its profit is
Π∗2 = (p
1
A − cA)(
1
2
− 2ε1(
1
tA
)) + (p1B − cB)(
1
2
− 2ε1(
1
tB
)).
If firm 2 introduces a bundle itself the region where consumers buy that bundle returns
and frontiers are given by
1. frontier between (A1B2) and (AB1): 3
4
− δ − ε1+ε2
tB
,
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2. frontier between (AB1) and (AB2): 1
tA−tB
(1
4
tA − 34tB + δtB),
3. frontier between (AB2) and (A2B1): 3
4
− δ + ε1+ε2
tB
,
4. frontier between (A2B1) and (AB2): 5
4
− δ − ε1+ε2
tB
,
5. frontier between (AB2) and (AB1): 1
tA−tB
(3
4
tA − 54tB + δtB),
6. frontier between (AB1) and (A1B2): 5
4
δ + ε1+ε2
tB
.
Profit of firm 2 if both firms bundle is then
Π∗∗2 = (p
2
A + p
2
B − cA − cB)(2( ε1+ε2tB )−
1
2
+ 1
tA−tB
(3
4
tA − 54tB −
1
4
tA +
3
4
tB)
+(p2A − cA + ε2)(12 − 2(ε1 + ε2)(
1
tB
) + (p2B − cB + ε2)(12 − 2(ε1 + ε2)(
1
tB
)
= Π∗2 + ε2 − 4[
(ε2)2+ε1ε2
tB
] + 2(p2A + p
2
B − cA − cB) ε1tB .
If ε1 and ε2 are small Π
∗∗
2 > Π
∗
2, so firm 2 also has an incentive to bundle.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Before proving Proposition 2.2 we have to establish several claims:
Claim 2.1
There cannot exist direct rivalry between product combination (A1B2) and
(A2B1).
Proof:
Assume that the consumer on xA with xA between 0 and
1
2
− δ is the marginal con-
sumer between product combination (A1B2) and (A2B1) and she buys either of these
alternatives. Thus (A2B1) must be better for her then (AB2). This is only the case if
p2A + p
1
B + tB(xA + δ)
2 ≤ p2AB + tB
(
1
2
− xA − δ
)2
(2.10)
or
p2A + p
1
B ≤ p2AB +
1
4
tBxAtB − δtB. (2.11)
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Since in equilibrium both firms bundle we know that p2AB < p
2
A + p
2
B. Thus we can
write p2A + p
2
B − κ with κ > 0 instead of p2AB. Then from (3.2) we get
p1B ≤ p2B − κ +
1
4
tB − xAtB − δtB. (2.12)
For the consumer indifferent between (A1B2) and (A2B1) it must also be optimal to
buy (A1B2) instead of (AB2). This is only the case if (knowing that p1AB = p
1
A +p
1
B−λ
with λ > 0)
p1A + p
1
B − λ + tB (xA + δ)
2 ≥ p1A + p2B + tB
(
1
2
− xA − δ
)2
.
or
p1B − λ ≥ p2B +
1
4
tB − xAtB − δtB.
But this is a contradiction to (2.12) because κ, λ > 0. Therefore it cannot be
optimal for a consumer at xA to buy (A1B2).
One can show that the same holds for xA between
1
2
− δ and 1
2
. Because of symmetry
a similar condition holds on the second half of the circle.
q.e.d.
Claim 2.2
(i) Take xA and x
′
A with 0 ≤ xA, x′A ≤ 12 and x
′
A < xA.
If (AB1) is optimal at xA then at x
′
A (AB2) can never be optimal.
(ii) Take xA and x
′
A with
1
2
≤ xA, x′A ≤ 1 and x′A < xA.
If (AB2) is optimal at xA then at x
′
A (AB1) can never be optimal.
Proof:
Assume that xA lies between 0 and
1
2
− δ. At xA we have
p1AB + tA(xA)
2 + tB(xA + δ)
2 ≤ p2AB + tA
(
1
2
− xA
)2
+ tB
(
1
2
− xA − δ
)2
and therefore
(tA + tB)xA ≤ p2AB − p1AB − tBδ +
1
4
(tA + tB) .
If (AB2) were optimal at x′A then
(tA + tB)x
′
A ≥ p2AB − p1AB − tBδ +
1
4
(tA + tB) .
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But since x′A < xA this cannot be the case.
One gets a similar condition for 1
2
− δ ≤ xA ≤ 12 . If
1
2
≤ xA, x′A ≤ 1 the method of
proof is exactly similar only with (AB1) and (AB2) reversed.
q.e.d.
Claim 2.3
(i) Take xA and x
′
A with 0 ≤ xA, x′A ≤ 12 and x
′
A < xA.
If (A1B2) is optimal at xA then at x
′
A (A2B1) can never be optimal.
(ii) Take xA and x
′
A with
1
2
≤ xA, x′A ≤ 1 and x′A < xA.
If (A2B1) is optimal at xA then at x
′
A (A1B2) can never be optimal.
Proof:
Assume that xA lies between 0 and
1
2
− δ. At xA we have
p1A + p
2
B + tA(xA)
2 + tB
(
1
2
− xA − δ
)2
≤ p1B + p2A + tA
(
1
2
− xA
)2
+ tB (xA + δ)
2
and therefore
(tA − tB)xA ≤ p1B + p2A − p1A − p2B + tBδ +
1
4
(tA − tB) .
If (A2B1) were optimal at x′A then
(tA − tB)x′A ≥ p1B + p2A − p1A − p2B + tBδ +
1
4
(tA − tB) .
But since x′A < xA this cannot be the case.
One gets a similar condition for 1
2
− δ ≤ xA ≤ 12 .
If 1
2
≤ xA, x′A ≤ 1 the method of proof is exactly similar only with (A1B2) and (A2B1)
reversed.
q.e.d.
Claim 2.4
(i) Take xA and x
′
A with 0 ≤ xA, x′A ≤ 12 and x
′
A < xA.
If (AB1) is optimal at xA then at x
′
A (A2B1) can never be optimal.
(ii) Take xA and x
′
A with
1
2
≤ xA, x′A ≤ 1 and x′A < xA.
If (A2B1) is optimal at xA then at x
′
A (AB1) can never be optimal.
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Proof:
Assume that xA lies between 0 and
1
2
− δ. At xA we have
p1A + p
1
B − λ + tA(xA)2 + tB(xA + δ)2 ≤ p1B + p2A + tA
(
1
2
− xA
)2
+ tB(xA + δ)
2
and therefore
tAxA ≤ p2A − p1A + λ +
1
4
tA. (2.13)
If (A2B1) were better than (AB1) at x′A then we would have
tAx
′
A ≥ p2A − p1A + λ +
1
4
tA.
But since x′A < xA this is a contradiction to (2.9).
One gets a similar condition for 1
2
− δ ≤ xA ≤ 12 .
If 1
2
≤ xA, x′A ≤ 1 the method of proof is exactly similar only with (AB1) and (A2B1)
reversed.
q.e.d.
Claim 2.5
(i) Take xA and x
′
A with 0 ≤ xA, x′A ≤ 12 and x
′
A < xA.
If (A1B2) is optimal at xA then at x
′
A (AB2) can never be optimal.
(ii) Take xA and x
′
A with
1
2
≤ xA, x′A ≤ 1 and x′A < xA.
If (AB2) is optimal at xA then at x
′
A (A1B2) can never be optimal.
Proof:
Assume that xA lies between 0 and
1
2
− δ. At xA we have
p1A + p
2
B + tA(xA)
2 + tB
(
1
2
− xA − δ
)2
≤ p2A + p2B − κ + tA
(
1
2
− xA
)2
+ tB
(
1
2
− xAδ
)2
and therefore
tAxA ≤ p2B − p1A − κ +
1
4
tA. (2.14)
If (AB2) were optimal at x′A then we would have
tAx
′
A ≥ p2B − p1A + κ +
1
4
tA.
46
But since x′A < xA this is not possible.
One gets a similar condition for 1
2
− δ ≤ xA ≤ 12 .
If 1
2
≤ xA, x′A ≤ 1 the method of proof is exactly similar only with (A1B2) and (AB2)
reversed.
q.e.d.
As a result in equilibrium there can only be three possible demand structures on
the circle A.41
(i) (AB1), (A1B2), (AB2), (A2B1), (AB1)
(ii) (A1B2), (AB2), (A2B1), (AB1), (A1B2)
(iii) (A1B2), (AB1), (AB2), (A2B1), (AB2), (AB1), (A1B2)
Calculating the profit function for each demand structure we get profit function
(2.2) for demand structures (i) and (ii) and profit function (2.4) for demand structure
(iii). Maximising each profit function with respect to p1AB, p
1
A and p
1
B yields equation
(2.3) for profit function (2.2) and equation (2.5) for profit function (2.4).
It remains to calculate for which values of δ the profit functions are valid.
For profit function (2.2) to arise (A1B2) must be followed by (AB2) and not by (AB1).
The frontier between (A1B2) and (AB2) at the equilibrium prices is given by
xA =
1
4
− 2
3
δ
tB
tA + tB
. (2.15)
The frontier between (A1B2) and (AB1) at the equilibrium prices is given by
xA =
3
4
− δ 5tA + 3tB
3(tA + tB)
. (2.16)
For demand structure (i) or (ii) to arise (2.15) must be smaller than (2.16). This gives
the first threshold
δTS1 =
3
2
(
tA + tB
5tA + tB
).
41This means that e.g. at demand structure (i) at point zero we have product combination (AB1)
followed clockwise by product combination (A1B2) which in turn is follwed by (AB2). (AB2) is
followed by (A2B1) and arriving at point 1 we again have (AB1).
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For profit function (2.4) to arise (A1B2) must be followed by (AB1) and not by (AB2).
Calculating in the same way as before by inserting the equilibrium prices of profit
function (2.4) gives that demand structure (iii) arises only if
δTS2 >
1
3
+
tB
6tA
.
This gives the second threshold.
In the region in between 3
2
tA+tB
5tA+tB
< δ ≤ 1
3
+ tB
6tA
firms set their prices in such a way
that demand structure (ii) arises. Routine manipulations show that equilibrium prices
and profits are given by (2.6). They exactly satisfy the constraint that
1
4
+
p2AB − p1A − p2B
tA
≥ 3
4
− δ + p
1
AB − p1A − p2B
tB
,
which says that (A1B2) is followed by (AB1) and not (AB2).
This completes the proof.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Welfare is calculated by inserting the equilibrium prices in the formulas for the
frontiers of each product combination and calculating the resulting transportation costs
on each circle. If δ < 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) welfare is given by
WF = KA + KB − cA − cB
−tA{
1
4
− 2
3
δ
tB
tA+tB∫
0
(x)2dx +
1
2∫
1
4
− 2
3
δ
tB
tA+tB
(1
2
− x)2dx
3
4
− 2
3
δ
tB
tA+tB∫
1
2
(x− 1
2
)2dx +
1∫
3
4
− 2
3
δ
tB
tA+tB
(1− x)2dx}
−tB{
1
4
+ 2
3
δ
tA
tA+tB∫
0
(x)2dx +
1
2∫
1
4
+ 2
3
δ
tA
tA+tB
(1
2
− x)2dx
3
4
+ 2
3
δ
tA
tA+tB∫
1
2
(x− 1
2
)2dx +
1∫
3
4
+ 2
3
δ
tA
tA+tB
(1− x)dx},
which after some manipulations yields
WF = KA + KB − cA − cB −
1
48
(tA + tB)−
4
9
δ2
tAtB
tA + tB
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which is equation (2.7).
Welfare is calculated in the same way if 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) < δ ≤ 1
3
+ tB
6tA
and if δ > 1
3
+ tB
6tA
which gives equations (2.8) in the first case and (2.9) in the second.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Calculating prices and profits for arbitrary values of αA and αB is done in the
standard way. This yields profits of
Π? =
1
2
αA(1− αA)tA +
1
2
αB(1− αB)tB +
16
9
δ2
αA(1− αA)tAαB(1− αB)tB
αA(1− αA)tA + αB(1− αB)tB
,
if δ ≤ 3(tAαA(1−αA)+tBαB(1−αB))
2αB(1−αA)[6tAαA−2tB(1−αB+8(tA+tB)αA(1−αB))]
Differentiating Π? with respect to αA and αB yields that profit is maximal if αA =
αB =
1
2
.
If δ > 1
2
(1− αA) + αB
(
1
6
+ tB
3tA
)
profits are given by
Π? =
1
2
tAαA(1− αA)−
7
18
tBαB(1− αB).
Differentiating this profit with respect to αA and αB yields that profit is maximal
if αA =
1
2
and αB = 0 since αB can only be between 0 and
1
2
.
If δ ≤ 3(tAαA(1−αA)+tBαB(1−αB))
2αB(1−αA)[6tAαA−2tB(1−αB+8(tA+tB)αA(1−αB))]
< δ ≤ 1
2
(1 − αA) + αB
(
1
6
+ tB
3tA
)
profits are given by
Π? = 1
2
((αA(1− αA)tA + (αB(1− αB)tB))+
tAtB
(tA−tB)2
(64αA(1− αB)(tA + tB)− 4αB(1− αA)δ(6tA + tB)− 8αA(1− αA)δ2tA) .
Differentiating this profit with respect to αA yields that profit is always maximal if
αA =
1
2
. Differentiating with respect to αB yields that αB =
1
2
if δ ≤
√
53t2A+26tAtB+2t
2
B
2tA
−
3
2
− tB
4tA
and αB = 0 if δ >
√
53t2A+26tAtB+2t
2
B
2tA
− 3
2
− tB
4tA
.
q.e.d.
Chapter 3
Two-Sided Markets with Negative
Externalities
3.1 Introduction
There are many markets where companies produce services for a group of agents who
do not pay for it or pay only a low price. Instead these companies get revenues from
advertisers who wish to gain access to potential consumers via the services of these
companies. Examples are private radio or television stations42 which often interrupt
their programme to broadcast advertisement.43 Search engines like Google or Yahoo!
or internet portals like GMX often have a multitude of advertisements on their web
sites.44 In the case of radio it is technically impossible to charge listeners for the
broadcasting of programmes. In the case of search engines it is not customary to
charge users for the services.
42To get an idea of the expenditures on advertising, in 2002 approximately $ 50 billion were spent
on TV advertising in the US only (Kind, Nilssen & Sorgard (2003)) and a 30 second commercial on
FOX had an average price of $ 150,000 (Prime Time Pricing Survey, The Advertising Age (2002)).
43In the US advertising time ranged from approximately 10 to 15 minutes per hour in 1999 (Tele-
vision Commercial Monitoring Report (1999)).
44For an internet portal advertising is the most important source of revenue since it does not charge
users. For example, the internet portal GMX sells a banner on its web site for Euro 20,000 per week
(http://www.gmx.de).
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This chapter studies a model of platform competition in which users dislike adver-
tisement and therefore spend less time to consume services of platforms. Advertisers
wish to gain users’ attention to tempt them to buy their products. In equilibrium the
level of advertising might be too high or too low compared with the socially optimal
one because platform pricing does not internalise the externality which is exerted on
users by more advertising. Concerning platform profits a higher degree of competition
for users can increase profits because price competition becomes less fierce. Thus a
different level of competition on one side influences the level of competition on the
other side and may have consequences on profits which are different to a one-sided
market. If platforms can charge users as well there might be an incentive to subsidise
users, i.e. set a negative fee, to attract more users. But since both platforms do so
this strategic effect lowers their profits. A prisoner’s dilemma situation arises. If the
user fee is positive the additional instrument increases profits. The equilibrium with
fees for both sides of the market is always efficient. The reason is that with the user
fee platforms do now take into account users’ utility in their pricing behaviour.
More specifically, we assume that two platforms compete for user time and adver-
tisers. For the advertisers platforms are completely similar while platforms compete
for users in a standard Hotelling style. Both sides of the market choose only one plat-
form.45 Profits of advertisers are increasing in the time users spend on a platform.
Users’ utility and the time they spend on a platform are decreasing with advertising.46
Therefore an advertiser causes a negative externality on users of that platform directly
and also on all other advertisers on that platform indirectly. If the gains from trading
advertisers’ goods are high compared to users’ utility loss all producers should adver-
tise from a social point of view. If the utility loss is high some of the advertisers should
45The assumption that advertisers single-home (use only one platform) is not crucial to the results
but simplifies the modeling. See the next section for a longer discussion.
46Ferrando, Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2003) analyse a model in which some people are
advertisement-avoiders while others are advertisement-lovers. But normally commercials are consid-
ered a nuisance for users. See Bagwell (2003) and Dukes & Gal-Or (2002).
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be excluded. The optimal distribution of advertisers among platforms is even. The
intuition is that if one platform has more than half of the advertisers the externality on
all of them is high and can be reduced if some advertisers shift to the other platform.
In a Nash equilibrium the number of advertisers on both platforms is the same but
might be too high or too low compared with efficiency. Platforms only internalise the
indirect externality that one advertiser exerts on other advertisers but not the direct
utility loss of users. This is the case because this externality is incorporated in their
pricing behaviour while the externality on users does not influence prices. So if the
degree of differentiation between platforms is low competition for users is fierce. But
platforms compete for users by reducing their advertisement levels. Thus with low
differentiation there is little advertising on platforms. But if the gains from trading
advertisers’ goods are high this level of advertising is too low compared with the social
optimum. If instead platforms are highly differentiated they will lose only few users if
they advertise more. In this case the level of advertising is too high.
Platforms’ profits depend on the level of differentiation as well. If differentiation
is relatively high profits fall with an increase in differentiation. The intuition is that
platforms have a higher incentive to attract advertisers because users do not switch
easily to the other platform. This results in lower prices for advertising. But since
both platforms lower their prices the level of advertising stays the same while profits
are decreasing. So the strategic effect hurts platforms. This shows that in a two-sided
market a lower level of competition on one side can increase the competition on the
other side and lead to lower profits. If differentiation is low and competition for users
is fierce an increase in the differentiation leads to rising profits. The reason is that
advertising levels are low and with a price decrease this level rises, which increases
profits.
I also analyse what happens if platforms can charge a user fee. If this user fee is
unrestricted, e.g. can either be positive or negative, the efficient outcome is reached.
With the possibility of a user fee platforms have two different instruments at hand to
make profits. They therefore take users’ utility into account as well. Since platforms
compete for both sides this leads to the efficient outcome.
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In equilibrium it might be the case that this user fee is negative because platforms
want to attract users in order to make more profits on advertisers. In this case the
additional instrument of a user fee hurts platforms and their profits are lower. If the
user fee is positive profits are higher than without a user fee. If the fee is restricted
to be positive the efficient outcome cannot be reached in general but only in the case
when the user charge would be positive in equilibrium.
Most of the papers in the two-sided markets literature are concerned with partici-
pants exerting positive externalities on each other like in the market for credit cards.
Examples of these papers are Rochet & Tirole (2003) or Wright (2003). In Section 6
of their paper Rochet & Tirole (2003) briefly analyse a model in which platforms earn
revenues from users and advertisers. Platforms are able to use a two-part tariff for
both groups of participants. Rochet & Tirole (2003) show that in general both prices
depend on the relations between own- and cross-price elasticities.47
Recently there has been a growing literature on platform competition for adver-
tisers. A seminal contribution to this literature is the paper of Anderson & Coate
(2003). They analyse a model of TV broadcasting and are interested in the question
whether two channels will offer the same or different programmes and how much ad-
vertisement they will broadcast. They find that dependent on parameter values there
can be too little but also too much advertising and also too low or too high a variety
of programmes. In their model viewers suffer from advertising with the consequence
that they switch to their less preferred programme if this has fewer advertisements. As
a result an even distribution of advertisers on platforms is efficient because otherwise
some viewers would not watch their preferred programme.
My paper revisits their first result in a different type of model. The difference
to their paper is that in my model platforms compete directly for advertisers while
in their model a change in the commercial price of channel 1 does not influence the
commercial price of channel 2. This allows me to analyse the consequences of different
47For a detailed overview how to model different forms of competition and externalities in two-sided
markets see Armstrong (2004). For a model with a monopoly platform see Baye & Morgan (2001).
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degrees of competition on one side for the degree of competition on the other side and
on platforms’ profits. Anderson & Coate (2003) also analyse the case in which viewers
can be charged for watching the programmes. They find that advertising levels are
usually lower in this case.
Kind, Nilssen & Sorgard (2003) analyse the broadcasting market as well and are
also concerned with the question if competition between channels leads to over- or un-
derprovision of commercials. Like Anderson & Coate (2003) they do not assume direct
competition for advertisers. Kind, Nilssen & Sorgard (2003) also find that there can
be underprovision of advertising for low degrees of differentiation between platforms.
They show as well that a merger between the two channels can improve welfare as it
leads to more advertisements.48
In a paper of Gal-Or & Dukes (2003) differentiated TV or radio stations also com-
pete for viewers/listeners. They analyse the conditions under which a merger of two
stations can be profitable. In their model consumers are averse to advertising but may
profit from advertisements by the fact that they are better informed about prices.49 If
two firms merge this results in a higher level of advertising which can drive producers’
prices and profits down. Therefore producers can pay less for advertising. This might
render a merger unprofitable.
In contrast to the above cited papers my paper analyses a model with competition
for both sides, users and advertisers, and not only users. I look at the consequences
on pricing behaviour and profits of platforms. As is shown this behaviour can be very
different in a two-sided market compared with a one-sided one. It has also different
consequences than competing for only one side.
48A paper with a similar basic model is Barros, Kind & Sorgard (2002). They are interested in
the consequences of a vertical merger between a platform and a producer. They show that such a
merger can be harmful for both firms. This is the case if platforms are close substitutes because the
independent platform acts as a free rider on the merger and increases its advertising price.
49A problem in their model is that this gain for viewers/listeners is not included in the utility
function. The reason is that this would complicate the model dramatically and would change some
results.
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section sets out the
basic model. In Section 3.3 the efficient outcome is presented. Section 3.4 analyses
the equilibrium and compares it with efficiency. In Section 3.5 an example of pricing
behaviour of internet portals is given. Section 3.6 presents the equilibrium with the
possibility of a user charge. A short conclusion is given in Section 3.7.
3.2 The Model
The goal is to develop a model in which platforms compete for users (consumers) and
advertisers (producers). It is assumed that if platforms are internet portals, radio
stations, or television channels consumers have the hardware to get access to these
platforms. Advertising causes a negative externality on users but advertisers’ profits
are increasing in the number of users. In the following the basic model is presented.
Platforms
There are two platforms i = 1, 2. Users cannot be excluded from using the platforms.
Therefore platforms cannot make profits from users directly. Instead platforms make
profits on advertisers. The profit function of platform i is
Πi = pini.
pi is the price that platform i is demanding from an advertiser for an advert and ni is
the number of advertisers on platform i. Each advertiser can place only one advertise-
ment and has to decide exclusively on which platform she wants to advertise. Thus
there is rivalry for advertisers. It is assumed that platform pricing is linear. We also
assume that the costs of platforms are zero.50
Users
There is a mass of users M . Users are uniformly distributed on a line with length
50This assumption is made for simplicity. Relaxing it would change the calculations but not the
qualitative results of the model.
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one where platform 1 is located at point 0 and platform 2 located at point 1. Each
user decides in favour of only one platform.51 The utility a user derives from spending
time t on platform i is v(t) where v(t) is an increasing and strictly concave function.
Users’ utility is decreasing in the number of advertisements ni on platform i. The
whole amount of disposable leisure time a user has is T̄ . So T̄ − t is the time a user
spends on doing other things during his leisure time. We normalize the utility a user
gets from doing this other things to 1 per unit of time.
The maximisation problem of a user who is located at x can be written as52
max
i,t
Ui = T̄ − t + v(t)− γtnλi − τU |x− xi| (3.1)
γ is a measure of the nuisance costs of advertising and is the same for all users.
The parameter λ measures the curvature of the utility function in ni. It is assumed
that λ ≥ 1 so utility is weakly concave in ni. This is a realistic assumption, e.g.
one or two commercials on a homepage are not very disturbing but if a web site is
full of adverts this disturbs users a lot and the time which is spent on these web site
decreases drastically with additional commercials. Lastly, τU is the transportation cost
parameter and represents the degree of differentiation between both platforms.
If a user has decided in favour of one platform differentiating with respect to t yields
v′(t) = 1 + γnλi . (3.2)
t∗(ni) is implicitly given by (3.2) and represents the demand function for time on
platform i dependent on ni. From the Implicit Function Theorem we get the slope of
this demand function
∂t
∂ni
=
γλnλ−1i
v′′(t)
< 0. (3.3)
51This formalisation fits the market for internet portals or TV broadcasting well. Users or viewers
decide in favour of only one portal to do e-mailing or can only watch one programme at the same
time.
52The advantage of this formulation is that the decision of users how much time to spend on a
platform is separated from the decision which platform to use. See Anderson, de Palma & Thisse
(1992).
56
So the amount of time on platform i is decreasing in ni.
The indirect utility function of a user x is given by
U(x, ni) = T̄ − t(ni) + v(ti(ni))− γt(ni)nλi − τU |x− xi|.
In the following we set T̄ − t(ni)+v(ti(ni))−γt(ni)nλi = UB(ni) so U(x, ni) = UB(ni)−
τU |x− xi|. The marginal consumer who is indifferent between both platforms is given
by
xm =
1
2
+
1
2τU
(UB(n1)− UB(n2)).
We assume that τU is small enough so that in equilibrium all users use one platform,
e.g. τU ≤ 2UB(N/2). Thus a mass of Xi = Mxm chooses platform 1 and the remaining
mass M(1− xm) chooses platform 2.
With advertising a producer informs users about the nature and the price of its
products. After having seen an advert a consumer knows his willingness to pay for the
good. It is assumed that this valuation is the same for all consumers and is K with
probability β and 0 with probability 1− β. For simplicity it is assumed that it is the
same for each advertiser’s good.53 This modeling follows Anderson & Coate (2003).
Although this formulation is specific it has the advantage that advertising cannot have
a positive value for users because each producer will sell its product at a price K. A
lower price does not improve the possibility of a sale. Thus the advertiser’s price is
equivalent to consumers’ valuation and therefore a user’s utility of getting aware of a
new good is zero. The implication of this formulation is that users do not get informa-
tional benefits from using a platform with much advertising.
Advertisers
There is a mass of advertisers N . Ex ante advertisers are indifferent between both
platforms. Advertisers choose only one platform to advertise on. This assumption
represents an easy way to model that platforms have to compete for advertisers.54 If
53This stochastic structure is chosen to make the model more realistic and to express that not every
user has a positive valuation for each new good he gets aware of through advertising.
54The results of the model do not depend on the assumption that advertisers single-home (choose
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platform i is chosen by an advertiser her profit is
Pi = XiβKt(ni)− pi.
If she decides not to advertise she gets a profit of zero. The value of an advertisement
on platform i does positively depend on the time users spend on that platform. The
idea is that the more time a user spend on platform i the higher is the possibility that
he gets aware of that advertisement and buys the product in the end. The gross value
of an advertisement on platform i is thus XiβKt(ni). The advertiser has to pay pi for
an advertisement on i. For simplicity it is assumed that production costs for advertise-
ments and products are zero. Again this assumption does not change the qualitative
results.
Game Structure
In the first stage the two platforms decide simultaneously about their prices p1 and p2.
In the second stage advertisers decide on which platform they want to advertise if on
any and users decide how much time they spend on each platform. Then profits and
utilities are realised. This completes the description of the model.
In the analysis to follow we maintain the following assumption:
A1 : βK >
U ′′B(ni)
−(2 ∂t
∂ni
+ ∂
2t
∂n2
i
ni)
∀ni.
The role of this assumption is to guarantee that the gain from trading advertisers’
goods is high enough so that ni = 0 is never efficient, e.g. no advertising is never
efficient.
only one platform). What is necessary is that with a price change of platform i the number of
advertisers on platform j changes. So if platform i lowers pi, ni increases and nj decreases. One
can get the same results with the assumption that advertising firms multi-home (advertise on both
platforms) but have only a certain budget for advertising expenditures. So the last unit of this
budget can either be spent on one or the other platform. Thus advertisers multi-home but put more
commercials on the platform with the lower price.
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3.3 Efficiency
In this section the optimal number of advertisements on each platform is derived. This
result is later compared with the equilibrium outcome of the pricing game.
In the analysis of efficiency there are two effects to consider. Firstly, a higher
number of advertisements increases the possibility of trade of advertisers’ products.
Secondly, a higher number of advertisements decreases users’ utility and exerts a neg-
ative externality on other advertisers. Total welfare is given by
WF = MβKn1[
1
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(n1)− UB(n2))]t(n1)
+MβKn2[
1
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(n2)− UB(n1))]t(n2)
+MUB(n1)[
1
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(n1)− UB(n2))]
+MUB(n2)[
1
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(n2)− UB(n1))]
−τU
∫ 12+ 12τU (UB(n1)−UB(n2))
0 xdx
−τU
∫ 1
1
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(n1)−UB(n2))(1− x)dx.
(3.4)
The first two terms are the welfare from trading advertisers’ products. The third and
the fourth term represent the utility of users gross of transportation costs and the fifth
and the sixth term are the transportation costs. Differentiating (3.4) with respect to
ni, i = 1, 2 yields the first order conditions
1
2τU
U ′B(ni)M [βKnit(ni) + UB(ni)]
+1
2
M [βKt(ni) + βKnit
′(ni) + U
′
B(ni)]
− 1
2τU
U ′B(ni)M [βKnjt(nj) + UB(nj)] = 0,
i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
(3.5)
So the first order condition is the same for both n1 and n2. Thus it is efficient if
n1 = n2. The second order condition is globally satisfied because of A1. Simplifying
(3.5) yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1
If
βKt(N/2) + βK(N/2)t′(N/2) + U ′B(N/2) > 0, (3.6)
neffi =
N
2
is efficient.
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Otherwise the efficient number of advertisers neffi , i = 1, 2 is implicitly given by
βKt(ni) + βKnit
′(ni) + U
′
B(ni) = 0. (3.7)
It is therefore efficient if advertisers allocate equally among platforms. The intuition
behind this is simple. If we look only at the gains from trade the externality that an
advertiser causes on another one is increasing convexly. So if one platform has many
advertisers users spend little time on this platform and thus many advertisers gain
little attention. To reduce this externality as well as possible it is optimal that each
platform has the same number of advertisers. Transportation costs can be reduced
with an even partition as well. If βK is high which means that the probability and
the welfare gains from trade are high all producers should advertise and ni = N/2. If
these gains are lower compared to the utility loss of users, n1 + n2 < N .
3.4 Nash Equilibrium
In this section we solve for the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game.
Since platforms can only quote prices to advertisers and are not differentiated from
their point of view we are in a standard Bertrand game. The difference is that with
a negative externality one platform cannot win all advertisers by undercutting its
competitor’s price. The platform with the lower price gets more advertisers but this
results in a higher externality on all of them and reduces their profits. It is thus optimal
for some advertisers to stay on the other platform. Thus platforms earn positive profits
in equilibrium.55
It turns out that the model is solvable in a similar way as the product differentiation
model of Hotelling.
55It should be mentioned that this result is completely different in a model with positive externalities.
If in such models buyers (in our model advertisers) can coordinate on the platform that gives them
the highest surplus prices would be driven down to zero because of the standard Bertrand argument.
For an overview of this literature see Farrell & Klemperer (2001) or Katz & Shapiro (1994).
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To see this let us assume first that all N producers advertise. Since all advertisers
are the same in equilibrium each advertiser must be indifferent between platform 1
and 2. If this would not be the case one platform can increase its price without losing
any advertisers which cannot be an equilibrium. Thus we can determine the marginal
advertiser who is indifferent between both platforms. She is described by
MβKt(n1)[
1
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(n1)− UB(N − n1))]− p1 =
MβKt(N − n1)[12 +
1
2τU
(UB(N − n1)− UB(n1))]− p2
(3.8)
The left hand side is the profit of an advertiser on platform 1 and the right hand
side the profit of an advertiser on platform 2 if the number of advertisers are n1 and
n2 = N − n1.
Contrary to standard analysis it is not possible to solve (3.8) for n1 because users’
utility is concave in n1. To get a solution (3.8) is solved for p1 which yields a maximi-
sation problem of platform 1 of
maxn1 Πi = {p2 + MβKt(n1)[12 +
1
2τU
(UB(n1)− UB(N − n1))]−
MβKt(N − n1)[12 +
1
2τU
(UB(N − n1)− UB(n1))]}n1.
(3.9)
Maximising profits for both firms yields two first order conditions. These first order
conditions in combination with equation (3.8) and equation (3.8) with 1 and 2 reversed
yields the equilibrium values of ni and pi. After applying the Envelope Theorem,
U ′B(ni) = −γλnλ−1i t(ni), we get
n∗i =
N
2
(which is obvious because of symmetry) and
p∗i = βKMNγλ(N/2)
λ−1[
t(N/2)2
tU
− 1
2v′′(t(N/2))
].
It remains to calculate the equilibrium if n1 + n2 < N .
56
The equilibrium of the game is described in the following proposition.
56The method of solution is similar to a standard product differentiation game where consumers’
gross surplus from buying is so low that firms are local monopolists. See e.g. Gabszewicz & Thisse
(1986).
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Proposition 3.2
If τU ≤ τ 1U =
(N/2)λγλt(N/2)2
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
in the unique Nash equilibrium n∗i is implicitly
given by
t(ni) +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni −
t(ni)
2γλnλi
τU
= 0, (3.10)
where a unique solution n∗i ∈ (0, N/2) exists, and
p∗i =
MβKt(n∗i )
2
. (3.11)
Profits of the platforms are
Π∗i =
MβKt(n∗i )
2
n∗i . (3.12)
If τ 1U < τU ≤ τ 2U =
4(N/2)λγλt(N/2)2
t(N/2)+
2γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
in the unique Nash equilibrium n∗i =
N
2
and
p∗i =
MβKt(N/2)
2
. (3.13)
Profits of the platforms are
Π∗i =
MβKt(N/2)
2
N/2. (3.14)
If τU > τ
2
U in the unique Nash equilibrium
n∗i =
N
2
(3.15)
and
p∗i = βKMNγλ(N/2)
λ−1[
t(N/2)2
τU
− 1
2v′′(t(N/2))
] (3.16)
Profits of the platforms are
Π∗i = βKMNγλ(N/2)
λ[
t(N/2)2
τU
− 1
2v′′(t(N/2))
]. (3.17)
Proof
When calculating the marginal advertiser in equation (3.8) it was assumed that all
producers advertise. But this is only the case if it pays the ’Nth’ producer to advertise
instead of not advertising and getting profits of zero.
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Thus with a price p∗i = βKMNγλ(N/2)
λ−1[ t(N/2)
2
τU
− 1
2v′′(t(N/2))
] this is only the case
if
M
2
βKt(N/2) > βKMNγλ(N/2)λ−1[
t(N/2)2
τU
− 1
2v′′(t(N/2))
]
or
τU > τ
2
U = 4
(N/2)λγλt(N/2)2
t(N/2) + 2γλ(N/2)
λ
v′′(t(N/2))
.
The next question is what the optimal price of a platform is if it does not have to
compete for advertisers because n1 +n2 < N . In this case the number of advertisers on
platform i depends on pi and is given by MβKt(ni)[
1
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(ni)−UB(nj))]−pi = 0.
So advertiser ni is the last one whose profit is not negative given a price of pi. Thus
the profit of platform i is
Π = MβKt(ni)ni[
1
2
+
1
2τU
(UB(ni)− UB(nj))]. (3.18)
Maximising this with respect to ni for both platforms yields that n
∗
i is given by
t(ni) +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni −
t(ni)
2γλnλi
τU
= 0.
which is equation (3.10).
If ni = 0 the left hand side of (3.10) is positive because t(0) > 0. If ni = N/2 the left
hand side is negative because profit function (3.18) is only relevant if τU < τ
1
U . Thus
a solution with n∗i ∈ (0, N/2) exists. Since all terms of (3.10) are continuous functions
of ni this solution is unique.
This n∗i equals
N
2
if
t(N/2) +
∂t(N/2)
∂ni
N/2− t(N/2)
2γλ(N/2)λ
τU
= 0
or
τU =
(N/2)λγλt(N/2)2
t(N/2) + γλ(N/2)
λ
v′′(t(N/2))
= τ 1U .
So for τU ≤ τ 1U =
(N/2)λγλt(N/2)2
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
n∗i is given by t(ni) +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni − t(ni)
2γλnλi
τU
= 0 and
p∗i =
MβKt(n∗i )
2
.
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It remains to calculate what happens if τ 1U < τU ≤ τ 2U =
4(N/2)λγλt(N/2)2
t(N/2)+
2γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
. In this
case n∗1 = n
∗
2 = N/2 and both platforms set their prices such that the advertisers have
zero utility, e.g.
p∗i =
MβKt(N/2)
2
which is equation (3.13).
q.e.d.
The profit function is continuous but it has two kinks. In the following we provide
some comparative static analyses. First let us look at a change in the transportation
cost parameter τU .
Proposition 3.3
Platform profits are increasing in τU as long as τU ≤ τ 1U .
Profits are independent of τU if τ
1
U < τU ≤ τ 2U and profits are decreasing in
τU if τU > τ
2
U .
Proof
If τU ≤ τ 1U profit is given by (3.12) and the optimal number of advertisers is
given by (3.10). As was shown in the proof of Proposition 2, (3.10) is the first or-
der condition for the maximisation problem of platform i with respect to ni. Apply-
ing the Implicit Function Theorem to (3.10) yields that sign( ∂ni
∂τU
) = sign(∂(3.10)
∂τU
) =
− 1
2(τU )2
βKMnit(ni)U
′
B(ni), which is greater than zero. Differentiating equation (3.12)
with respect to τU gives
∂Π∗i
∂τU
= MβK
2
(t(ni) +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni)
∂ni
∂τU
. So sign( ∂Πi
∂τU
) = sign(t(ni) +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni). By equation (3.10), t(ni)+
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni− t(ni)
2γλnλi
τU
= 0. Since the last term of the
left hand side is negative t(ni) +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni > 0 which yields
∂Πi
∂τU
> 0.
If τ 1U < τU ≤ τ 2U profit is given by (3.14). Here n∗i = N2 and therefore (3.14) is
independent of τU .
If τU > τ
2
U profit is given by (3.17). In this case
∂Πi
∂tU
= −βKMNγλ(N/2)λ[ t(N/2)
2
(τU )2
] <
0.
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q.e.d.
The intuition behind this result is the following. τU represents the level of differ-
entiation between the two platforms from the perspective of the users. If τU is small
platforms have to compete fiercely for users. They do this by reducing their amount
of advertising. Thus prices are high and only few producers advertise. If τU increases
prices decrease. But profit is rising because more advertiser choose to advertise on the
platforms.57 In this region platforms do not compete for advertisers since n1 +n2 < N .
But when τU reaches τ
1
U all producers are advertising and competition for advertisers
starts. In the region between τ 1U and τ
2
U profits stay the same since it does not pay for
one platform to lower prices. But if τU rises further competition for advertisers lowers
prices. The reason is that it pays platforms to attract more advertisers because fewer
consumers will switch to the other platform. This strategic effect drives prices down.
But also profits are lower because both firms lower their prices and n∗i stays the same.
This shows that in a two-sided market with negative externalities a lower degree
of competition on one side can increase the competition on the other side and lead to
lower profits. This is never possible in a standard market with only one side.
It is also possible to derive a comparative static result with respect to γ, the nuisance
cost of advertising.
Proposition 3.4
If τU ≤ τ 2U platform profits are decreasing in γ but if τU > τ 2U the effect of
a change in γ on profits is ambiguous.
Proof
First look at the case τU ≤ τ 1U . Equation (3.10) is the first order condition of the
maximisation problem of platform i. By applying the Implicit Function Theorem we
57This result is also obtained by Barros, Kind & Sorgard (2003) in a different model.
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have
sign(∂ni
∂γ
)
= sign(∂t(ni)
∂γ
+ ni
∂2t(ni)
∂ni∂γ
+ niU
′
B(ni)
1
τU
∂t(ni)
∂γ
)
= sign(
nλi (1+λ)τU−n
2λ
i t(ni)γλ
v′′(t(ni))
)
= sign(−(1 + λ)τU + nλi γλt(ni)).
Multiplying (3.10) with τU
t(ni)
yields
τU +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni
τU
t(ni)
− t(ni)γλnλi = 0.
Thus τU > t(ni)γλn
λ
i and therefore τU(1 + λ) > t(ni)γλn
λ
i . This shows that
∂ni
∂γ
< 0.
If τU ≤ τ 1U profit is given by (3.12). Differentiating (3.12) with respect to γ yields
∂Πi
∂γ
= MβK
2
[t(ni)
∂ni
∂γ
+ ∂t(ni)
∂γ
ni].
Differentiating ∂t(ni)
∂γ
yields
nλi
v′′(t(ni)
< 0 and thus ∂Πi
∂γ
< 0.
If τ 1U < τU ≤ τ 2U profit is given by (3.14). Differentiating yields ∂Πi∂γ =
MβKN
4
∂t(ni)
∂γ
<
0.
If τU > τ
2
U profit is given by (3.17). Differentiating profit with respect to γ
yields sign(∂Πi
∂γ
) = sign(2t(ni)
2(v′′(t(ni)))
2 − t(ni)v′′(t(ni)) + 4t(ni)γv′′(t(ni))2 ∂t(ni)∂γ +
γτU
∂t(ni)
∂γ
v′′′(t(ni))).
The first two terms are positive the third term is negative and the fourth term is
unclear. So profit may increase or decrease in γ.
q.e.d.
γ represents the nuisance costs of advertising. So one would guess that profit
should decrease in γ because consumers spend less time on the platforms. Proposition
3.4 states that this is only true if platforms do not compete for advertisers, i.e. if τU
is low. In this case each user spends less time on platforms which results in a lower
possibility of trade of advertisers’ goods and thus in lower prices. But if τU is high
and platforms compete for advertisers, profit might increase in γ. The intuition is
that with a high τU platforms have an incentive to lower their prices to attract new
advertisers. This reduces profits. With a higher nuisance cost this effect is dampened
because each platform makes lower profits on new advertisers and thus prices might
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be higher compared with a lower γ. Thus a higher γ causes two effects on prices. The
first is that users are more disturbed by commercials which reduces prices. The second
is that competition is reduces which increases prices. The consequences on profits are
therefore not clear cut.
Now let us turn to the comparison of the Nash equilibrium with the efficient out-
come.
Proposition 3.5
If βKt(N/2) + βKN/2t′(N/2) + U ′B(N/2) > 0 advertising is efficient if
τU ≥ τ 1U and there is too little advertising if τU < τ 1U .
If there exists ni s.t.βKt(ni) + βKnit
′(ni) + U
′
B(ni) = 0, there can be too
much or too little advertising in equilibrium.
There is too little advertising if τU < min[τ
1
U , βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i )] and too much
if τU > min[τ
1
U , βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i )].
Only if τU = βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i ) ≤ τ 1U the equilibrium is efficient.
Proof
From Proposition 3.1 the optimal number of advertisers on each platform is given
by (3.6) or (3.7). First look at the case where there exists an ni < N/2 such that (3.7)
holds.
In the Nash equilibrium of the game neqi = N/2 if τU > τ
1
U . Thus it follows that
neqi > n
eff
i if τU > τ
1
U .
If τU < τ
1
U , n
eq
i is given by the first order condition (3.10). If we insert n
eff
i in this
first order condition we get from (3.7)
γλt(neffi )(n
eff
i )
λ−1
βK
− γλt(n
eff
i )
2neffi
τU

>
=
<
 0
or
τU

>
=
<
 βKneffi t(neffi ).
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So if τU > βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i ) the left hand side of equation (3.10) is zero at n
eq
i but it is
greater zero at neffi . Thus n
eq
i > n
eff
i .
If τU < βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i ) the left hand side of equation (3.10) is zero at n
eq
i but it is
lower than zero at neffi . Thus n
eq
i < n
eff
i .
It therefore follows that neqi > n
eff
i if τU > min[τ
1
U , βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i )] and n
eq
i < n
eff
i
if τU < min[τ
1
U , βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i )]. Only in the case when τU = βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i ) ≤ τ 1U the
equilibrium is efficient.
Now look at the case where neffi = N/2. We know that in equilibrium n
eq
i = N/2
if τU ≥ τ 1U and n
eq
i < N/2 if τU < τ
1
U .
The proposition follows.
q.e.d.
This shows that it depends on the level of τU whether the equilibrium is efficient or
not. If τU is low competition for users is fierce and therefore advertising levels are low.
Platforms do not take into account users’ utility loss from an additional commercial
but only the indirect externality on all advertisers. The reason is that only this indirect
externality can be reflected in their pricing behaviour. If competition for users is harsh
many users switch to the competitor if one platform has an additional advertiser. Thus
the advertising level is lower than the efficient level. From (3.6) and (3.7) we know
that τU does not play a role in determining the efficient advertising level. But it is
the important variable for platform competition. In the case when not all producers
should advertise there can be too much advertising if τU is high because competition
for users is low.
If all producers should advertise there can only be too little advertising. This is the
case if competition is fierce with the same line of reasoning as before.
3.5 Pricing Behaviour of Internet Portals
In this section we discuss the pricing behaviour of two internet portals, namely AOL
and GMX. We argue that the structure of their commercial prices fits the results of
the preceding section quite well.
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Both AOL and GMX are portals where members have access to free e-mail, get
informed about cheap offers of products and can inform themselves about specific
topics in so called affinity groups. It is costless to become a member of theses portals.
The portals get revenues from members only if the members buy some services from
the portals, like sending SMS or printing pictures. Usually these services are sold at
low prices.
The most important source for profits of the portals is advertising. There are
different forms of advertising on both portals but the most common ones are banners
on their web site. AOL sells a full-size banner on its homepage for 15 Euros per
thousand eye-balls, a half-size banner is sold for 10 Euros. A full-size banner on the
logout-page of AOL costs only 7 Euros, a half-size banner 5 Euros.58 A similar pricing
structure can be observed at GMX.59 At GMX a logout banner costs 15 Euros while a
comparable banner on the homepage costs 24 Euros.60
Where does this difference come from? Since these prices are per thousand eye-balls
one cannot argue that homepage prices are higher because more people are watching
the homepage. Instead a reason can be found from the arguments of the preceding
section. To attract advertisers portals have to attract users at first. But before a user
decides which portal to use he will compare the homepages of the portals. If one site
is plain while the other one is full of commercials while both portals can be used for
free he will most likely decide in favour of the plain one. Thus competition for users
occurs mainly on the homepages. This can explain the high prices for the homepage
banners. Thus homepages of portals do usually have few advertisements on it.
By contrast, only if a user has already decided to use a portal he will see the logout
page. So there is no more competition for users and prices for logout-banners are cheap.
For example, on the portal GMX usually four advert banners are on the logout page
but at most one the start page.
58See http://www.aol.de/mediaspace/preise/preistabelle/contentview.jsp
59See http://media.gmx.net/de/cgi/preise?LANG=de&AREA=homepage.
60Prices are higher at GMX than at AOL because banners are bigger and the form of advertising
is fancier.
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This provides some evidence that the degree of competition for users has a high
influence on commercial prices.
3.6 User Charge
In some markets it is not only possible for platforms to make money on advertisers
but to charge users for the consumption of platforms’ services as well. Examples are
pay-TV channels and newspapers. For example in Europe direct broadcast satellite
channels like Canal Plus or Premiere are partially financed by user charges. This is
also of policy interest since in the TV case it is becoming technically easier to exclude
viewers.
In our model the possibility of a user charge can be incorporated in an easy way. In
the following we assume that each platform i can charge users a fee ci for its services.
Then platform profit is given by
Πi = pini + Xici.
The indirect utility of a user who is located at x and uses platform i is given by
U(x, ni) = T − t(ni) + v(ti)− γt(ni)nλi − ci − τU |x− xi|.
Again, as in Section 3.2 we set T − t(ni) + v(ti) − γt(ni)nλi = UB(ni) so U(x, ni) =
UB(ni)−ci−τU |x−xi|. The assumption that all users choose one platform is maintained
so τU ≤ 2(UB(N/2)− c∗i ).
The marginal user is then given by
x =
1
2
+
1
2τU
(UB(n1)− UB(n2) + c2 − c1).
Conducting the same analysis as before gives a maximisation problem of platform 1 of
maxn1,c1 Π1 = {p2 + βKMt(n1)[12 +
1
2τU
(UB(n1)− UB(N − n1)) + c2 − c1]−
MβKt(N − n1)[12 +
1
2τU
(UB(N − n1)− UB(n1))]}n1
+c1M(
1
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(n1)− UB(n2) + c2 − c1))
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if all producers advertise. Formulating the first order condition and solving for pi and
ci yields
p∗i = Mγλ(N/2)
λ−1[t(N/2)− NβK
2v′′(t(N/2))
]
and
c∗i = τU − βKNt(N/2).61
The profit of the platform is given by
Π∗i = Mγλ(N/2)
λ[t(N/2)− NβK
2v′′(t(N/2))
] +
M
2
[τU − t(N/2)NβK].
Comparing this profit with the profit without a user charge we get
Πwith charge = Πwithout charge + [1− t(N/2)
NβK
τU
][Mλγt(N/2)(N/2)λ + τU
M
2
].
Thus the profit with user charge is higher if 1 − t(N/2)NβK
τU
> 0. But this is exactly
the formula for the user charge to be positive.
The profits in the case that not all producers advertise are computed in the same way
as in Section 3.3. This leads to the following equilibrium.
Proposition 3.6
If βK ≤ (N/2)
λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
then n∗i is implicitly given by
t(ni) + ni
∂t
∂ni
− t(ni)
nλ−1i γλ
βK
= 0, (3.19)
where a unique solution n∗i ∈ (0, N/2) exists, and
p∗i =
M
2
βKt(n∗i ) (3.20)
and
c∗i = τU − βKn∗i t(n∗i ). (3.21)
Profits of the platforms are
Π∗i =
1
2
MτU (3.22)
61For the moment we assume that ci can be positive or negative.
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If (N/2)
λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
< βK ≤ 2(N/2)
λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
2v′′(t(N/2))
then n∗i =
N
2
,
p∗i =
M
2
βKt(N/2) (3.23)
and
c∗i = τU − βKNt(N/2). (3.24)
Profits of the platforms are
Π∗i =
1
2
MτU . (3.25)
If βK > 2(N/2)
λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
2v′′(t(N/2))
then n∗i =
N
2
,
p∗i = Mγλ(N/2)
λ−1[t(N/2)− NβK
2v′′(t(N/2))
] (3.26)
and
c∗i = τU − βKNt(N/2). (3.27)
Profits of the platforms are
Π∗i = Mγλ(N/2)
λ[t(N/2)− NβK
2v′′(t(N/2))
] +
M
2
[τU − t(N/2)NβK]. (3.28)
Proof
If platforms set prices p∗i = Mγλ(N/2)
λ−1[t(N/2)− t(N/2) NβK
2v′′(t(N/2))
] the condition
under which N producers advertise is given by
M
2
βKt(N/2)− p∗i =
M
2
βKt(N/2)−Mγλ(N/2)λ−1[t(N/2)− NβK
2v′′(t(N/2))
] > 0
or
βK >
2(N/2)λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2) + γλ(N/2)
λ
2v′′(t(N/2))
.
In this case p∗i = and c
∗
i are given by (3.26) and (3.27).
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If not all N producers advertise there is no competition for advertisers. Thus each
platform set the price pi =
M
2
βKt(ni). The maximisation problem of platform i is thus
max
ni,ci
Πi = ni
M
2
βKt(ni)
which yields that n∗i is implicitly given by (3.19) and c
∗
i = τU − βKNt(n∗i ).
For the same reason is in the proof of Proposition 3.2 a unique solution n∗i ∈ (0, N/2)
exists.
Inserting ni = N/2 in (3.19) gives t(N/2) + N/2
∂t
∂ni
− t(N/2) (N/2)
λ−1γλ
βK
= 0 or
βK = (N/2)
λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
.
Thus if βK ≤ (N/2)
λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
then n∗i is given by (3.19). If βK >
(N/2)λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
then n∗i = N/2 and p
∗
i = and c
∗
i are given by (3.23) and (3.24).
q.e.d.
The profit can now be compared with the profit if a user charge is not possible.
Proposition 3.7
Suppose that platforms can set an unrestricted user charge. If this user
charge is positive in equilibrium profits are higher than without the user
charge.
Proof
To prove the proposition we compare the highest profit without a user charge with
the lowest profit with user charge.
Because of Proposition 3.2 the highest profit without a user charge is given by
Πwithout charge =
MβKt(N/2)
2
N/2.
The lowest profit with user charge is Πwith charge =
1
2
MτU . This is the case
because Mγλ(N/2)λ[t(N/2)− NβK
2v′′(t(N/2))
]+ M
2
[τU−t(N/2)NβK], which is the profit with
user charge if βK > 2(N/2)
λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
2v′′(t(N/2))
, is higher than 1
2
MτU if βK >
2(N/2)λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
2v′′(t(N/2))
.
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Now comparing Πwith charge =
1
2
MτU with Πwithout charge =
MβKt(N/2)
2
N/2
yields that Πwith charge > Πwithout charge if τU > N/2βKt(N/2). But this exactly
the condition for the user fee to be positive.
q.e.d.
We have shown that if the user charge is positive profits always increase. But if it is
negative profits might be lower than without this possibility. The intuition behind this
result is the following. If platforms have the possibility to set a user charge there are
two different ways to do that. The first is to set a higher commercial price to get rid of
some advertisers in order to make profits on users with a positive user charge. This is
the case if τU > βKNt(N/2). Both platforms set a higher p
∗
i so none of them loses many
advertisers. But they set c∗i > 0 as well which results in higher profits. The second
possibility is to subsidise users with a negative fee in order to attract more advertisers.62
But since both platforms do so in equilibrium they reduce their advertiser price as well
and profits are lower than without a user charge. Thus a prisoner’s dilemma situation
arises.63 Profits would be higher if the additional instrument of the user charge were
not available.
Differentiating with respect to τU yields that
∂Π∗i
∂τU
= M
2
> 0. So in contrast to the
case without user charge profits are always increasing in τU . The reason is that p
∗
i is
independent of τU while c
∗
i is increasing in τU . Thus if platforms can charge both sides
of the market the degree of competition on one side is only reflected in the price of
that side.
Let us turn now to the welfare analysis.
62A similar way of reasoning is given by Rochet & Tirole (2003). In two-sided markets the platforms
charge prices such that the side with the higher demand elasticity is subsidised by the side with the
lower demand elasticity.
63Similar effects are at work in Anderson & Leruth (1993) and Thisse & Vives (1988) where an
additional pricing instrument hurt firms.
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Proposition 3.8
If platforms can set an unrestricted user charge the equilibrium is efficient.
Proof
If βK ≤ (N/2)
λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
then in equilibrium n∗i is given by (3.19). But since
U ′B(ni) = −γλnλ−1i t(ni) equation (3.19) is the same as βKt(ni)+βKnit′(ni)+U ′B(ni) =
0 which is equation (3.7), the condition for efficiency if neffi < N/2.
If βK > (N/2)
λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
then n∗i = N/2. Routine manipulations of the inequality
yields that this inequality is the same as βKt(N/2) + βKN/2t′(N/2) + U ′B(N/2) > 0.
But this is inequality (3.6), the condition for efficiency if neffi = N/2.
q.e.d.
Why does the additional instrument of a user charge lead to the efficient outcome?
The intuition is that platforms now take users’ utility directly into account and not
only indirectly in the commercial prices. Since we have competition for users both
platforms set the fees in such a way that users allocate efficiently. On the side of the
advertisers there is Bertrand competition (although profits are positive). Advertisers
are allocated efficiently as well. The reason is that the efficient allocation helps both
firms to get higher revenue. Thus we show that with a second instrument at hand
competition for users and advertisers leads to the efficient outcome.
Up to now we assumed that the user charge is unrestricted so it can be negative.
But in many situations this is not practicable. TV watchers are not paid by stations or
internet users are not subsidised by portals. If the user fee is restricted to be positive
this means in our analysis that c∗i = max{0, τU − βKNt(n∗i )}. If τU < βKNt(n∗i ) this
constraint is binding. In this case it would be optimal for platforms in a symmetric
equilibrium to set c∗i = 0. But this exactly what we observe in many markets. Take
again the case of an internet portal. For them it would be technically no problem to
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charge a user if he wants to get access to their site. Instead they do not require users
to pay a fee in order to attract many users and make profits on advertisers.
In terms of welfare if a user charge has to be positive the equilibrium is no longer
generally efficient but only if τU > βKNt(n
∗
i ). So if the constraint on c
∗
i is binding the
result is the same as in the case without a user charge. To reach efficiency both pricing
instruments have to be unrestricted.64
3.7 Conclusion
This paper analysed a model of platform competition in which each advertiser exerts
a direct negative externality on users and an indirect one on all other advertisers on
the same platform. It was shown that the number of advertisements in equilibrium
can be too high or too low compared with the efficient one. Profits of platforms can
increase if they become less differentiated because this leads to lower competition on
the advertisers’ side. If platforms can set a user charge as well profits increase only
if this charge is positive in equilibrium. A prisoner’s dilemma result is possible. But
welfare is always higher with a user charge. We have also given anecdotal evidence
that supports our results in an example of pricing behaviour of internet portals .
An interesting suggestion for further research might be to analyse the dynamics
of such a two-sided market. Usually if people are used to one internet portal or read
a newspaper for several years they would not switch easily if another one has fewer
advertisements. People form habits. It would be interesting to analyse how such habit
formation might change the results. A new platform which enters the market after the
others (such as Google in the search engine case) needs a very low level of advertising
to induce consumers to switch. This is what was actually observed for Google. So the
question arises if this low level of advertising will persist or vanish over time.
64For a discussion of policy implications for two-sided markets see Evans (2004).
Chapter 4
Vertical Product Differentiation,
Market Entry, and Welfare
4.1 Introduction
There are a lot of different ways how an incumbent firm reacts when facing the threat
of entry. For example, in the pharmaceutical market after patent expiration some
formerly protected monopolists introduced their own generics to keep competitors out
of the market65 while others abstained from such practice and increased its price after
entry generic competitors.66
Another example is the airline industry. In Canada in fall 2000 the low cost carrier
CanJet Airlines entered the Toronto-Halifax market. The reaction of Air Canada, the
incumbent, was not to increase its price like in the pharmaceutical industry but to lower
its fares.67 A quite different strategy was pursued by British Airways. Its reaction on
the entry of low cost carriers on long haul routes was to reduce economy class capacity
and enlarge premium class capacity thereby increasing its average prices.68 Many flag
carriers instead tried to deter entry of low cost airlines by establishing their own ’no-
65See Hollis (2003).
66See Grabowski & Vernon (1992) or Frank & Salkever (1997).
67See Gillen (2002).
68See Johnson & Myatt (2003).
77
frills’-airline. This was done by British Airways on short-haul routes with the subsidiary
GO. In 2000 the Dutch carrier KLM followed and established Basiq Air and in 2002
the low cost carrier Germanwings was founded.69 Germanwings is an affiliate company
of Eurowings. In turn, Eurowings is controlled by the German flag carrier Lufthansa.
So a couple of questions arise. Why do incumbents pursue so many different strate-
gies to seemingly the same problem, namely threat of entry? Does an incumbent’s
strategy differ if it can produce only one quality level or a whole quality range? What
are the welfare consequences of this potential competition, i.e. does welfare always
increase in such a scenario or is it possible that a protected monopoly is better?
This chapter tries to answer these questions in a vertical product differentiation
framework. We compare a model where each firm can produce a single quality with
one where price discrimination over a quality range is possible. We show that in the
single quality case welfare with potential competition can be lower than in monopoly.
The intuition is that if qualities are strategic complements the incumbent lowers its
quality in comparison to monopoly and produces some middle range quality to deter
entry because it is impossible then for an entrant to find a profitable entry segment.
Even in case of entry such a quality reduction might be profitable, causing the entrant
to produce a low quality and reducing price competition. If qualities are strategic
substitutes the incumbent produces higher quality and welfare increases.
If firms can produce a quality range we find that consumer rent with potential
competition is higher than under monopoly. The intuition is that in order to deter
entry the incumbent enlarges its product line to occupy the lower segment as well. In
this case welfare increases as well. If entry cannot be deterred there is a gap between
the two firms’s quality ranges which reduces competition. In this case consumer rent
always increases because of lower prices while the consequences on welfare are unclear.
The reason is that some consumers buy a higher quality but others buy a lower one.
Specifically, we analyse a model of vertical product differentiation with entry. In
the first stage the incumbent produces a quality which cannot be changed in the sequel.
After observing this quality level the entrant decides if it wants to enter and if so which
69See Gilroy, Lukas, & Volpert (2003).
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quality level it wants to produce. In the third stage firms compete in prices dependent
on the produced quality levels.70
We compare this situation of potential competition with a situation of monopoly.
In monopoly the firm produces too low a level of quality. The reason is that the
monopolist can only charge one price which is the valuation of the marginal consumer.
The valuation of the inframarginal consumer is higher but cannot be represented in the
price. In the scenario of potential entry the incumbent can deter entry by varying its
quality level. If qualities are strategic complements in the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos,
& Klemperer (1985) a reduction of the incumbent’s quality leads to a reduction of
the entrant’s quality which lowers the entrant’s profit.71 If fixed costs of entry are
high enough entry is deterred by a quality reduction and welfare is lower than under
monopoly. Even in the case where entry is accommodated it might be profitable for
the incumbent to reduce its quality. The entrant lowers its quality as well which results
in lessened price competition. So even in case of competition it is possible that welfare
is lower than under monopoly. If products are strategic substitutes welfare rises in
both cases (entry deterrence and accommodation) because the incumbent increases
its quality.72 We also show that if marginal costs of production are low quality of
the incumbent in case of entry is higher than in monopoly. The intuition is that
the incumbent wishes to differentiate itself from its competitor by producing a higher
quality. If marginal costs are low it is not very costly to do so and quality in case of
entry is higher.
We also analyse a model where each firm can produce a whole range of different
qualities and engage in second-degree price discrimination. This model is compared
with the single quality case and we find that the results differ in some respects. In the
model with price discrimination the lowest quality of the incumbent and the highest
70Throughout the paper we assume that it is more profitable for the incumbent to be the high
quality firm than the low quality firm.
71In a different terminology which is used by Fudenberg & Tirole (1984) the strategy where the
incumbent reduces quality to deter entry is called the ’lean and hungry look’.
72In the terminology of Fudenberg & Tirole (1984) this strategy is called ’Top Dog’.
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quality of the entrant are strategic complements. So if the incumbent enlarges its
quality range the profit of the entrant decreases. Thus the incumbent’s entry deterrence
strategy is to expand its product line which results in a welfare increase because more
consumers are served. This is different from the single quality case where welfare in
case of entry deterrence can be lower if qualities are strategic complements. If fixed
costs of entry are low and the incumbent accommodates entry then we always get
a gap between the two product lines of incumbent and entrant in order to reduce
price competition. Thus some qualities in the middle range which are produced in
monopoly are no longer produced in duopoly. But more qualities in the lower segment
are produced in duopoly. The result is that some consumers buy higher quality in
duopoly while others buy lower quality. Therefore the consequence on welfare is not
clear. By contrast, it can be shown that consumer rent always increases in case of
entry due to increased price competition.
For both models, single quality case and price discrimination, we provide two em-
pirical examples from different industries where firms’ behaviour is similar to that
predicted by our model.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In the next section our model
is related to the existing literature. Section 4.3 presents the model and the equilibrium
without price discrimination. Some anecdotal evidence that supports the results is
given in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents the model, the equilibrium, and the welfare
consequences if price discrimination is possible. In Section 4.6 two practical examples
for such firm behaviour are given. Section 4.7 gives a short conclusion and some policy
implications. Most proofs of the results are presented in the Appendix.
4.2 Related Literature
Our model relates to the literatures on vertical product differentiation, second-degree
price discrimination, and market entry. We will give the relation to each of the three
branches and how our model differs from these literatures in turn.
The literature on quality competition started with the pioneering work of Gab-
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szewicz & Thisse (1979) and Shaked & Sutton (1982). In their models firms are re-
stricted to produce one quality level and compete in prices. In Gabszewicz & Thisse
(1979) firms’ qualities are exogenously given while in Shaked & Sutton (1982) firms
decide simultaneously about their quality levels in the stage before price competition.
Shaked & Sutton (1982) show that firms will produce different quality levels to avoid
fierce competition in the last stage of the game. Under some parameter constellations
only two firms are active in the market if there exist costs of entry. Shaked & Sutton
(1982) were the first to analyse the now common game structure where firms are com-
mitted to their quality levels when competing in prices because prices can be changed
at will while a quality change involves modifications of the production facilities.
Ronnen (1991) analyses a model with a similar framework as Shaked & Sutton
(1982) but where a regulation authority can set a minimum quality standard before
firms compete in qualities. In his model qualities are strategic complements. Thus if
the minimum quality standard is set (slightly) above the quality which is produced by
the low quality firm in a game without restriction, both qualities will rise in equilibrium.
Price competition is intensified and all consumers are better off while the high quality
firm loses. Ronnen (1991) shows that with an appropriately chosen standard social
welfare improves.
Cabrales (2003) looks at the consequence of a price ceiling. He shows that with a
lower price ceiling the market share of the high quality variant increases. The reason
is that market share depends on the ratio of price to quality. But the quality responds
less than proportionally to the price ceiling if the cost function is convex. He applies
his model to regulation issues in the pharmaceutical market.
In contrast to these models my paper analyses a sequential move game in the
quality decision. It might therefore be possible for the first mover to deter entry by an
appropriate quality choice. Also welfare in this sequential structure is compared with
a pure monopoly situation.
There are several papers which analyse competition between multiproduct firms.73
73Spulber (1989) analyses a model where firms are horizontally differentiated on a Hotelling line.
He shows that each firm produces the first best quality for the consumer who is located exactly at
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The closest to the model considered here are Champsaur & Rochet (1989) and Johnson
& Myatt (2003). Champsaur & Rochet (1989) analyse a duopoly where firms commit
in the first stage to a quality range and in the second stage compete in prices for each
produced quality. They show that firms produce non overlapping quality ranges (there
is always a gap between the two product lines) to reduce price competition. This result
appears in my paper as well. The difference is that in my paper quality decisions are
taken sequentially and one firm has a first mover advantage. This influences prices and
quality ranges and may results in entry deterrence. I also provide a welfare analysis.
Johnson & Myatt (2003) analyse an asymmetric duopoly. One firm (which is called
’incumbent’ by Johnson & Myatt (2003)) can produce the entire range of qualities while
the other (the ’entrant’) is limited to some range with an upper quality level. So the
incumbent can produce upgrade versions. Firms compete simultaneously in quantities
for each quality level. As is shown by Johnson & Myatt (2003) the incumbent may
produce fewer qualities (’product line pruning’) or more qualities (’fighting brands’)
in duopoly than in monopoly dependent on the cost function. If marginal revenue is
decreasing the quality range is reduced while the quality range might be broader if
marginal revenue is increasing in some regions.
A model of market entry in a vertical product differentiation framework is analysed
by Donnenfeld & Weber (1995).74 In their model there are two incumbents who face
the entry threat of a third firm. They show that the equilibrium depends on the level
of the fixed costs of entry. If these fixed costs are low entry is accommodated and the
incumbents select extreme qualities to reduce price competition. The entrant chooses
a quality in the middle.75 If fixed costs are in some middle range incumbents deter
entry. They do this by producing similar qualities which leads to harsh competition
the firm’s position while qualities for all other consumers are distorted downwards. Stole (1995) in
addition to Spulber (1989) considers the case where firms are uncertain about vertical preferences.
He finds that a similar result holds in this case.
74For a model of entry deterrence and horizontal preferences see Bonanno (1987).
75A similar result is obtained in Donnenfeld & Weber (1992) in the case without fixed costs. They
show that in this case the entrant’s profit is higher than the profit of the incumbent which produces
the lower quality.
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and low profits. If fixed costs are so high that entry is blockaded incumbents choose
sharply differentiated products to reduce competition. In contrast to Donnenfeld &
Weber (1995), my model analyses the behaviour of only one incumbent but firms can
produce quality ranges and engage in second degree price discrimination.
In short, models of vertical product differentiation usually do not consider the
possibility of price discrimination if entry is possible. So this paper makes a first
attempt to analyse the equilibrium and the welfare consequences of such a strategy.
4.3 The Model without Price Discrimination
This section presents the model where each firm can produce only one quality level.
Description of the Model
There is a continuum of consumers of mass 1. Each consumer purchases a single
unit of a good. If a consumer decides to purchase from firm i she gets a good of quality
qi at price pi. Consumers’ tastes are described by the parameter θ which is distributed
between 0 and 1 with distribution function F (θ) and density function f(θ). The utility
from purchasing from firm i can therefore be denoted as
U(qi, θ, pi) = u(qi, θ)− pi,
where u is assumed to be strictly concave in q and in θ and thrice continuously differ-
entiable. Consumers’ reservation value from not buying is normalised to zero.
We proceed by making a few assumptions on the utility and the distribution func-
tion.
A1 : Single Crossing Property : uqθ(q, θ) > 0
A2 : uqθθ(q, θ) ≤ 0, uqqθ(q, θ) ≥ 0
A3 : Monotone Hazard Rate Condition : ∂
∂θ
(
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
)
≤ 0.
A1 is the single crossing property. It states that utility and marginal utility go in the
same direction if θ increases. It implies that indifference curves cross only once. This
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assumption is standard in the literature. A2 imposes two technical assumptions that
guarantee that the second order conditions are satisfied. A3 is a standard assumption
in the adverse selection literature and is called monotone hazard rate condition. It
is satisfied by many distribution functions like the uniform distribution, the normal
distribution etc.
There are two firms i = 1, 2. Firm 1 is the incumbent and firm 2 the potential
entrant. If a firm decides to produce quality q it has to incur development costs c(q)
with c′(q) > 0 and c′′(q) > 0.76 c(q) is the same for both firms. Marginal costs are
denoted v and are the same for both firms as well.
The game structure is as follows. The game has three stages. In stage 1 firm 1
chooses q1. Firm 2 decides about market entry in stage 2 after observing the choice of
firm 1. If firm 2 decides not to enter firm 1 is a monopolist in stage three and decides
about p1. If firm 2 enters it has to incur fixed costs of market entry of F
77 and chooses
q2 in stage 2. Firm 1 observes q2 and in stage 3 both firms set their prices p1 and p2
conditional on q1 and q2.
The important feature of the model is that both firms are committed to the quality
they produce. In particular it is not possible for firm 1 to make a later change in the
quality to which it has committed in stage 1.78 This time structure represents the idea
that it is easy and almost costlessly possible to change prices but it takes a considerable
amount of time and costs to change the quality of a good.79
Monopoly Situation
First let us look at the monopoly case as a benchmark which is later compared
with the results of the entry game. So suppose firm 1 is a monopolist and there is no
76c(q) satisfies the standard Inada-conditions limq→0 c′(q) = 0 and limq→∞ c′(q) = ∞.
77These entry costs might contain advertising expenditures to inform consumers about the entrant’s
product, investment in transportation channels and so on.
78For a model where such commitment is only partially possible see Henkel (2003).
79This line of reasoning is followed in most models of vertical product differentiation, see for example
Shaked & Sutton (1982) or Ronnen (1991).
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potential entrant. In other words stage 2 of the game does not exist and firm 1 chooses
first q1 and then p1. Let the marginal consumer who is served by the monopolist be
called θmonm . If quality is q1 this marginal consumer is given by u(q1, θ
mon
m ) − p1 = 0.
So all types θmonm ≤ θ ≤ 1 are buying from the monopolist while all types θ < θmonm are
not buying. In the last stage the monopolist chooses its price given quality q1. The
maximisation problem is thus
max
p1
Π1 =
∫ 1
θmonm
[p1 − vq1]f(θ)dθ − c(q1).
Since θmonm is determined by p1 it is convenient to make a change in the decision variables
and let θmonm be the decision variable. Thus we have
max
θmonm
Π1 =
∫ 1
θmonm
[u(q1, θ
mon
m )− vq1]f(θ)dθ − c(q1).
This results in a first order condition of
∂Π1
∂θmonm
= −f(θmonm )[u(q1, θmonm )− vq1] + (1− F (θmonm ))uθ(q1, θmonm ) = 0. (4.1)
Because of Assumption A3 the second order condition is globally satisfied.
The first order condition as usual states that the marginal gain from serving an
additional consumer type (first term) is equal to the loss on all other consumers because
of the price reduction (second term).
Turning to the first stage where the firm decides about quality q1 we get a first
order condition of80
∂Π1
∂q1
= (1− F (θmonm ))[uq1(q1, θmonm )− v]− c′(q1) = 0. (4.2)
The second order condition is globally satisfied because of uq1q1(q1, θ
mon
m ) < 0 and
c′′(q1) > 0. Thus we get that θ
mon∗
m is given by (4.1), p
mon∗ = u(qmon∗1 , θ
mon∗
m ) and q
mon∗
1
is given by (4.2).
A comparison of the monopolistic outcome with the welfare maximising outcome
yields
80Because of the Envelope Theorem terms with ∂Π1∂θmonm
∂θmonm
∂q1
= 0 and can therefore be ignored in
the first order condition.
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Proposition 4.1
Compared with the welfare-maximizing θWFm and q
WF a monopolist serves
too few consumers, θmon∗m > θ
WF
m , and provides too low a quality q
WF >
qmon∗1 .
Proof
See the Appendix.
The result that too few consumers are served by a monopolist is standard. The
intuition for the quality distortion is that the monopolist can charge only one price
namely pmon∗1 = u(q
mon∗
1 , θ
mon∗
m ) for its produced quality. So by increasing quality it
can only increase its price by the amount that the utility of the marginal consumer
rises. But the utility of all types θ > θmon∗m rises more from a quality increase than the
utility of the marginal consumer because of the single crossing property. Thus from a
welfare point of view quality in monopoly is too low. Since the monopolist also serves
too few consumers the downward distortion of quality is intensified.
Potential Competition
Now let us turn to the three stage game in which firm 2 can enter the market in
stage 2. In the following let us define q2(q1) as the best answer of firm 2 if it enters
in response to firm 1 producing q1. Before starting with the analysis we need two
additional assumptions:
A4 : Π2(q
mon∗
1 , q2(q
mon∗
1 )) > 0
A5 : Π1(q
H
1 , q2(q
H
1 )) > Π1(q
L
1 , q2(q
L
1 ))
whenever qH1 > q2(q
H
1 ) and q
L
1 < q2(q
L
1 ).
The first assumption states that the profit of firm 2 is positive if firm 1 produces its
optimal monopoly quality. The assumption is made to avoid the uninteresting case
that it is an equilibrium if firm 1 produces its monopoly quality and firm 2 stays out of
the market. In the terminology of Bain (1956) this would mean that entry is blockaded.
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Assumption A5 states that firm 1’s profit is higher if it is the high quality firm, i.e.
produces such a quality in stage 1 that the optimal response of firm 2 is to produce a
lower quality in stage 2.
As usual the game is solved by backwards induction.
In the third stage there are two possibilities. Either firm 2 has entered in stage 2
and there is competition or firm 2 stayed out of the market and firm 1 is a monopolist.
If firm 1 is a monopolist the marginal consumer is determined in the same way as in
the last subsection and θmonm is given by (4.1) given the quality q1 firm 1 has produced
in stage 1 (which is different from qmon∗1 because of Assumption A4.)
If firm 2 has entered the market in stage 2 firms compete for consumers in stage
3. Because of Assumption A5 firm 1 will always produce a quality q1 such that it is
optimal for firm 2 to produce q2 < q1. It is therefore apparent that firm 1 will serve
higher consumer types. The marginal consumer θduom1 who is indifferent between buying
from firm 1 and buying from firm 2 is given by u(q1, θ
duo
m1 ) − p1 = u(q2, θduom1 ) − p2 or
p1 = p2 + u(q1, θ
duo
m1 )− u(q2, θduom1 ). Thus firm 1’s profit function is given by
Π1 =
∫ 1
θduom1
[p2 + u(q1, θ
duo
m1 )− u(q2, θduom1 )− vq1]f(θ)dθ − c(q1).
Maximising this with respect to θduom1 yields
∂Π1
∂θduom1
= −f(θduom1 )[p2 + u(q1, θduom1 )− u(q2, θduom1 )− vq1]+
(1− F (θduom1 ))(uθ(q1, θduom1 )− uθ(q2, θduom1 )) = 0.
(4.3)
The second order condition is globally satisfied because of Assumptions A2 and A3.
Concerning firm 2 the marginal consumer θduom2 who is indifferent between buying
at firm 2 and buying nothing is given by u(q2, θ
duo
m2 )− p2 = 0 or p2 = u(q2, θduom2 ). Thus
the profit function of firm 2 is
Π2 =
∫ θduom2
θduom1
[u(q2, θ
duo
m2 )− vq2]f(θ)dθ − c(q2)− F.
The first order condition is
∂Π2
∂θduom2
= −f(θduom2 )[u(q2, θduom2 )− vq2] + (1− F (θduom2 ))uθ(q2, θduom2 ) = 0. (4.4)
Again because of Assumption A3 the second order condition is satisfied.
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In equilibrium marginal consumers θ∗m1 and θ
∗
m2 are given by (4.3) and (4.4) and
equilibrium prices are given by p∗1 = u(q2, θ
∗
m2) + u(q1, θ
∗
m1) − u(q2, θ∗m1) and p∗2 =
u(q2, θ
∗
m2).
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Now let us look at stage 2 and suppose for the moment that firm 2 has entered. In
this case firm 2 maximises its profit with respect to q2 which yields
∂Π2
∂q2
= (F (θ∗m1)− F (θ∗m2))(uq(q2, θ∗m2)− v) + [u(q2, θ∗m2)− vq2]f(θ)
∂θ∗m1
∂q2
− c′(q2) = 0.
(4.5)
The second order condition is satisfied because of uqq(q, θ) < 0 and c
′′(q) > 0. q∗2 is
given by (4.5) and since θ∗m1 is dependent on q1, q
∗
2 is dependent on q1 as well.
Firm 2 only enters if
∫ θ∗m2
θ∗m1
[u(q∗2, θ
∗
m2)− vq∗2]f(θ)dθ − c(q∗2) > F.
Firm 1 in stage 1 does now take into account that q∗2 depends on q1. Its first order
condition if firm 2 enters is given by
∂Π1
∂q1
= (1− F (θ∗m1))(uq1(q1, θ∗m1)− v
−[uq2(q∗2, θ∗m1)− uq2(q∗2, θ∗m2)− uθ(q∗2, θ∗m2)]
∂θ∗m2
∂q∗2
∂q∗2
∂q1
)− c′(q1) = 0.
(4.6)
But if F is high enough then firm 1 also has the possibility to choose q1 in such a way
that firm 2 does not enter. Let us denote the quality that deters entry of firm 2 by
qED1 . It is given by∫ θ∗m2
θ∗m1
[u(q∗2(q
ED
1 ), θ
∗
m2)− vq∗2(qED1 )]f(θ)dθ − c(q∗2(qED1 )) = F.
If firm 1 produces this qED1 it is a monopolist in stage 3 and earns profits of
ΠED1 =
∫ 1
θ∗m(q
ED
1 )
[u(qED1 , θ
∗
m(q
ED
1 ))− vqED1 ]f(θ)dθ − c(qED1 ).
Thus firm 1 engages in entry deterrence if and only if
ΠED1 =
∫ 1
θ∗m(q
ED
1 )
[u(qED1 , θ
∗
m(q
ED
1 ))− vqED1 ]f(θ)dθ − c(qED1 ) >∫ 1
θ∗m1
[u(q∗2, θ
∗
m2) + u(q
∗
1, θ
∗
m1)− u(q∗2, θ∗m1)− vq∗1]f(θ)dθ − c(q∗1) = Πduo1 .
81Variables marked with a star indicate equilibrium values of the game after firm 2 has entered.
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We are now in a position to state the equilibrium of the game:
• If ΠED1 > Πduo1 then firm 1 chooses qED1 , firm 2 does not enter in stage 2 and
p∗1 = u(q
ED
1 , θ
∗
m) where θ
∗
m is given by (4.1) with q1 = q
ED
1 .
• If ΠED1 ≤ Πduo1 then q∗1 is given by (4.6), firm 2 enters in stage 2 and q∗2 is given by
(4.5). θ∗m1 and θ
∗
m2 are given by (4.3) and (4.4) and p
∗
1 = u(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m2)+u(q
∗
1, θ
∗
m1)−
u(q∗2, θ
∗
m1) and p
∗
2 = u(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m2).
Now this equilibrium with potential competition can be compared with the monopoly
equilibrium. First look at the case where firm 2 enters. In this case fixed costs of mar-
ket entry are so low that it does not pay for firm 1 to choose qED1 such that firm 2 does
not enter. Instead firm 1 sets q∗1 according to (4.6).
Proposition 4.2
q∗1 > q
mon∗
1 if and only if
v < uq1(q
mon∗
1 , θ
∗
m1)−
∂q∗2
∂q1
[(uq2(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m1) + uq2(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m2)
−uθ(q∗2, θ∗m2))
∂θ∗m2
∂q∗2
)]( 1
F (θmon∗m )−F (θ∗m1)
)
(4.7)
Proof
qmon∗1 is given by (4.2),
∂Π1
∂q1
= (1− F (θmon∗m ))(uq1(q1, θmon∗m )− v)− c′(q1) = 0,
while q∗1 is given by (4.6),
∂Π1
∂q1
= (1− F (θ∗m1))(uq1(q1, θ∗m1)− v − (uq2(q∗2, θ∗m1) + uq2(q∗2, θ∗m2)
−uθ(q∗2, θ∗m2))∂θm2∂q∗2
∂q∗2
∂q1
− c′(q1) = 0.
Evaluated at qmon∗1 , (4.6) becomes
[F (θmon∗m )− F (θ∗m1)](uq1(qmon∗1 , θ∗m1)− v)−
((uq2(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m1) + uq2(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m2)− uθ(q∗2, θ∗m2)) ∂θ∂q∗2 )
∂q∗2
∂q1
,
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which can be greater or smaller than zero. Solving for v yields
uq1(q
mon∗
1 , θ
∗
m1)− [(uq(q∗2, θ∗m1) + uq2(q∗2, θ∗m2)
−uθ(q∗2, θ∗m2)) ∂θ∂q∗2
∂q∗2
∂q1
]
(
1
F (θmon∗m )−F (θ∗m1)
)

>
=
<
 v.
If ′ >′ is true the first derivative of the profit function of firm 1 after entry
is increasing at qmon∗1 while it is zero at q
∗
1. Since the function is globally
concave qmon∗1 < q
duo∗
1 .
q.e.d.
This shows that the quality level of the incumbent increases after entry if and only
if marginal costs are lower than a given threshold. At first glance one may would have
guessed that the quality level of firm 1 in duopoly is always higher achieving a higher
degree of differentiation from the entrant’s quality. But with high marginal costs this
is not true. The reason is that in case of competition it is harder for the incumbent to
extract consumer rent. Thus it does not pay to produce high quality if this comes at
high costs.
More specifically, let us have a closer look at inequality (4.7). It is obvious from
equation (4.2) that uq1(q
mon∗
1 , θ
∗
m1) > v. Thus if the term [−
∂q∗2
∂q1
[(uq2(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m1)+uq2(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m2)
− uθ(q∗2, θ∗m2))
∂θ∗m2
∂q∗2
)]( 1
F (θmon∗m )−F (θ∗m1)
)] is greater than zero the right hand side of (4.7) is
higher than the left hand side and we have q∗1 > q
mon∗
1 . To get an intuition for the result
suppose that θ∗m1 < θ
mon∗
m (and thus F (θ
∗
m1) < F (θ
mon∗
m )).
82 Then this term is positive
if
∂q∗2
∂q1
< 0, i.e. qualities are strategic substitutes. In this case an increase in q∗1 has a
favourable impact for firm 1 on q∗2, namely a reduction of q
∗
2. Thus q
∗
1 unambiguously
increases with competition. If instead
∂q∗2
∂q∗1
> 0 the qualities are strategic complements.
In this case it might be optimal for firm 1 to set q∗1 < q
mon∗
1 to induce firm 2 to lower
its quality as well. Firm 1 will do so if variable costs are high because then costs can
be reduced and competition is lowered by the reaction of firm 2.
82In the next proposition it is shown that this is always the case if u(q, θ) = θq.
90
To gain some insights into welfare comparisons between monopoly and potential
competition we have to give a bit more structure to the model.
Proposition 4.3
Let u(q, θ) = θq. If qualities are strategic substitutes welfare unambiguously
rises with entry.
Proof
See the Appendix.
If u(q, θ) = θq firm 1 serves more consumers in duopoly than in monopoly. The
reason is that the quality deflated price
p∗1
q∗1
is lower.83 This follows from the fact that
θ∗m1 < θ
mon∗
m which for the specific utility function means that
p∗1−p
∗
2
q∗1−q
∗
2
<
pmon∗1
qmon∗1
, and
the fact that
p∗2
q∗2
<
pmon∗1
qmon∗1
. Taken together this implies that
p∗1
q∗1
<
pmon∗1
qmon∗1
. Thus more
consumers are buying from the incumbent. If its quality in duopoly is higher as well
then welfare in duopoly is for sure higher. This is the case if qualities are strategic
substitutes because then firm 2 reduces its quality as reaction to a quality increase
of firm 1, which is profitable for firm 1. It should be mentioned that if qualities are
strategic substitutes welfare necessarily increases. But the ”only if” statement is not
true. Even in case if qualities are strategic complements welfare can rise because more
consumers are buying in duopoly. But it is also possible that welfare decreases because
the incumbent reduces its quality and this quality reduction effect dominates the effect
that more consumers are served.
Now let us turn to the case where firm 1 deters entry of firm 2. In this case firm
1 produces qED1 and is a monopolist thereafter. From Proposition 4.1 we know that a
monopolist distorts quality downwards. So whether welfare in case of entry deterrence
is higher than welfare in a pure monopoly situation depends on qED1 in comparison
with qmon∗1 . If q
ED
1 > (<)q
mon∗
1 welfare in case of entry deterrence is higher (lower).
83This result is obtained in many models of quality competition, see e.g. Bae & Choi (2003) or
Banerjee (2003). In these models quality is exogenous. In the paper here it is shown that this result
holds for endogenous quality choice as well.
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But this depends on the reaction of q∗2 on q
∗
1. If e.g.
∂q∗2
∂q∗1
< 0 the incumbent has
to increase its quality to keep the entrant out of the market. pmon∗1 is always given
by pmon1 = u(q
mon∗
1 , θ
mon∗
m ). Thus a change in q
mon∗
1 leads to a change in p
mon∗
1 of
uqmon∗1 (q
mon∗
1 , θ
mon∗
m ) but θ
mon∗
m stays unchanged and we get the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4
If qualities are strategic substitutes welfare in case of entry deterrence is
higher than in a protected monopoly. If qualities are strategic complements
the reverse is true.
This shows that the threat of entry can either increase or decrease welfare depending
on the strategic reaction of firm 2 to the quality of firm 1. In the most general model it
is impossible to assess whether qualities are strategic substitutes or complements. But
we can make a general conclusion in the specific framework of Mussa & Rosen (1978).
In their model θ is uniformly distributed, u(q, θ) = θq, v = 0, and c(q) = 1
2
q2.
Proposition 4.5
In the linear-uniform-quadratic case of Mussa & Rosen (1978) qualities are
strategic complements.
Proof
See the Appendix.
So in the uniform-linear-quadratic case welfare decreases with potential entry if
fixed costs from entry are high enough such that entry is deterred. The reason is that
the incumbent distorts its quality further downwards so that it is not profitable for the
entrant to occupy the low quality segment and therefore the entrant stays out of the
market. But this downward distortion of quality lowers welfare. In Section 4.5 this
result will be contrasted with a model where both firms can produce many different
quality levels.
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4.4 Discussion
The preceding analysis points to cost-and demand-function-based reasons for an incum-
bent to increase or decrease its quality and price after entry. In this section we turn
to a discussion of some empirical examples from different markets that give anecdotal
evidence for our results.
4.4.1 Pricing of Pharmaceuticals after Generic Entry
In the market for pharmaceuticals, patents protect drug developers after the develop-
ment of a new pharmaceutical. The aim of these patents is to give developing firms
an incentive to develop new pharmaceuticals because they can earn monopoly rents
during the patent period. After the expiry of the patent, entry of generic drugs is
possible. In the US the Watchman-Hax Act in 1984 makes it easier for generic firms
to enter the market.84 This makes the pharmaceutical market a suitable example for
applying the results of the previous section.
By Proposition 4.2 our theory predicts that if variable marginal costs of production
are low, quality and price of the brand-name drug should increase after entry. In the
production of pharmaceuticals marginal costs are very low compared with research and
development costs. For example, in the US the pharmaceutical industry has spent the
largest fraction of its sales receipts to research and development among all US industries
with comparable data (US Federal Trade Commission (1985)). So one would predict
that prices increase after generic entry. This is confirmed by empirical studies. Scherer
(2000) gives an example of the expiry of the product patent covering the cephalosporin
antibiotic cephalexin in April 1987. This was sold under the brand name Keflex. After
entry the price of Keflex rose from around $60 (per 100 capsules) to $85 in 1990.
During this time the prices of generics went down from $30 to $15. Frank & Salkever
84The reason is that testing requirements for generics have been relaxed. It is only necessary to
demonstrate that the drug has the same ingredients as the original, that the formulation was absorbed
in the blood stream at more or less the same time, and to document good manufacturing practices of
the generic firm. See Scherer (2000), p. 1321.
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(1997) looked at 45 drugs which faced generic competition for the first time after the
Watchman-Hax Act. They found that brand-name prices increased by 50% five years
after generic entry. Similar pricing patterns were obtained in the studies by Grabowski
& Vernon (1992) and Scherer (1996). This supports the prediction that if variable
marginal costs are low prices will rise after entry.
Rising quality is a bit harder to explain because normally quality of drugs stayed
unchanged. But the brand-name producers tried to increase consumers’ perceived qual-
ity via advertising during the period of patent protection. Scherer (2000) states that in
1998 in the USA producers spend about $1 billion on direct-to-consumer advertising.85
This amount can not only be seen as informative advertising but is also done to con-
vince consumers of the product’s quality and to separate from generics. After entry,
advertisement was reduced because of the fear that this would also spur the sales of
the new competitors. Thus in the market for pharmaceuticals brand-name producers
did not increase the real quality of the drugs. Instead they increased perceived quality
when faced with the threat of entry.
4.4.2 The Market for Fragrance and Cosmetics
In Singapore for a long time cosmetics were sold exclusively by authorised distributors
and listed retailers. These firms demand high prices and had high price-cost margins.
For example, consumers had to pay $35 to $38 for a lipstick at cosmetic counters
of department stores but it costs only US $0.50 to manufacture a lipstick.86 These
lipsticks are imported from the US or Europe so one had to add transportation costs.
Still price cost margins were high.
In the late 1980s the parallel importer B&N entered the market. B&N imported
the same products as the authorised distributors but had a simple business strategy,
namely price cuts. It sold a Christian Dior lipstick at $19 or $2087 and in general
offered the cosmetics up to 50% below the prices of listed retailers. The products are
85See also Caves, Whinston & Hurwitz (1991).
86See Lee, Lim & Tan (2001).
87”Parallel Importers Make Cosmetic Firms See Red”, The Straits Time, October 7, 1994, p.44.
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qualitatively similar but disadvantages for B&N were that the company was unknown
at the beginning of their business and that authorised distributors placed their products
on premium space and had set up cosmetic counters at department stores. What was
the reaction of distributors to the entry of B&N? Beside negative advertising about
parallel imports and lawsuits their main response consisted in price cuts. For example
they lowered the lipstick price from $34 to $28.88
In contrast to the pharmaceutical market in the market for fragrance and cosmetics
marginal costs play the important role compared to development costs. The only source
of development costs is the building up of connections to importers. But the main bulk
of costs a retailer has to bear are the delivering costs of lipsticks, the advertising costs,
and the rents to be paid to department stores for display on premium space. In this
respect the retailers also reduced the quality of their offers. They set up fewer cosmetic
counters in stores and spend less money on costly advertising.89 But especially with
cosmetics and fragrance the conveyed life-style of the products is very important and
this can be mainly given by advertising. Since the retailers do not manufacture the
cosmetics themselves the physical quality if the products stays the same. But the
quality was reduced from the perspective of the consumers since the products are no
longer displayed on premium space and are less advertised. Thus the observations in
this market go in line with the predictions of our theory that an incumbent’s price and
quality decrease if marginal variable costs are high.
4.5 The Model with Price Discrimination
This section analyses a model where firms can produce many different qualities which
can be sold at different prices. The results of this model are later compared with the
results of Section 4.3.
88”Parallel Imports: Copyright Owners Fight Back”, The Straits Time, August 12, 1996, p.31.
89See Lee, Lim & Tan (2001).
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Model Framework
Consumers’ utility functions, the distribution of preferences, firms’ cost functions,
and the game structure is the same as in Section 4.3. The only difference is that each
firm can now produce not only one quality but many different qualities which are sold
at different prices. We are therefore in a problem of adverse selection. We assume that
for each quality a firm produces it has to bear development costs c(q)90 and variable
costs v. Assumptions A1, A2, and A3 are kept as well.
Monopoly Situation
As in Section 4.3 before solving the game consider the benchmark case where firm
1 is a monopolist. In this case we are in a standard mechanism design problem
of second-degree price discrimination. The firm’s problem is to choose the optimal
quality-payment schedule and the marginal consumer θmonm subject to the standard
participation and incentive compatibility constraints,
maxq(θ),p(θ),θmonm Π1 =
∫ 1
θmonm
[p(θ)− vq(θ)]f(θ)dθ −
∫ 1
θmonm
c(q)dθ
s.t. u(q(θ), θ)− p(θ) ≥ 0 ∀θ ≥ θmonm
u(q(θ), θ)− p(θ) ≥ u(q(θ̂), θ)− p(θ̂) ∀θ, θ̂ ≥ θmonm .
The equilibrium is characterised in the following lemma:
Lemma 1
The optimal q(θ)mon?, p(θ)mon?, θmon?m are given by the following equations:
pmon?(θ) = u(qmon?(θ), θ)−
∫ θ
θmon?m
∂u(qmon?(τ), τ)
∂θ
dτ, (4.8)
∂u(qmon?(θ), θ)
∂q
−
(1− F (θ)
f(θ)
)∂2u(qmon?(θ), θ)
∂q∂θ
−v− c
′(qmon?(θ))
f(θ)
= 0, (4.9)
90Theoretically the assumption of development costs for each quality is necessary to avoid that firm
1 can costlessly commit to the whole range of qualities. If this is possible we get trivial equilibria in
which firm 2 is always kept out of the market.
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[u(qmon?(θmon?m ), θ
mon?
m )− vqmon?(θmon?m )]f(θmon?m )− c(qmon?(θ))
= (1− F (θmon?m ))
∂u(qmon?(θmon?m ),θ
?
m)
∂θmon?m
.
(4.10)
Proof
See the Appendix.
The first two equations are standard in second degree price discrimination. The
first states that the price for each type θ is the utility type θ gets from buying a good
of quality qmon?(θ) minus a term which is increasing in θ. So higher types get a higher
utility to prevent them from choosing the contract designed for the lower types. The
second equation states that the quality a type θ gets is increasing in θ but is always
lower than the optimal quality except for θ = 1. This is the famous ’no-distortion-at-
the-top-result’. The third equation states that the marginal consumer is characterised
in such a way that the net gain of serving him (the left hand side of (4.10)) is exactly
equal to the loss that occurs to the firm because it has to give a higher rent to the
inframarginal consumers (the right hand side of (4.10)).
Concerning welfare the firm offers a whole range of qualities where higher types get
higher quality. But except for the highest type quality is distorted downwards.
Analysis of the Duopoly Situation
In the following we denote the quality range of firm 1 Q1 = [q
−
1 , q
+
1 ] and the quality
range of firm 2 Q2 = [q
−
2 , q
+
2 ]. Q2(Q1), as in Section 4.3, is the best response of firm 2
after entry if firm 1 produces a quality range Q1. If the quality ranges do not overlap,
i.e. the lowest quality of firm i, q−i , is higher than the highest quality of firm j, q
+
j , we
say that Qi > Qj.
91
Again before starting with the analysis of the entry game we make two assumptions
which are modifications of assumptions A4 and A5 of Section 4.3.
A4′ : Π2(Q
mon
1 , Q2(Q
mon
1 )) > 0.
91In Lemma 4.2 we show that in equilibrium this is always the case.
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Qmon1 is the quality range firm 1 produces in the monopoly case and A4
′ states that
firm 2 enters if firm 1 produces Qmon1 .
A5′ : Π1(Q
H
1 , Q2(Q
H
1 )) > Π1(Q
L
1 , Q2(Q
L
1 ))
whenever QH1 > Q2(Q
H
1 ) and Q
L
1 < Q2(Q
L
1 ).
Assumption A5′ states that it is profitable for firm 1 to be the high quality firm, i.e.
producing a quality range which is above the one of firm 2.
Again the game is solved by backwards induction. First look at the case where firm
2 did not enter in stage 2. By the same calculations as in the monopoly case we get
that prices are p?(θ) = u(q(θ), θ)−
∫ θ
θ?m
∂u(q(τ),τ)
∂θ
dτ . This prices are independent of the
ends of the quality range firm 1 has produced in stage 1.
Now let us turn to the case where firm 2 entered in stage 2.92 We have to determine
the prices given that firm 1 produces quality range Q1 and firm 2 produces quality range
Q2.
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For simplicity let us assume first that q−1 > q
+
2 . We will later show that this
is always the case. The marginal consumer θm who is indifferent between buying
q−1 and q
+
2 is given by u(q
−
1 , θm) − p1(θ(q−1 )) = u(q+2 , θm) − p2(θ(q+2 )) or p1(θ(q−1 )) =
p2(θ(q
+
2 )) + u(q
−
1 , θm) − u(q+2 , θm). Firm 1’s maximisation problem in stage 3 can be
written as
maxp1(θ),p1(q−1 ) Π1 =
∫ 1
θ(q−1 )
[p1(θ)− vq(θ)]f(θ)d(θ)+∫ θ(q−1 )
θm
[p1(q
−
1 )− vq−1 ]f(θ)dθ −
∫ 1
θ(q−1 )
c(q(θ))dθ
s.t. u(q(θ), θ)− p1(θ) ≥ u(q+2 , θ)− p2(q+2 ) ∀θ ≥ θm
u(q(θ), θ)− p1(θ) ≥ u(q(θ̂), θ)− p1(θ̂) ∀θ, θ̂ ≥ θm,
92The analysis in this section draws heavily on Champsaur & Rochet (1989). The difference is that
firms choose qualities simultaneously in Champsaur & Rochet (1989) while in my model qualities are
chosen sequentially. But the analysis of the second and the third stage is quite similar.
93In principle we should analyse the third stage for arbitrary (Q1, Q2). However, this is clearly
impossible to do. But one can put the restriction on (Q1, Q2) that there is never a whole in one of two
quality ranges for the same reason as for the monopolist. For a discussion on that issue and why it is
reasonable to conduct the analysis in the way as it is done in this chapter see Champsaur & Rochet
(1989).
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where θ(q−1 ) is the highest type who buys quality q
−
1 .
Firm 2’s maximisation problem in stage 3 is
maxp2(θ),p2(q+2 ) Π2 =
∫ θ(q+2 )
θm2
[p2(θ)− vq(θ)]f(θ)d(θ)
+
∫ θm
θ(q+2 )
[p2(q
+
2 )− vq+2 ]f(θ)dθ −
∫ θ(q+2 )
θm2
c(q(θ))dθ
s.t. u(q(θ), θ)− p2(θ) ≥ u(q−1 , θ)− p1(q−1 ) ∀θ < θm
u(q(θ), θ)− p2(θ) ≥ u(q(θ̂), θ)− p2(θ̂) ∀θ, θ̂ < θm,
where θ(q+2 ) is the lowest type who buys quality q
+
2 .
Solving for p1(θ) and p2(θ) yields for the same reasons as in Lemma 4.1
p1(θ) = u(q(θ), θ)−
∫ θ
θ(q−1 )
∂u(q(τ), τ)
∂θ
dτ + p1(q
−
1 )− u(q−1 , θ(q−1 )), (4.11)
and
p2(θ) = u(q(θ), θ)−
∫ θ
θm2
∂u(q(τ), τ)
∂θ
dτ + p2(q
+
2 )− u(q+2 , θ(q+2 )). (4.12)
Plugging this back in the profit function and solving for p1(q
−
1 ) and p2(q
+
2 ) gives
p∗1(q
−
1 ) = vq
−
1 +
1− F (θm)
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)], (4.13)
p∗2(q
+
2 ) = vq
+
2 +
F (θm)− F (θm2)
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)]. (4.14)
Having solved stage 3 of the game we can go back one stage to stage 2 where firm
2 chooses its optimal quality range. The problem of firm 2 is thus
maxq(θ),q+2 ,θm2 Π2 =
∫ θ(q+2 )
θm2
[u(q(θ), θ)−
∫ θ
θm2
∂u(q(τ),τ)
∂θ
dτ
+p∗2(q
+
2 )− u(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))− vq(θ)−
c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)d(θ)+∫ θm
θ(q+2 )
[p∗2(q
+
2 )− vq+2 ]f(θ)dθ.
Differentiating with respect to θm2 and q(θ) yields
(F (θm)− F (θm2))(∂u(q
?(θ?m),θ
?
m)
∂θ?m
)− f(θm2)
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)] =
f(θm2)[u(q(θm2), θm2)− c(q(θm2))f(θm2) + p
∗
2(q
+
2 )− u(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))− vq(θm2)]
(4.15)
and
∂u(q?(θ),θ)
∂q
−
(
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
)
∂2u(q?(θ),θ)
∂q∂θ
− v − c
′(q∗(θ))
f(θ)
= 0,
∀θ with θ(q+2 ) > θ ≥ θm2.
(4.16)
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Before differentiating with respect to q+2 it is helpful to decompose the profit func-
tion as Champsaur & Rochet (1989) do. Inserting p∗2(q
+
2 ) in Π2 yields
Π2 =
(F (θm)−F (θm2))2
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)]+∫ θ(q+2 )
θm2
[u(q(θ), θ))−
∫ θ
θm2
∂u(q(τ),τ)
∂θ
dτ − u(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))−
vq(θ) + vq+2 −
c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]]f(θ)d(θ).
(4.17)
The first term is dependent on q−1 and q
+
2 while the second term (the integral term)
is independent of q−1 .
94 In the following we denote the integral term by I(q+2 ). This
decomposition also shows that q+2 is only dependent on q
−
1 but not on the other qualities
firm 1 produces. The first order condition for q+2 is thus given by
−(F (θm)− F (θm2))
2
f(θm)
uθq(q
+
2 , θm) +
∂I(q+2 )
∂q
= 0 (4.18)
It is now possible to show that q+2 < q
−
1 .
Lemma 4.2
There is always a gap between the quality ranges of firm 1 and firm 2.
Proof
See the Appendix.
This result is different to Champsaur & Rochet (1989). If firms decide simultane-
ously about their qualities there can be equilibria where the quality ranges overlap and
firms make zero profits with these overlapping qualities.95
We can get an additional result. Differentiating equation (4.17) with respect to q−1
we get by using the Envelope Theorem
∂Π2
∂q−1
=
(F (θm)− F (θm2))2
f(θm)
uθq(q
−
1 , θm) > 0, (4.19)
94Champsaur & Rochet (1989) call the first term pure differentiation profit and the second term
pure segmentation profit.
95Champsaur & Rochet (1989) assume that there are no development costs, i.e. c(q) = 0. If such
development costs exists firms would make losses with overlapping qualities and they may decide not
to produce them even in the simultaneous move game. Despite this, in the sequential move game even
if c(q) = 0 product ranges would never overlap.
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where the inequality comes from the Single Crossing Property.
So firm 2’s profit is increasing if firm 2 produces a smaller quality range. But this
also implies that
∂q+2
∂q−1
> 0 so the lowest quality of firm 1 and the highest quality of firm
2 are strategic complements. Firm 1 will take this into account in its decision of Q1 in
stage 1.
Let us now turn to stage 1. As in Section 4.3 firm 1 has two possibilities either to
accommodate entry or to deter entry. Let us look at each case in turn. If fixed costs are
low firm 1 finds it optimal to accommodate entry. Decomposing firm 1’s profit function
in the same way as firm 2’s profit function before we get a maximisation problem of
maxq(θ),q−1 Π1 =
(1−F (θm))2
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)]+∫ 1
θ(q−1 )
[u(q(θ), θ))−
∫ θ
θ(q−1 )
∂u(q(τ),τ)
∂θ
dτ − u(q−1 , θ(q−1 ))
−vq(θ) + vq−1 −
c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]]f(θ)d(θ).
In the following we call the integral term I(q−1 ).
We get two first order conditions
∂u(q?(θ),θ)
∂q
−
(
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
)
∂2u(q?(θ),θ)
∂q∂θ
− v − c
′(q∗(θ))
f(θ)
= 0,
∀θ with θ(q−1 ) ≤ θ ≤ 1.
(4.20)
and
−1− F (θm))
2
f(θm)
(uθq(q
−
1 , θm)− uθq(q+2 , θm)
∂q+2
∂q−1
) +
∂I(q−1 )
∂q
= 0. (4.21)
From the first of these two equations it is apparent that all types θ(q−1 ) ≤ θ ≤ 1 get
the same quality as in monopoly because this equation coincides with equation (4.9).
All types θm ≤ θ < θ(q−1 ) get a higher quality because they buy q−1 which is above q(θ)
in the monopoly case given by equation (4.9).
The term uθq(q
+
2 , θm)
∂q+2
∂q−1
in equation (4.21) is greater than zero because we know
that
∂q+2
∂q−1
> 0. This expresses that with a change in q−1 firm 1 can change firm 2’s
reaction in stage 2. In the model of Champsaur & Rochet (1989) this term does not
exist because qualities are chosen simultaneously. Thus the incumbent produces a
larger quality range than with a simultaneous quality choice to shift firm 2’s upper
quality downwards.
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Let us now look at the case where firm 1 deters entry of firm 2. From equation
(4.17) we know that q+2 does only depend on q
−
1 and from equation (4.19)
∂Π2
∂q−1
> 0.
So if firm 1 wants to deter entry it has to enlarge its quality range compared with
the monopoly situation. The intuition is straightforward. There is less space in the
product range left for firm 2 because firm 1 has occupied more quality levels and if
fixed entry costs F are high enough firm 2 founds it not profitable to enter. Let us
denote the quality range Q1 which deters entry by Q
ED
1 = [q
ED
1 , q
+
1 ] where Q
ED
1 is given
by Π2(Q
ED
1 , Q2(Q
ED
1 )) = 0.
We are now in a position to describe the equilibrium of the game:
• If ΠED1 > Πduo1 then Q∗1 = [qED1 , q+1 ], where q∗(θ) is given by (4.9), firm 2 does not
enter in stage 2 and prices are given by p?(θ) = u(q?(θ), θ)−
∫ θ
θEDm
∂u(q?(τ),τ)
∂θ
dτ .
• If ΠED1 ≤ Πduo1 then Q∗1 = [q−1 , q+1 ] where q∗(θ) is given by (4.20), q−1 is given by
(4.21). Firm 2 enters in stage 2 and produces a quality range of Q∗2 = [q
−
2 , q
+
2 ]
where q∗(θ) is given by (4.16), q+2 is given by (4.18) and θ
∗
m2 is given by (4.15).
Prices of the firm are given by (4.11), (4.12), (4.13), and (4.14).
This equilibrium can be compared with the monopoly outcome with regard to con-
sumer rent and welfare. First we analyse the case where firm 2 enters. Comparing
welfare of market entry with welfare under pure monopoly we get the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 4.6
Welfare in case of market entry is higher than under monopoly if and only
if∫ θ(q−1 )
θduo∗m
[u(q−1 , θ(q
−
1 ))− u(q(θ), θ)− vq−1 + vq(θ) +
c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)dθ − c(q−1 )− F
+
∫ θmon∗m
θ∗m2
[u(q(θ), θ)− vq(θ)− c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)dθ
>
∫ θduo∗m
θ(q+2 )
[u(q(θ), θ)− u(q+2 , θ(q+2 ) + vq−1 − vq(θ)−
c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)dθ + c(q+2 ).
(4.22)
Proof
See the Appendix.
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If firm 2 enters some consumers stay with firm 1, others switch to firm 2, while a
third group which has not bought in monopoly does now buy from firm 2. Types θ
with θ(q−1 ) ≤ θ < 1 stay at firm 1 and get the same quality as in monopoly. This can
be seen from the first order conditions of the quality maximisation, (4.9) and (4.20).
Consumers between θduo∗m and θ(q
−
1 ) are consuming higher quality in duopoly, namely
q−1 , than in monopoly. This leads to a rise in welfare. But consumers between θ
duo∗
m
and θ(q+2 ) are now getting a lower quality, q
+
2 , than in monopoly because they buy
from firm 2. Consumers with a θ below θ(q+2 ) but above θ
mon∗
m buy the same quality
as before since equations (4.9) and (4.16) coincide. Customer types θmon∗m > θ ≥ θ∗m2
have not bought in monopoly but are buying now from firm 2.
Thus we have two sources for a welfare increase, namely that more consumers are served
and that types between θduo∗m and θ(q
−
1 ) buy higher quality. But there are two sources
for a welfare loss as well, namely that types between θ(q+2 ) and θ
duo∗
m buy lower quality
and the fixed costs of entry F . The overall effect on welfare is therefore ambiguous.
But we can say more about consumer rent.
Proposition 4.7
Consumer rent in case of market entry is always higher than in monopoly.
Proof
See the Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is simple. In monopoly the marginal consumer
θmon∗m gets zero rent. But in duopoly there is competition for this consumer. Thus he
gets a positive utility. But because the incentive compatibility constraints have to be
satisfied this leads to an increase of the rents for all types above. Since more consumers
are served in duopoly utility for the types below θmon∗m weakly increases as well.
Now let us turn to the case where firm 1 deters entry. As was already mentioned
firm 1 deters entry by enlarging its product line and producing more qualities than in
the monopoly case. So more people are served. But since the incentive compatibility
constraints must be satisfied this results in lower prices for all consumers who bought
already in the monopoly case. Thus we get the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.8
If the incumbent can produce a range of qualities welfare and consumer
rent in case of entry deterrence are higher than in case of pure monopoly.
The proof is omitted.
This result can be contrasted with the result of Section 4.3 where firms can produce
only one quality level. If in that case qualities are strategic complements welfare in
case of entry deterrence is lower because the incumbent distorts its quality downwards.
In case of price discrimination the lowest quality of the incumbent and the highest
one of the entrant are strategic complements. This results in an enlargement of the
quality range in the segment of low qualities and increases welfare. The rent for every
consumer who buys is higher than in monopoly as well because only the marginal one
gets zero utility and prices for the ’old’ consumers are lower to prevent them from
buying lower qualities.
It is also interesting to investigate under which conditions it is more profitable for
an incumbent to deter entry than to accommodate entry.
Proposition 4.9
There exists a threshold value v′. If v < v′ the incumbent deters entry, if
v ≥ v′ entry is accommodated.
Proof
The incumbent’s profit if entry is deterred is given by
ΠED1 =
∫ 1
θm(qED1 )
[u(q(θ), θ)− vq(θ)−
∫ θ
θEDm
∂u(q?(τ), τ)
∂θ
dτ − c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)dθ.
If entry is accommodated profit is given by
Πduo1 =
∫ θ(q−1 )
θduom
[1−F (θm)
f(θm)
][uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)]f(θ)dθ+∫ 1
θ(q−1 )
[u(q(θ), θ))−
∫ θ
θ(q−1 )
∂u(q(τ),τ)
∂θ
dτ − u(q−1 , θ(q−1 ))−
c(q(θ))
f(θ)
−
vq(θ) + vq−1 +
1−F (θm)
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)−
c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)d(θ).
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Thus entry is deterred if ΠED1 > Π
duo
1 . Rearranging terms yields∫ θ(q−1 )
θED1
[u(q(θ), θ))−
∫ θ
θ(q−1 )
∂u(q(τ),τ)
∂θ
dτ − vq(θ)− c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)d(θ)
+
∫ 1
θ(q−1 )
[u(q−1 , θ(q
−
1 ))− vq−1 −
c(q(θ))
f(θ)
− 1−F (θm)
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)]f(θ)d(θ)
≥
∫ 1
θ(q−1 )
[1−F (θm)
f(θm)
][uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)]f(θ)dθ.
The right hand side is independent of v while the left hand side is strictly
decreasing in v. Thus there exists a value v′ below which the left hand side
is higher and above which the right hand side is higher.
q.e.d.
Thus if v is small the incumbent deters entry. The intuition is that in order to
deter entry the incumbent has to enlarge its product line. This is costly for him. But
if costs are small it pays the incumbent to bear these costs to enjoy monopoly power
afterwards. If instead costs are high this enlargement is not profitable. The incumbent
reduces its product line to save on costs but faces competition from the entrant. In
the next section we provide two examples that seem to fit very well with the results of
our theory.
4.6 Empirical Examples
As in Section 4.4 in this section we present two empirical examples from different
industries that seem to resonate well with our theory.
4.6.1 Airline Industry
In Europe deregulation of the air transportation market started in the late 1980’s and
lasted till 1993. The European Council of Ministers decided to launch three ’liberalisa-
tion packages’ but only the last one which was launched in 1993 really caused market
liberalisation. After this package each airline was allowed to offer services with no
restrictions either on prices or on routes.96
96See Doganis (2001).
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One of the most striking developments of this deregulation was the entry of the so
called ’no-frills’-airlines or low cost carriers starting in summer 1995 with Ryanair.97
These low cost carriers offer little or no services but demand prices which are very
cheap.98 Also the low cost carriers mainly fly to secondary airports like Stansted
instead of Heathrow in London or Frankfurt-Hahn instead of Frankfurt. So the quality
of these low cost carriers is obviously below that of the established airlines.
Usually all established airlines engage in second degree price discrimination. So
there can be two possible reactions of the established airlines to this entry threat.
They can either expand their quality range to deter entry in the low quality segment
or accommodate entry and reduce their quality range to lessen competition. From
Proposition 4.9 we would predict that if variable costs are high the reaction would be
a contraction of the quality range while if costs are low entry would be deterred by
introducing an own low cost carrier. In the airline industry there are examples of both
practices.
On long-haul routes the U.K. carrier British Airways focused on the business trav-
eller segment and reduced its quality range.99 The aim of British Airways was to offer
premium services and facilities to charge higher prices and attract a higher number of
business travellers. The segment of the leisure travellers was given away to the low
cost carriers.
On short-haul routes costs are to some extent cheaper than on long-haul routes.
For example, on intercontinental flights by regulation three or four pilots are needed
instead of only two as on continental flights and also more board personnel. This re-
sults in higher personnel costs. After a long-haul flight an airline is obliged to maintain
the aircraft because the engine has worked for a long time and the risk of a crash is
increased.100 This causes fewer capacity utilization of a long-haul plane and therefore
97For an extensive overview of low cost carriers in Europe see Gilroy, Lukas, & Volpart (2003).
98Recently there was an offer of Ryanair to fly from Salzburg (Austria) to London with return flight
for 1 Cent. Although the time of the flight was not attractive it is hard to imagine such an offer five
years ago.
99See Johnson & Myatt (2003), p. 708.
100See Doganis (2001).
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higher costs. As predicted by our theory the strategy of many established airlines on
short-haul routes was very different than the one on long-haul routes. As an example
we take the case of Lufthansa in Germany. In October 2002 the low cost carrier Ger-
manwings was founded which is an affiliate company of Eurowings. In turn, Lufthansa
holds 24.9% of Eurowings and has the option to enlarge its share up to 49%.101 Ger-
manwings operates mainly on routes in Germany which are offered by Lufthansa as
well. So the foundation of Germanwings can be seen as an entry deterrence strategy
of Lufthansa to occupy the lower market segment and to deter entry of competing low
cost carriers.102
A different interpretation for the introduction of a low cost carrier by an established
airline is given by Johnson & Myatt (2003). They argue that these low cost carriers
are introduced as fighting brands to other competitive low cost airlines. Without entry
of these competitors the subsidiary would not have been founded because of negative
effects on core operations but after entry the low quality segment is opened and the
established airline finds it profitable to enter. This might be true in case of GO which
was purchased by Easyjet in 2002. But in case of Lufthansa, Germanwings was clearly
introduced to deter entry of other low cost airlines and up to now no independent low
cost airline has entered the German market.
4.6.2 Brand-Controlled Generics in the Pharmaceutical Mar-
ket
In Subsection 4.4.2 we gave some evidence that prices of brand-name drugs increased
after the entry of generics. However, some patent-holding firms pursued a different
strategy namely to introduce a ’branded generic’, i.e. the same drug under a different
label. These branded generics were introduced shortly before patent expiration and
were priced below the prices of the branded drugs. Hollis (2003) reports that the
success of these branded generics in Canada was very impressive. While in the 1980’s
101See Gilroy, Lukas, & Volpert (2003).
102As mentioned in the introduction a similar strategy was pursued by British Airways and KLM.
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they had only a tiny share of total generic sales this share has grown to 34.6% in 1999
which is an amount in money terms of approximately $500 million.103 The reason was
obviously to deter entry of generic competitors as Scherer (2000) states:
In this way they (brand-name firms) gained a ”first mover advantage” in
the generic market, secured the leading share of generic sales, and perhaps
thereby discouraged some would-be generic suppliers from entering and
driving prices even lower.
However, not all brand name producers introduced these pseudo-generics. In the
US a study of the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1998) reports that among 112
drugs with generic competition only 13 sold its own generic products. But this is in
line with the predictions of our theory that not all firms expand their product line to
deter entry but only those with low costs. In Canada in the 1990’s, Altimed, a joint
venture of three brand-name firms, was created. The purpose of this joint venture was
to sell branded generics. For this three firms after the joint venture it was easily and
cheaply possible to sell generics. In contrast, in the US such a joint venture was not
created so brand name pharmaceutical firms have to bear higher costs of introducing
their own generics.104 This might be a reason why many of them found it profitable to
accommodate entry of generic competitors.
4.7 Conclusion
The reactions of incumbents on entry threats are very different. Some firms accom-
modate entry and prune their product line while others deter entry and expand their
product line. In the single quality case post-entry prices of incumbents in some markets
are higher than pre-entry prices while in other markets they are lower.
This paper analysed a model of vertical product differentiation where an incumbent
and an entrant can either produce a single quality or a quality range. We show that in
103See Hollis (2003).
104An important source for these costs is the fear of destroying the brand name. This fear was not
by present in case of Altimed because it emerged as an own brand rapidly.
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the single quality case the behaviour of the incumbent depends on the cost function and
on the nature of strategic competition (whether qualities are strategic complements or
strategic substitutes). We have shown that if qualities are strategic complements the
incumbent deters entry by reducing its quality which leads to a welfare loss compared
with monopoly. In case of entry accommodation quality might be lowered as well
to cause a quality reduction of the entrant and reduce price competition. With low
marginal costs quality of the incumbent increases after entry which results in a welfare
gain. Also if qualities are strategic substitutes the incumbent increases its quality to
differentiate itself from the entrant. If firms can produce a quality range the results
are different. To deter entry the incumbent has to enlarge its quality range and this
leads to a welfare increase. If entry is accommodated the consequences on welfare are
not clear because some consumers buy a higher quality while others buy a lower one.
We have not provided a substantial empirical analysis but have given examples
from different industries that seem to fit well with the predictions of our theory. Since
we relate the results to firm’s cost functions which are observable in many industries
we give predictions which are potentially testable.
To conclude the paper we want to discuss some policy implications resulting from
our theory. Let us first look at the case where production of a quality range is pos-
sible. In this case we find that the effects on welfare are positive in case of entry
deterrence and unclear in case of entry accommodation but consumer rent increases
in both cases.105 This leads to the conclusion that deregulation and potential entry
have positive consequences in industries in which it is possible to produce a quality
range. Thus governments should pursue the policy of free market entry and reduce
legal barriers like it was done in the deregulation of the airline industry in the US and
Europe.
The effects in the single quality case are not so clear. Whether welfare increases
105We have not done a welfare comparison between the case of entry deterrence and entry accommo-
dation. This is an interesting topic for further research because it can provide some policy implications,
e.g. if it should be allowed for incumbents to establish a subsidiary brand which produces a downgrade
version of the product.
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with potential entry depends heavily on the nature of competition. But normally it is
hard to assess if products are strategic complements or substitutes. Thus governments
should be careful in deregulating such markets because potential competition does not
necessarily lead to a welfare gain.
4.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.1
We first show that the monopolist provides too low quality.
Welfare is given by
WF =
∫ 1
θWFm
[u(q, θ)− vq]f(θ)dθ − c(q).
For a given q welfare is maximised if
∂WF
∂θWFm
= u(q, θWFm )− vq = 0. (4.23)
In monopoly θmonm is given by
u(q, θmonm )− vq =
1− F (θmonm )
f(θmonm )
uθ(q, θ
mon
m ). (4.24)
The left hand side of equation (4.24) is greater 0 while it is 0 in equation (4.23). Since
uθ(q, θ
mon
m ) > 0 it follows that θ
WF
m < θ
mon
m . Thus for a given q the monopolist serves
too few consumers.
Maximising welfare with respect to quality yields
∂
∫ 1
θWFm
[u(q, θ)f(θ)dθ]
∂q
= (1− F (θWFm ))v + c′(q). (4.25)
The equivalent formula for the monopolist is
(1− F (θmonm ))(uq(q, θmonm )− v) = c′(q). (4.26)
If both qualities were the same we can solve both equations (4.25) and (4.26) for c(q)
and get
∂
∫ 1
θWFm
[u(q, θ)f(θ)dθ]
∂q
− (1− F (θWFm ))v = (1− F (θmonm ))(uq(q, θmonm )− v).
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This can be written as
∂
∫ 1
θmonm
[(u(q, θ)− u(q, θmonm ))f(θ)dθ]
∂q
+
∂
∫ θmonm
θWFm
[u(q, θ)f(θ)dθ]
∂q
= (F (θmonm )− F (θWFm ))v.
The second term on the left hand side is the increase in utility for all consumers between
θmonm and θ
WF
m from a marginal increase in q. The term on the right hand side is the
increase in variable costs if consumers between θmonm and θ
WF
m are served. Thus the
second term on the left hand side must be higher than the right hand side because
otherwise it would not have been welfare maximising to serve consumers between θmonm
and θWFm . Since the first term on the left hand side is positive as well we get that the
first order condition for qWF is positive at qmon. Thus qWF > qmon.
Turning back to the comparison of marginal consumers we have shown in equations
(4.23) and (4.24) that if qWF = qmon then θWFm < θ
mon
m . But now we know that
qWF > qmon. A comparison of the left hand sides of (4.23) and (4.24) shows that for
θWFm = θ
mon
m the left hand side of (4.23) is higher. But since the right hand side of
(4.24) is higher it follows that θWFm < θ
mon
m .
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
If u(q, θ) = θq the marginal consumer in the monopoly case is given by θmq
mon
1 −
pmon1 = 0 or θm = p
mon
1 /q
mon
1 . This yields a first order condition for θm of
1− F (θmonm )− f(θmonm )(θmonm − v) = 0.
In duopoly the marginal consumer θduom1 who is indifferent between buying from firm 1
and buying from firm 2 is given by θduom1 q1 − p1 = θduom1 q2 − p2 or θduom1 = p1−p2q1−q2 . The first
order condition for the incumbent is then
F
(
p1 − p2
q1 − q2
)
− f
(
p1 − p2
q1 − q2
)
p2 − vq2
q1 − q2
− F
(
p2
q2
)
− f
(
p2
q2
)(
p2
q2
− v
)
= 0
or
1− F (θ∗m1)− f(θ∗m1)(θ∗m1 −
p2 − v
q1 − q2
) = 0. (4.27)
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Evaluating (4.27) at θmon∗m yields
vq2 − p2 < 0.
Since the profit function is globally concave in θ this shows that θmon∗m > θ
∗
m1 so more
consumers are buying from firm 1 in duopoly.
Now we know that F (θmon∗m ) > F (θ
∗
m1). Thus the term
1
F (θmon∗m )−F (θ∗m1)
on the right
hand side in inequality (4.7) is positive. If qualities are strategic substitutes,
dq∗2
dq1
< 0,
the right hand side of inequality (4.7) is always higher than the left hand side since
v < uq1(q
mon∗
1 , θ
∗
m1). It follows that q
∗
1 > q
mon∗
1 .
Up to now we have shown that in duopoly quality of the incumbent is higher than in
monopoly and that in duopoly more consumers are served by the incumbent. Because
firm 2 is present as well there are some people who are not consuming in monopoly but
consume in duopoly from firm 2. So the only source for a welfare loss can be the fixed
costs F . But firm 2 only enters if Π2 > 0. Since p
∗
2 = u(q
∗
2, θ
∗
m2), Π2 must be lower
than the welfare gain because consumers between θ∗m2 and θ
∗
m1 still get a rent. Thus
the welfare gain which is induced by firm 2 is higher than F. Altogether welfare must
have been increased.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 4.5
Let us look at the case θ uniformly distributed, u(q, θ) = θq, v = 0, and c(q) = 1
2
q2.
Solving the first order conditions in the third stage of the game, equations (4.3) and
(4.4), we get
p1 =
2q1(q1 − q2)
4q1 − q2
p2 =
q2(q1 − q2
4q1 − q2
.
Inserting these values in the first order condition of firm 2 in stage 2, we get from
equation (4.5)
2q1−q2
4q1−q2 −
q1−q2
4q1−q2 (
2q1−q2
4q1−q2 −
6q21
(4q1−q2)2 )
+ q1−q2
4q1−q2 (
−q1
4q1−q2 +
6q21
(4q1−q2)2 )− q2 = 0.
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Simplifying and totally differentiating yields
dq1[64q
2
1(1− q2) + 2q22(2− q2) + q1q2(64q2 − 50)]
= dq2[64q
2
1(q1 − q2) + 25q21 + 36q1q22 − 4q2(q1 + q22)].
Both terms in brackets are always positive since q1 > q2. Thus we get
dq2
dq1
> 0.
q.e.d.
Proof of Lemma 4.1
The first step in this proof is to replace the incentive compatibility constraint
u(q(θ), θ)− p(θ) ≥ u(q(θ̂), θ)− p(θ̂) ∀θ, θ̂ ≥ θmonm
by
dq(θ)
dθ
≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ [θmonm , 1] (4.28)
and
∂u(q(θ), θ)
∂q
dq(θ)
dθ
+
dp(θ)
dθ
= 0 ∀θ ∈ [θmonm , 1]. (4.29)
This step is a standard one in the theory of adverse selection and the proof of it
can be found in many textbooks. See e.g. Fudenberg & Tirole (1991, chapter 7) or
Schmidt (1995, chapter 4).
We know that U(θ) = u(q(θ), θ)− p(θ).
Using (4.29) we get
dU(θ)
dθ
=
∂u(q(θ), θ)
∂q
dq(θ)
dθ
+
∂u(q(θ), θ)
∂θ
+
dp(θ)
dθ
=
∂u(q(θ), θ)
∂θ
.
Integrating both sides of this equation yields
U(θ) = U(θmonm ) +
∫ θ
θmonm
∂u(q(τ), τ)
∂θ
dτ.
Because firm 1 wants to maximise the payoff from consumers, the participation con-
straint must bind for θ = θmonm , which implies U(θ
mon
m ) = 0 and therefore
U(θ) =
∫ θ
θmonm
∂u(q(τ), τ)
∂θ
dτ.
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Equation (4.8) follows.
Now we have determined the prices for a given quality range. In the first stage the
marginal consumer θmonm and the quality q(θ) assigned to each type has to be deter-
mined.
The maximisation problem of firm 1 can be written as
maxq(θ),θmonm
∫ 1
θmonm
[u(q(θ), θ)− vq(θ)−
∫ θ
θmonm
∂u(q(τ),τ)
∂τ
dτ ]f(θ)dθ −
∫ 1
θmonm
c(q(θ))dθ
s.t. dq(θ)
dθ
≥ 0.
After integration by parts we get
max
q(θ),θmonm
∫ 1
θmonm
[u(q(θ), θ)− vq(θ)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
∂u(q(θ), θ)
∂θ
− c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)dθ. (4.30)
Pointwise differentiation with respect to q(θ) yields (4.9).
Differentiation with respect to θmonm yields (4.10).
Because of Assumptions in A1, A2, and A3 all second order conditions and condition
(4.28) are satisfied.
q.e.d.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
From equation (4.18) we know that the first order condition for q+2 is given by
−(F (θm)− F (θm2))
2
f(θm)
uθq(q
+
2 , θm) +
∂I(q+2 )
∂q
= 0.
We have to show that the derivative of the profit function with respect to q+2 is
negative at q+2 = q
−
1 . Integrating by parts and differentiating the term in the integral,
I(q+2 ), with respect to q
+
2 we get
∂I(q+2 )
∂q+2
= −[uq(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))− v]f(θ(q+2 ))− uθq(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))[F (θ(q+2 ))− F (θm2)]−
c′(q+2 )
f(θ)
= ∂
∂θ
([−uq(q+2 , θ(q+2 )) + v][F (θ(q+2 ))− F (θm2)])−
c′(q+2 )
f(θ)
.
Thus
∂Π2(q
−
1 ,q
+
2 =q
−
1 )
∂q+2
=
−[uq(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))− v][F (θ(q+2 ))− F (θm2)]−
(F (θm)−F (θm2))2
f(θm)
uθq(q
+
2 , θm)−
c′(q+2 )
f(θ)
=
(F (θ(q+2 ))−F (θm2))
2
f(θ(q+2 ))
uθq(q
+
2 , θ(q
+
2 ))−
(F (θm)−F (θm2))2
f(θm)
uθq(q
+
2 , θm),
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where the first equality follows from the fact that
∫ θ(q+2 )
θm
∂
∂θ
([−uq(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))+v][F (θ(q+2 ))−F (θm2)])f(θ)dθ = [−uq(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))+v][F (θ(q+2 ))−F (θm2)]
and the second equality follows from equation (4.16).
We know that θ(q+2 ) < θm so it remains to check that uθq
(F (θ)−F (θm2))2
f(θ)
is increasing in
θ.
We have
∂
∂θ
[uθq
(F (θ)−F (θm2))2
f(θ)
] =
uθq[2(F (θ)− F (θm2))− (F (θ)−F (θm2))
2f ′(θ)
(f(θ))2
] + uθθq(
(F (θ)−F (θm2))2
f(θ)
) > 0
because of Assumptions A2 and A3.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 4.6
We first show that θm2 < θ
mon
m .
θm2 is given by the first order condition
(F (θ∗m)− F (θm2))(
∂u(q?(θ?m),θ
?
m)
∂θ?m
− f(θm2)
f(θ∗m)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θ
∗
m)− uθ(q+2 , θm)] =
f(θm2)[u(q(θm2), θm2)− c(q(θm2))f(θm2) + p2(θ
∗
m)− u(q+2 , θ(q+2 ))− vq(θm2)].
θmonm is given by the first order condition
[u(qmon?(θmon?m ), θ
mon?
m )− vqmon?(θmon?m )]f(θmon?m )− c(qmon∗(θ∗))
= (1− F (θmon?m ))
∂u(qmon?(θmon?m ),θ
mon?
m )
∂θmon?m
.
Inserting θmon?m in the first order condition for θm2 yields
−f(θ
mon?
m )
f(θm)
[uθ(q
−
1 , θm)− uθ(q+2 , θm)]
< f(θmon?m )p2(θm)− u(q+2 , θ(q+2 )) + (1− F (θm))
∂u(qmon?(θmon?m ),θ
mon?
m )
∂θmon?m
.
Thus θm2 < θ
mon
m , more consumers are served after entry than in pure monopoly.
Now let us turn to the welfare comparison. Consumers with θ(q−1 ) ≤ θ ≤ 1 and
with θmon?m ≤ θ < θ(q+2 ) get the same quality under monopoly and under duopoly.
This is obvious because equations (4.9) and (4.16) and also equations (4.9) and (4.20)
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coincide. Consumers between θduom and θ(q
−
1 ) consume a higher quality in duopoly,
namely q−1 , than in monopoly, while consumers between θ(q
+
2 ) and θ
duo
m consume a
lower one, namely (q+2 ). Therefore we have that welfare under market entry is only
higher if ∫ θ(q−1 )
θduom
[u(q−1 , θ(q
−
1 ))− vq−1 ]f(θ)dθ − c(q−1 )− F
+
∫ θduom
θ(q+2 )
[u(q+2 , θ(q
+
2 ))− vq+2 ]f(θ)dθ − c(q+2 ) +
∫ θmonm
θ∗m2
[u(q(θ), θ)− vq(θ)− c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)dθ
>
∫ θ(q−1 )
θ(q+2 )
[u(q(θ), θ)− vq(θ)− c(q(θ))
f(θ)
]f(θ)dθ.
Rearranging terms yields equation (4.22).
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 4.7
All types θ(q−1 ) < θ ≤ 1 get the same quality in duopoly than monopoly but have
to pay a price of
pduo1 (θ) = u(q(θ), θ)−
∫ θ
θ(q−1 )
∂u(q(τ), τ)
∂θ
dτ + p1(θm)− u(q−1 , θ(q−1 )).
This can also be written as pduo1 (θ) = p
mon
1 (θ)+p1(θ
duo
m )−u(q−1 , θ(q−1 )) < pmon1 (θ). Thus
the price in duopoly is lower than in monopoly.
Types θ ≤ θ(q+2 ) get the same quality in duopoly as in monopoly if they are served
in both cases. The price under duopoly is pduo2 (θ) = p
mon
1 (θ)+p2(θ
duo
m )−u(q+2 , θ(q+2 )) <
pmon1 (θ) and thus below the price in monopoly. Since in duopoly more consumer types
are served as well, the consumer rent for types θ ≤ θ(q+2 ) is weakly higher in duopoly
than in monopoly.
The utility for types θ(q−1 ) ≥ θ > θ(q+2 ) in monopoly is given by
∫ θ
θmonm
∂u(q(τ),τ)
∂θ
dτ .
with θ increasing utility is increasing by ∂u(q(θ),θ)
∂θ
. In duopoly for types θ > θ(q+2 ) utility
is u(q+2 , θ(q
+
2 ))−p2(q+2 ), and for types θ(q−1 ) ≥ θ utility is given by u(q−1 , θ(q−1 ))−p1(q−1 ).
Starting at type θ(q+2 ), if θ increases utility increases by uθ(q
+
2 , θ) up to θ
duo
m and by
uθ(q
−
1 , θ) from θ
duo
m up to θ(q
−
1 ). But since we know that U(θ(q
+
2 ))
duo > U(θ(q+2 ))
mon
and U(θ(q−1 ))
duo > U(θ(q−1 ))
mon for all types in between θ(q+2 ) and θ(q
−
1 ) utility in
duopoly must be higher than in monopoly as well. Thus consumer rent increases.
q.e.d.
Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
This chapter provides a few concluding remarks on the three models presented in this
thesis. In the first part of the chapter I point out some limitations of the models and
a few interesting issues that are not addressed and give a direction for future research.
In the second part I present some ideas how the models can be interrelated.
In the model on commodity bundling I pointed out that the correlation of reser-
vation prices is the crucial variable in determining profits not only in monopoly but
in duopoly as well, yet, with opposite consequences. Such an analysis was not done
before and the model can be seen as a first step in this direction. The correlation was
modelled in a special way to keep the model tractable. It would be interesting to see
if the model can be generalised. This could be done in a similar framework by drop-
ping the assumption of a one-to-one mapping of locations and allowing for uncertainty
as described in Section 2.8. But one might also find a different framework than the
product differentiation one which is appropriate to model the consequences of different
correlations on competition with bundling. However, my intuition is that the results
of the model are quite robust. The reason is that the bundle always makes the sum
of consumers’ valuations more similar. While this helps a monopolist to extract more
consumer rent it leads to intensified competition in duopoly.
The field of two-sided markets is a relatively new one in economics and there are
several new and interesting ideas for further research. In my model advertisers are
local monopolists on the product market and consumers do not get a positive utility
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from getting aware of a new product because firms can extract all consumer rent. This
assumption greatly simplifies the analysis and all models in this literature use it. But
it does not allow for product market competition between advertisers. This might
be a fruitful direction for further research. In this case one side of the market, the
advertisers, interact via two channels (on platforms and in the product market) and
this may lead to new results.107 A second aspect which is not considered in my model
is that platforms can invest their revenues from advertising in the content they provide.
So platforms that broadcast advertising which yields higher revenues can therefore be
”qualitatively” better.108 To the best of my knowledge, no model exists that addresses
this issue. Such a model may yield the realistic result of an asymmetric equlibrium
in which one platform has little advertising earnings and provides low quality while
the other platform’s advertising yields higher revenues and enables it to provide higher
quality.
In the model on vertical product differentiation the welfare effects of allowing for
price discrimination or not are studied. I consider a special comparison namely unit
pricing versus second-degree price discrimination. But it would also be interesting
to study the effects of other pricing regimes. As an example consider the case of
third-degree price discrimination, e.g. firms can distinguish between students and
non-students. Then it might be possible that the entrant chooses to enter only one
market, namely the non-student one where consumers have higher valuations. But if
third-degree price discrimination were not possible the incumbent could prevent entry
because it produces a middle quality range as in my model. In this case the ability to
price discriminate hurts the incumbent and benefits the entrant.
Let us now look at possible interrelations between the models.
Consider for example the bundling practice of US telephone companies which sell long
107An attempt in this direction is the paper by Gal-Or & Dukes (2003) who model this interaction in
a radio-station example. However, the problem in their model is that although listeners get informed
by a commercial about cheap prices and derive positive utility from it, this is not represented in their
utility function. Thus their model is inconsistent in this respect.
108Quality here means that this platform’s content attracts more users.
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distance service and internet access in a package. Verizon offers a bundle which is
obviously designed for lower value consumers (”Verizon Freedom Options” at a price
of $39.95) but also another one for higher value consumers (”Verizon Freedom with
DSL” at a price of $69.90). Thus it engages in second-degree price discrimination
with bundles. So there is a connection between the models of chapter two and four.
We have vertical differentiation between bundles but horizontal differentiation between
the goods of which the bundles consist of. Since correlation matters in case of only
horizontal differentiation one might guess that it should also matter in case of vertical
product differentiation, e.g. if a consumer who values internet access highly also has
a high valuation for long distance services. So a detailed analysis might reveal under
which circumstances it is profitable to offer vertical differentiated bundles both in
monopoly and in duopoly.109
There can also be an interrelation between the models in chapter two and three.
Consider the market for credit cards. In this market Visa or MasterCard offer in addi-
tion to their usual credit card (e.g. Visa classic) some upgrade cards (e.g. Visa gold)
that are only attractive for consumers with higher income. In contrast to the standard
analysis of second-degree price discrimination this practice now has consequences for
the other side of the market, here the merchants. Several questions arise. What are
the effects on prices on the other side of the market? Will they be lowered (increased)
in case of positive (negative) externalities in order to make higher profits with the
side where price discrimination is possible? What are the welfare consequences of this
practice? Is it easier to deter entry in this case or not? All these questions are of both
theoretical and practical relevance. I am convinced that a lot of fruitful research can
be done in this area.
109For a starting point of research in the direction of monopoly see Armstrong (1999).
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